Abstract
We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model ofa competitive political economy in which the economic interestsof groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibriumpolicy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP taxmodel, calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAPhouseholds into homogeneous groups affects the numericalrepresentation of interests and influence for representativemembers of each group.
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Hotte, L., Winer, S.L. Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: With Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983. Public Choice 109, 69–99 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012059101225
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012059101225