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Performance, Promotion and Information

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Abstract

If a firm provides incentives by promoting those who have performed well in a job, it may transfer them to a job to which they are not well suited and agents are promoted to their levels of incompetence. Tournaments are an alternative to reputation as a means of ensuring that firms reward good performance when performance is unverifiable.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Management, FEI, Slovak University of Technology, Ilkovicova 3, 81209, Bratislava, Slovakia

    Zajac Jaroslav

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  1. Zajac Jaroslav
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Jaroslav, Z. Performance, Promotion and Information. Journal of Business Ethics 50, 187–198 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BUSI.0000022124.95071.0c

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:BUSI.0000022124.95071.0c

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