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Characterizations of scoring methodsfor preference aggregation

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Abstract

The paper surveys more than forty characterizations of scoring methods for preferenceaggregation and contains one new result. A general scoring operator is self-consistent ifalternative i is assigned a greater score than j whenever i gets no worse (better) results ofcomparisons and its “opponents” are assigned, respectively, greater (no smaller) scores thanthose of j. We prove that self-consistency is satisfied if and only if the application of ascoring operator reduces to the solution of a homogeneous system of algebraic equationswith a monotone function on the left-hand side.

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Authors
  1. Pavel Yu. Chebotarev
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  2. Elena Shamis
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Chebotarev, P., Shamis, E. Characterizations of scoring methodsfor preference aggregation. Annals of Operations Research 80, 299–332 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018928301345

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