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Germany Inc. Eroding? - Board Structure, CEO and Rhenish Capitalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Peer Zumbansen

Extract

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On May 22, Mr Rolf-Ernst Breuer, until then speaker of the managing board of Deutsche Bank AG (“Bank”), stepped aside to let Mr Josef Ackermann take his place in the small circle of leading managers of Europe's biggest banking institution. Mr Breuer takes the chair of the Bank's supervisory board, as is often practice for the departing Speaker in German stock corporations. This would – in and by itself – be less noteworthy were it not marking, at the same time, possibly a fundamental change in German company structure. The French newspaper, Le Monde, asked already ahead of time whether the event ought to be seen as a cultural revolution and other commentators are readily applying likewise vocabulary. Mr Ackermann has, for some time now and under immense press coverage, been ventilating his strong desires to change the inner workings and structure of the Bank's managing board and it is all but easy to decipher whether or not he ultimately will succeed in doing so and which other changes his initiatives eventually will bring about. The structural overhaul inside the Bank certainly takes place at a time where the Bank is facing financial pressure.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 3 , Issue 6 , June 2002 , E4
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

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