(1) Justices to the Constitutional Court are elected (by a committee of the Bundestag and the full Bundesrat) for 12 year, non-renewable term, not to extend beyond the mandatory retirement age of 68. Articles 4.1 and 4.3 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG – Federal Constitutional Court Act). Ms. Limbach turned 68 on 27 March 2002.Google Scholar

(2) A woman served on the Court at its creation: Erna Scheffler was a member of the Court's First Senate and served from 1951 to 1963. There was a period, following Frau Scheffler's retirement, during which no woman presided at the Court. This period ended with the election of Gisela Niemeyer in 1977. Presently, including Ms. Limbach's successor Prof. Dr. Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, five of the Court's sixteen Justices are women.Google Scholar

(3) Kerscher, Helmut, “Eine wunderbare Frau,” SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (2 May 2002).Google Scholar

(4) UTA FÖLSTER AND CHRISTINA STRESEMANN (EDS.), RECHT SO, JUTTA LIMBACH, NOMOS Verlag, 2002, ISBN 3-7890-7982-0. The Editors note in their foreword that President Limbach strictly forbade the publication of a traditional, academic Festschrift (honorary publication) in her honor. (Id. at 11.).Google Scholar

(5) The collection is truly enjoyable, but leaves room for (if it does not demand) a more critical/theoretical analysis of the feminist “meaning” of President Limbach's tenure. The body of feminist legal criticism upon which such an analysis can be built is abundant. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); HILAIRE BARNETT, SOURCEBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (1997); Cynthia G. Bowman and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 249 (1998); JO BRIDGEMAN, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LAW (1998); F. C. DECOSTE; K. M. MUNRO; LILLIAN MACPERSHON, FEMINIST LEGAL LITERATURE: A SELECTIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1991).Google Scholar

(6) As opposed to being a matter for the jurisdiction of the full (16 judge) membership of the Court sitting in Plenum, the Second Senate seized the issues on the grounds that, as President, Ms. Limbach merely represented the interests of the Court as an institution, including the First Senate. This role, the Second Senate concluded, extended to the President no influence over the jurisprudence of the wholly independent First Senate. “The decisions of each Senate of the Constitutional Court, also in procedural questions, cannot be reviewed by the other Senate.” (Beschluss BVerfG 2 BvY 1/02, RECHT SO, JUTTA LIMBACH 13, 14-15 (Uta Fölster and Christina Stresemann eds., 2002)). (Author's translation).Google Scholar

(7) Id. at 15-16.Google Scholar

(8) Id. at 16-17.Google Scholar

(9) In essence, two wrongs making a right. Id. at 18.Google Scholar

(10) Id. at 19.Google Scholar

(11) Id. at 20. Obviously relying, at least in part, on the equality guarantee of the Grundgesetz (GG – Basic Law). See, especially, Art. 3.2 GG.Google Scholar

(12) Id., at 21.Google Scholar

(13) See, Kerscher, , supra note 3. (“Das Engagement der Spitzenjuristin und künftigen Präsidentin des Goethe-Instituts für die Gleichberechtigung sowie für die beruflichen Chancen von Frauen rühmten alle Redner dieses hiter-melancholischen Festakts.”).Google Scholar

(14) JUTTA LIMBACH, DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (2001).Google Scholar

(15) JUTTA LIMBACH, “IM NAMEN DES VOLKES” – MACHT UND VERANTWORTUNG DER RICHTER (1999).Google Scholar

(16) Beschluss BVerfG 2 BvY 1/2, RECHT SO, JUTTA LIMBACH 13, 20 (Uta Fölster and Christina Stresemann eds., 2002).Google Scholar

(17) Lehmann, Karl Kardinal, Grußwort zur Verabschiedung, RECHT SO, JUTTA LIMBACH 115 (Uta Fölster and Christina Stresemann eds., 2002).Google Scholar

(18) GERMAN BUNDESTAG, QUESTIONS ON GERMAN HISTORY: PATHS TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 201 (1998).Google Scholar

(19) Id.Google Scholar

(20) Id.Google Scholar

(21) Kneier, Gerhard, Limbach hat mehr verändert als alle ihre Vorgänger, FAZ.NET (10 April 2002) www.faz.net.Google Scholar

