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Random Matching of Several Infinite Populations

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Abstract

Random matching models with infinite populations present formal difficulties due to the lack of a law of large numbers for a continuum of random variables. In a previous paper (Alós-Ferrer, 1999), random matching processes for a continuum of agents were studied, proving their existence. The present work extends the analysis to the case of several populations, which includes general equilibrium buyers–sellers models, and evolutionary models with underlying asymmetric games.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Vienna, Hohenstaufengasse, 9, A-1010, Vienna, Austria

    Carlos Alós-Ferrer

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  1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer
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Alós-Ferrer, C. Random Matching of Several Infinite Populations. Annals of Operations Research 114, 33–38 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021045732513

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021045732513

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