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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
It is difficult to put a label on a historical period. Human history is full of variety, complexities and contradictory developments. Consequently, the precondition of grand theories of history is often their openness to unjustified simplification. On the other hand, some orientation is indispensable, and for this, general descriptions are helpful if one stays aware of their limited function and value. With this in mind it is possible to state that the post-war period is marked by what one may call a universalistic stance.
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