Abstract
Inter-service rivalry over budget allocations between the Japanese Imperial Navy and the Imperial Army played a crucial role in the genesis of World War Two in the Pacific. The adoption of a nanshin (“southward advance”) strategy by the Navy may be explained as an attempt to maximize its budget leading directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. To date, this argument has been presented in the form of historical narrative without any explanatory theoretical framework. The present paper seeks to place inter-service budgetary rivalry within the context of public choice theory to enhance understanding of this historical perspective.
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Dollery, B., Spindler, Z. & Parsons, C. Nanshin: Budget-Maximizing Behavior, the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Origins of the Pacific War. Public Organization Review 4, 135–155 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PORJ.0000031626.61125.6c
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PORJ.0000031626.61125.6c