(22) Lore Maria Peschl-Gutzeit, Emanzipatorischer Gleichklang, RECHT SO, JUTTA LIMBACH 89, 90-91 (Uta Fölster and Christina Stresemann eds., 2002).Google Scholar

(23) “Two years ago, she opened up the Constitutional Court to the public, holding ‘court days’ during hearings on relatively straightforward matters that had emotional appeal… Ms. Limbach saw herself more as a moderator than one who conducted proceedings, something she managed to do successfully.” (Friedrich Karl Fromme, Profile: From Ivory Tower to High Court, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition) 2 (11 April 2002).Google Scholar

(24) Lehmann, , supra note 17, at 117.Google Scholar

(25) Lamprecht, Rolf, Zur Akzeptanz des Selbstverständlcihen, RECHT SO, JUTTA LIMBACH 67, 71 (Uta Fölster and Christina Stresemann eds., 2002).Google Scholar

(26) See, Blankenburg, Erhard, Changes in Political Regimes and Continuity of the Rule of Law in Germany, in COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 249, 265 (note 16) (Herbert Jacob, et. al., 1996). Frau Däubler-Gmelin has since risen to the position of Federal Minister of Justice in Gerhard Schroeder's SPD/Grün coalition government. The informal, but highly political nature of the process is substantially similar for those judges “elected” by the full Bundesrat (Federal Council of the States). See, DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 22 (2d. ed., 1997).Google Scholar

(27) As is the tradition, the Court's Vice President rises to assume the position of President.Google Scholar

(28) See, e.g., “IM NAMEN DES VOLKES” (DVA 1999); DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (Beck Wissen 2001); DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT – GESCHICTHE, AUFGABE, RECHTSPRECHUNG (ed., Müller 2000).Google Scholar

(29) See, e.g., BVerfGE 92, 277; BVerfGE 94, 351.Google Scholar

(30) See, e.g., BVerfGE 98, 169; BVerfGE 99, 216; BVerfGE 99, 246/268/273; BVerfGE 99, 300; BVerfG, 2 BvL 17/99 from 6 March 2002 (www.bverfg.de/).Google Scholar

(31) See, e.g., BVerfGE 97, 350; BVerfGE 102, 147.Google Scholar

(32) See, e.g., BVerfGE 102, 370; BVerfG, 1 BvR 1783/99 from 15 January 2002 (www.bverfg.de/).Google Scholar

(33) BVerfGE 90, 286.Google Scholar

(34) BVerfG 2, BvE 6/99 from 22 November 2001 (http://www.bverfg.de/).Google Scholar

(35) A role apparently intended by Art. 87a.2 of the Basic Law: “Other than for defense purposes the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law.”Google Scholar

(36) BVerfGE 90, 286, 344-380 (1994). See, e.g., Kommers, supra note 26, at 163.Google Scholar

(37) BVerfGE 90, 286, 353-353 (1994).Google Scholar

(38) BVerfGE. 90, 286, 381-390 (1994).Google Scholar

(39) Limbach, supra note 28, at 58.Google Scholar

(40) BVerfG, 2 BvE 6/99 from 22 November 2001 (http://www.bverfg.de/). See, Andreas Paulus, Quo vadis Democratic Control? The Afghanistan Decision of the Bundestag and the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the NATO Strategic Concept Case, 3 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1 (1 January 2002) (www.germanlawjournal.com).Google Scholar

(41) The Deployment Case focused on Article 87a.2 of the Basic Law and the NATO Strategic Concept Case focused on Article 59.2(1) of the Basic Law.Google Scholar

(42) In the year since the Court's NATO Strategic Concept Case ruling, Germany has assumed leadership of NATO peacekeeping force in Macedonia (Ian Black, Germany Heads New NATO Force: Schröder agrees security role in Macedonia after British leave, THE GUARDIAN 25 September 2001 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/macedonia/story/0,7369,557636,00.html)) and joined the American-led Afghanistan War, representing the first deployment of German troops in a combat role outside of Europe since the end of World War II.Google Scholar

(43) Limbach, , supra note 28, at 135-136.Google Scholar

(44) Id., at 136.Google Scholar