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Barriers to Mobility in Europe's Civil Aviation Markets: Theory and New Evidence

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Abstract

A questionnaire-based survey is applied to investigate the perception of mobilitybarriers by European airline managers. Whilst the liberalisation of Europe's airline markets removed regulatory mobility barriers, we find that mobility impediments still appear to exist. Potential entrants moreover, perceive some mobility barriers as significantly more effective than others. The perceived effectiveness of a particular mobility barrier varies considerably among airline managers. We also provide an overview of previous studies on the contestability hypothesis and the effectiveness of endogenous (strategic) mobility barriers. Our results support earlier findings for the U.S. to the effect that barriers to mobility are perceived to exist and matter. Whilst our results are clearly subjective, as they are based on the perceptions of managers, we believe such perceptions matter as they inform managerial actions. In this sensewe believe our results are of value.

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Pitelis, C.N., Schnell, M.C.A. Barriers to Mobility in Europe's Civil Aviation Markets: Theory and New Evidence. Review of Industrial Organization 20, 127–150 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013828420609

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