Abstract
The generality principle, advocatedby Buchanan and Congleton (1998), requires that political decisionstreat all citizens equally qua citizens. The effects of implementingsuch a constitutional rule on lobbying, public expenditures,economic efficiency, and disposable incomes are explored. Themain contribution is to propose a way of mitigating potentiallynegative effects not discussed by Buchanan and Congleton, especiallythe risk for “fiscal explosion.” It is suggested that if generalityis augmented with a rule stating that public expenditures asa share of GDP are not to rise, this will probably render generalitymore attractive than non-generality for most citizens.
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Berggren, N. Implementing Generality while Reducing the Risk for Fiscal Explosion. Constitutional Political Economy 11, 353–369 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026523623232
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026523623232