Abstract
Well-specified property rightsenhance economic performance but vary considerably across countries.The failure of numerous nation-states to adopt growth-enhancinginstitutions is paradoxical. This paper examines the role ofethnic and linguistic diversity in retarding the developmentof growth-enhancing property rights and in-turn economic growth.The data show that property rights are attenuated in more diversepolities and economic growth is correspondingly lower.
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Norton, S.W. The Cost of Diversity: Endogenous Property Rights and Growth. Constitutional Political Economy 11, 319–337 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026567305485
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026567305485