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The Determinants of REIT CEO Compensation

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Abstract

Executive compensation has garnered much attention in the last decade from both academicians and practitioners. We examine the relationship between increase in CEO compensation, industry-specific performance measures, and stock return for the years 1993–1999 in the Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) industry. We find evidence that compensation evaluation is related to stock returns, and to changes in Real Estate Investment and Funds from Operation for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. Furthermore, we document a negative relation between CEO raise and age. We find no link between compensation and earnings per share, whether the REIT is self-managed, or type of property in which the REIT specializes.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics and Finance, Louisiana Tech University, Box 10318, College of Business, Ruston, LA, 71270, USA

    Anita K. Pennathur

  2. Finance Department, Ohio University, 234 Copeland Hall, Athens, OH, 40571-2979, USA

    Roger M. Shelor

Authors
  1. Anita K. Pennathur
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  2. Roger M. Shelor
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Pennathur, A.K., Shelor, R.M. The Determinants of REIT CEO Compensation. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 25, 99–113 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015329002700

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