Abstract
This paper argues that philosophical critiques of concepts in psychotherapy are inappropriate unless the context in which they are used is taken into account. In the case of REBT it is misleading to try to evaluate Ellis' use of ‘rationality’ by matching it with the concept which has developed in modern philosophy of science. There is no pure essence of rationality which could enable it to be applied normatively in all contexts. The pitfalls of attempting this are illustrated by analysing two recent attempts to criticise ‘rationality’ in REBT, by Erwin (1997) and O'Donohue and Vass (1996). We argue that ‘Rationality’ in REBT can only be understood by seeing it as part of a network of categories and practices (a ‘discursive formation’) that has evolved over the last 45 years.
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Dryden, W., Still, A. REBT and Rationality: Philosophical Approaches. Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy 16, 77–99 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024920326970
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024920326970