Abstract
According to the thesis of epistemic conservatism it would be unreasonable to change one's beliefs in the absence of any good reasons. Although it is claimed that epistemic conservatism has informed and resolved a number of positions and problems in epistemology, it is difficult to identify a single representative view of the thesis. This has resulted in advancing a series of disparate and largely unconnected arguments to establish conservatism. In this paper, I begin by casting doubt on the claim of widespread and genuine applications of the conservative policy. I then distinguish between three main varieties of epistemic conservatism, namely, differential, perseverance and generation conservatism Having evaluated various arguments that have been offered or may be considered on behalf of the conservative thesis, I close by concluding that those versions of the thesis that survive critical scrutiny fail to live up to the aspirations of the thesis as a substantive canon of rationality, that to the extent that principles of conservatism are epistemically promising, they are not plausible. While to the extent that they are plausible, they are not of much epistemic interest.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Adler, J.: 1990, 'Conservatism and Tacit Confirmation',Mind 99, 559–570.
Alston, W.: 1989, Epistemic Justification, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Cherniak, C.: 1986, Minimal Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Chisholm, R.: 1980, 'A Version of Foundationalism' in Wettstein, et al (eds),Midwest Studies in Philosophy V, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN.
Christensen, D.: 1994, 'Conservatism in Epistemology', Nous 28, 69–89.
Davidson, D.: 1984, 'Radical Interpretation', reprinted in Inquires into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon, Oxford.
Foley, R.: 1982, 'Epistemic Conservatism', Philosophical Studies 43, 165–182.
Foley, R.: 1987, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Goldman, A.: 1979, 'Varieties of Epistemic Appraisal', Nous 13, 23–38.
Goldman, A.: 1986, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard, Cambridge, MA.
Goldman, A.: 1999, 'Internalism Exposed',The Journal of Philosophy 96, 271–293.
Goldman, A.: 2001, 'The Unity of Epistemic Virtue' in Fairweather and Zagzebski (eds), Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press.
Goldstick, D.: 1971, 'Methodological Conservatism',American Philosophical Quarterly 8, 186–191.
Harman, G.: 1986, Change in View, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Lycan, W.: 1988, Judgement and Justification, Cambridge University Press.
Sklar, L.: 1975, 'Methodological Conservatism', Philosophical Review LXXIV, 186–191.
Quine, W. V. O.: 1951, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd edn.,Harper & Row, New York.
Vahid, H.: 2001, 'Charity, Supervenience, and Skepticism', Metaphilosophy 32, 308–325.
Vogel, J.: 1992, 'Sklar on Methodological Conservatism',Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 125–131.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vahid, H. Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 141, 97–122 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035849.62840.e8
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035849.62840.e8