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Generalized Change and the Meaning of Rationality Postulates

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Abstract

The standard theory of belief revision was developed to describe how a rational agent should change his beliefs in the presence of new information. Many interesting tools were created, but the concept of rationality was usually assumed to be related to classical logics.

In this paper, we explore the fact that the logical tools used can be extended to other sorts of logics, as proved in (Hansson and Wassermann, 2002), to describe models that are closer to the rationality of a real agent.

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Wassermann, R. Generalized Change and the Meaning of Rationality Postulates. Studia Logica 73, 299–319 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022992115613

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