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Modeling Instrumental Rationality, Land Tenure and Conflict Resolution

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Abstract

Full instrumental rationality and perfect institutions are two cornerstoneassumptions underlying neoclassical models. However, in the real world, thesetwo assumptions never hold, especially not in developing countries. In thispaper, we develop a game theoretical model to investigate if relaxations inthe full instrumental rationality and perfect institutions premise can explainthe conflicts that have been occurring between the various principals in theNarok district in Kenya with regard to land tenure and use.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Tinbergen Institute, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Hans M. Amman

  2. International Institute for Sustainable Development, 161 Potage Avenue, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 0Y4, Canada

    Anantha Kumar Duraiappah

Authors
  1. Hans M. Amman
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  2. Anantha Kumar Duraiappah
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Amman, H.M., Duraiappah, A.K. Modeling Instrumental Rationality, Land Tenure and Conflict Resolution. Computational Economics 18, 251–257 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014811703866

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014811703866

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