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Normische Gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedeutung des nichtmonotonen Schliessens

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Abstract

Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoningfor Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form `if A thennormally B'. They have been discovered in the explanation debate,but were considered as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue thatthe prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws impliesstatistical normality (§2), whence normic laws have empiricalcontent. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws isnonmonotonic, and why the understanding of the individual caseis so important here. After sketching some foundations ofnonmonotonic reasoning as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understandceteris paribus laws (§6). §7 deals with the differencebetween physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with thedifference between normicity and approximation. In §8 it isshown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding ofthe protection of theories against falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- andevolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason for theomnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality.

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    Gerhard Schurz

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Schurz, G. Normische Gesetzeshypothesen und die wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedeutung des nichtmonotonen Schliessens. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 32, 65–107 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011209401546

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