Abstract
In his paper ‘Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Reply to My Critics’, N. Tennant (1997b) reacts to the critical reception of an earlier article of his. The present note rectifies some of the most serious misrepresentations in Tennant's reply.
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Hansson, SO., Rott, H. Beyond Recovery? a Reply to Tennant. Erkenntnis 49, 387–392 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005495400861
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005495400861