Abstract
In this comment it is argued that the game-theoretical analysis presented by Rasmusen (1993) is incomplete. First, a short description of his model is given, then a proposition stating all equilibria of the model is presented. The proposition supplements the analysis of Rasmusen by showing that an, in our view plausible, equilibrium is ignored. Thereupon a comprehensive equilibrium analysis leads us to qualify his argument; lobbying does not always fully substitute for independent investigation, truthful lobbying is not successful, and a lobbyist having the ‘right’ information does not always gets his way.
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References
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Rasmusen, E. (1993). Lobbying when the decision maker can acquire independent information. Public Choice 77: 899-913.
Umbhauer, G. (1994). Information transmission in signaling games: Confrontation of different forward induction criteria. In B. Munier and M.J. Machina (Eds.), Models and experiments in risk and rationality, 413-438. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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Sloof, R. Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information: A comment. Public Choice 91, 199–207 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004964105609
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004964105609