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Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models: A Constructive Critique

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Abstract

A fundamental property of any good theoryis logical consistency. However, two commonassumptions in the rational choice approach topolitical analysis (that induced preferences overpolicy are separable and that such preferences areindependent of changes in exogenous factors) are notconsistent with the archetypal assumptions ofindividual utility maximization. These particularpathologies of spatial models of politics have notbeen well recognized in the political scienceliterature.

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  1. Department of Economics, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 02155, U.S.A.

    Jeffrey Milyo

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  1. Jeffrey Milyo
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Milyo, J. Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models: A Constructive Critique. Public Choice 105, 273–289 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005203611524

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