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Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance

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  1. Department of Economics, London University, Royal Holloway

    Anthony Heyes

  2. London University, Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 OBD, England

    Anthony Heyes

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Heyes, A. Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance. Journal of Regulatory Economics 17, 107–129 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008157410380

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