Abstract
Virtue theorists in ethics often embrace the following characterizationof right action: An action is right iff a virtuous agent would performthat action in like circumstances. Zagzebski offers a parallel virtue-basedaccount of epistemically justified belief. Such proposals are severely flawedbecause virtuous agents in adverse circumstances, or through lack ofknowledge can perform poorly. I propose an alternative virtue-based accountaccording to which an action is right (a belief is justified) for an agentin a given situation iff an unimpaired, fully-informed virtuous observerwould deem the action to be right (the belief to be justified).
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Kawall, J. Virtue Theory and Ideal Observers. Philosophical Studies 109, 197–222 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019673427556
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019673427556