1 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), commonly referred to as the European Constitution, is an international Treaty intended to create a constitution for the European Union. Despite its name, it only covers the European Union. It was signed in 2004 by representatives of the Member States of the Union but was subject to ratification by all member states which has, to date, proved impossible to obtain. The constitutional treaty was signed by representatives of the Member States on October 29, 2004 and was in the process of ratification by the Member States until 2005 when French (May 29) and Dutch (June 1) voters rejected the Treaty in referenda. Had it been ratified, the Treaty would have been entered into force on November 1, 2006, but this is now impossible.Google Scholar

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5 Id.Google Scholar

6 Article 3b: “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.”Google Scholar

7 Macrory, R. and Turner, S., Participatory Rights, Transboundary Environmental Governance and EC Law, 39 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW (C.M.L. REV.) 489 (2002). See also Cooper, I., The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU, 44 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 281 (2006).Google Scholar

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9 For this aspect see, more properly, note 4.Google Scholar

10 Art. 1, European Constitution.Google Scholar

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14 See A. Peters, European Democracy after the 2003 Constitution, 41 C.M.L. REV. 37, 61 (2004).Google Scholar

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23 Id., para. 103. The leading case is Case C-491/01, Queen v. Secretary of States for Health (ex parte British American Tobacco [Investments] Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd.), 2002 E.C.R. I-11453. See, moreover, Fiumara, O., La nuova normativa comunitaria sulla lavorazione, presentazione e vendita dei prodotti del tabacco (direttiva 2001/37/CE), RASSEGNA DELL'AVVOCATURA DELLO STATO 34 (2002); Selmayr, M., Kamann, H.G. & Ahlers, S., Die Binnenmarktkompetenz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS UND STEUERRECHT (E.W.S.) 49 (2003). For a complete framework concerning the proportionality principle in foodstuff matters, see also Spagnuolo, F., Il principio di proporzionalitä come parametro di legittimitä nelle sentenze della Corte di Giustizia sulle normative nazionali relative alla circolazione delle merci e alla tutela dei consumatori, RIVISTA IT. DIR. PUBBLICO COM 1544 (2003).Google Scholar

24 ECJ, C., Grand Chamber, 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, para. 106.Google Scholar

25 The case law addressing the proportionality principle and its interactions with the precautionary principle is copious. For a detailed comment on it, see Lenaerts, K., “In the Union we trust”: Trust-Enhancing Principles of Community Law, 41 C.M.L. Rev. 317 (2004), which cites Case-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2265; Case C-352/98, P. Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. I-5291; Case C-3/00, Denmark v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. I-2643. See also Dabrowska, P., GM Foods, Risk, Precaution and Internal Market: Did Both Sides Win the Day in the Recent Judgement of European Court of Justice? 5 German Law Journal 151 (2004), available at www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=383.Google Scholar

26 In 2005 E.C.R.I-1135, paras. 93-95.Google Scholar

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