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Christian Democracy, Labor, and the Postwar Politics of Old-Age Pension Reform

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2023

DENNIE OUDE NIJHUIS Open the ORCID record for DENNIE OUDE NIJHUIS [Opens in a new window]
DENNIE OUDE NIJHUIS*
Affiliation:
Institute for History, Leiden University
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Abstract

Christian-democratic parties not only constituted the most successful political force in much of Western Europe during most of the twentieth century; their attitudes toward solidaristic welfare reform have arguably also been more diverse than have those of most other major political groupings during this period. Whereas existing studies have mostly attributed this variation to electoral or strategic considerations, this article emphasizes the importance of interest group involvement. It analyzes and compares postwar old-age pension reform in three important Christian-democratic-ruled societies, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, and shows how the very different attitudes of the main Christian-democratic parties toward solidaristic welfare reform in these countries related to the strength and unity of the Christian-democratic labor union movements there.

Keywords

Welfare StateLabor UnionsChristian DemocracyRedistributionCollective bargaining
Type
Article
Information
Journal of Policy History , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , July 2023 , pp. 387 - 413
Copyright
© Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press, 2023

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References

NOTES

1. See, for instance, Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; van Kersbergen, K., Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (London: Routledge, 1995)Google Scholar; Seeleib-Kaiser, M., van Dyk, S., and Roggenkamp, M., Party Politics and Social Welfare. Comparing Christian and Social Democracy in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; van Kersbergen, K. and Manow, P., Religion, , Class Coalitions, and Welfare States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2. For an excellent overview, see the classification provided in Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds.

3. On this difficulty see among others van Kersbergen, K. and Becker, U., “The Netherlands: A Passive Social Democratic Welfare State in a Christian Democratic Ruled Society,” Journal of Social Policy 17, no.4 (1988): 477–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cox, R., The Development of the Dutch Welfare State: From Workers’ Insurance to Universal Entitlement (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism; D T. Iversen and D. Soskice, “Democratic Limits to Redistribution. Inclusionary versus Exclusionary Coalitions in the Knowledge Economy,” World Politics 67, no.2 (2015): 185–225; Nijhuis, D. M. Oude, Religion, Class, and the Postwar Development of the Dutch Welfare State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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5. Quote from Iversen and Soskice, “Democratic Limits,” 187. See also Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds; Cox, The Development; Aust, A. and Bönker, F., “New Social Risks in a Conservative Welfare State: The Case of Germany,” in New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European Welfare State, ed. Taylor-Gooby, P. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 29–51 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Picot, G., The Politics of Segmentation: Party Competition and Social Protection in Europe (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012)Google Scholar.

6. See, for instance, Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds further showed that the more entrenched nature of white-collar unionism in Belgium compared with that in the Netherlands explains “The Netherlands,” 477–99.

7. See, for instance, Wise, D., Social Security Programs and Retirement around the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 6–7 Google Scholar.

8. See, for instance, Esping-Andersen, G. and Korpi, W., “Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-War Capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany, “ in Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism , ed. Goldthorpe, J. H. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 184Google Scholar; Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 32.

9. See, for instance, Korpi, W. and Palme, J., “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries,” American Sociological Review 6, no. 5 (1998): 661–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gottschalk, M., The Shadow Welfare State: Labor, Business, and the Politics of Health Care in the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leimgruber, M., Solidarity without the State? Business and the Shaping of the Swiss Welfare State 1890-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)Google Scholar; Trampusch, C., “The Welfare State and Trade Unions in Switzerland: an Historical Reconstruction of the Shift from a Liberal to a Post-liberal Welfare Regime,” Journal of European Social Policy 20, no. 1 (2010): 58–73 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pemberton, H., “The Failure of ‘Nationalization by Attraction’: Britain’s Cross-Class Alliance against Earnings-Related Pensions in the 1950s,” The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 1428–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10. For some examples of studies that have emphasized the importance of coalition formation, see Van Kersbergen and Becker, “The Netherlands,” 490; Cox, The Development, 212–13 and 135; Hupe, P., “Beyond Pillarization: The (Post) Welfare State in the Netherlands,” European Journal of Political Research 23, no. 4 (1993): 359–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Iversen, T. and Stephens, J. D., “Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Human Capital Formation,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4 (2008): 612 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Iversen and Soskice, “Democratic Limits,” 187.

11. Many of these studies refer specifically to the median voter theorem to do so. See for instance, Goodin, R. and LeGrand, J., Not Only the Poor. The Middle Classes and the Welfare State (London: Routledge, 1987)Google Scholar; Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 23. See also Korpi and Palme, “The Paradox”; Iversen, T. and Soskice, D., “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” American Political Science Review 100, no. 2 (2006): 165–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bradley et al., “Distribution,” 195.

12. For reasons of simplicity the article uses Dutch-language acronyms, including for Belgian political parties and labor unions. The Christian People’s Party will consequently be referred to as CVP (Christelijke Volkspartij) rather than CVP–PSC (Christelijke Volkspartij–Parti Social Chrétien).

13. See, for instance, Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds.

14. For some excellent contributions, see Van Kersbergen, “The Netherlands”; E. Huber, C. Ragin, and J. D. Stephens, “Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State,” American Journal of Sociology 99, no. 3 (1993), 711–49; Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism; Seeleib-Kaiser et al., Party Politics; Aust and Bönker, “New Social Risks”; Van Kersbergen and Manow, Religion; Fleckenstein, T., “The Politics of Ideas in Welfare State Transformation: Christian Democracy in and the Reform of Family Policy in Germany,” Social Politics 18, no. 4 (2011): 543–71CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Hien, Competing Ideas; Picot, The Politics of Segmentation.

15. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 23; Manow and Van Kersbergen, “Religion and the Western Welfare State: The Theoretical Context,” in Van Kersbergen and Nanow, Religion, 2–4.

16. See, for instance, Castles, The Impact of Parties; Hicks, A. Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

17. Hibbs, D., “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Theory,” American Political Science Review 71, no. 4 (1977): 1467–87CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18. For criticisms of this tendency, see for instance Van Kersbergen and Manow, Religion, 18–19.

19. For an excellent overview of their catch-all nature, see, for instance, Gehler, M. and Kaiser, W., Christian Democracy in Europe Since 1945: Volume 2 (London: Routledge, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. As noted earlier, in much of the political economy literature it is assumed that redistributive reform can only be successful when they benefit middle-class groups (who after hold a median voter position), which means that such reform generally rested on coalitions between low- and middle-income groups to exploit the rich. As noted by various studies on tax financing, however, in most cases the redistributive consequences of progressive taxation place a particularly hefty burden on middle-class groups. See, for instance, Cusack, T. R. and Beramendi, P., “Taxing Work,” European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 1 (2006): 43–73 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prasad, M. and Deng, Y., “Taxation and the Worlds of Welfare,” Socio-Economic Review 7, no. 3 (2009): 431–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. Iversen and Soskice, Electoral Institutions,” 166.

22. The sheltered position of the Dutch Christian democrats has received a particularly large amount of attention over the years. Much of this literature has referred to this sheltered position to explain why the development of the Dutch welfare state proceeded more slowly than that of many of its counterparts up to the 1960s. For a criticism of this view, see Oude Nijhuis, Religion, 8–10.

23. For studies that have emphasized the lack of visibility and traceability of many aspects of welfare reform see, for instance, Hacker, J., The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 35Google Scholar; Wilensky, Rich Democracies, 29–31.

24. Iversen and Stephens, “Partisan Politics, 612; Iversen and Soskice, Democratic Limits,” 187.

25. See, for instance, Cox, The Development; Deleeck, H. and Cantillon, Bea, De architectuur van de welvaartsstaat opnieuw bekeken (Leuven: Acco, 2008)Google Scholar; Oude Nijhuis, Religion.

26. See, for instance, Manow, Philip, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Esping-Andersens Soziaalstaats-Typologie und die konfessionellen Wurzeln des westlichen Wohlfahrtsstaats,” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 54, no. 2 (2002): 203–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kalyvas, S. N. and van Kersbergen, K., “Christian Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010), 183–209 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Van Kersbergen and Manow, Religion; Hien, Competing Ideas.

27. Stjernø, S., “The Idea of Solidarity in Europe,” European Journal of Social Law 3, no.5 (2011): 156–76Google Scholar.

28. See, for instance, Manow, “The Good,” 203–25; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen, “Christian Democracy,” 183–209; Van Kersbergen and Manow, Religion; Hien, Competing Ideas; M. W. Hertogh, “Geene wet maar de heer!”De confessionele ordening van het Nederlandse sociale zekerheidsstelsel (Den Haag: Vuga, 1998).

29. The ARP’s transformation in this respect has been particularly dramatic. See, for instance, Wim Couwenberg, “Op- en Neergang der Christen-democratie,” Politiek Perspectief 1, no.4 (1972): 2–23; Roelof Bouwman, De val van een bergredenaar: het politieke leven van Willem Aantjes (Amsterdam: Boom, 2002); Ria Jaarsma, Elske ter Veld, and Joke Mes, “Zeg maar Hannie…”: 65 jaar strijdlustig in politiek en samenleving (Wormer: Inmec, 2005).

30. For the quote, see Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 2.

31. See, for instance, Windmuller, J. P., Labor Relations in the Netherlands (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969)Google Scholar; Gerard, E., De Christelijke vakbeweging in België. Deel 2 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Nijhuis, D. M. Oude, Labor Divided in the Postwar European Welfare State: The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32. Ebbinghaus, B., “Germany,” in The Societies of Europe. Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945, ed. Ebbinghaus, Bernhard and Visser, Jelle (London: Springer: 2000), 279–337 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33. For an excellent overview of these bonds, see for instance Schröder, W., Gewerkschaftspolitik zwischen DGB, Katholizismus und CDU 1945 bis 1960 (Bonn: Bund-Verlag, 1990).Google Scholar

34. Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism; Seeleib-Kaiser et al., Party Politics.

35. Esping-Andersen and Korpi, “Social Policy as Class Politics,” 191.

36. Korpi, W. and Shalev, M., “Strikes, Power, and Politics in the Western Nations, 1900-1976,” Political Power and Social Theory 1 (1980) 301–34Google Scholar; Van Kersbergen and Becker, “The Netherlands,” 477–99; Cox, The Development; Iversen and Soskice, “Democratic Limits,” 187; Oude Nijhuis, Religion, 4–5.

37. As these unions represented members with more secure positions, they among others opposed the inclusion of their members in a public unemployment insurance program. Resistance to this seems to have been particularly strong in the socialist Dutch Association of Trade Unions (Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen, or NVV). See Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, NVV codelijsten 1945-1967, Vergadering Sociale Commissie, 24-6-1954. Broad political party support for unitary pension schemes was first expressed in the Van Rhijn-Committee, see Van Rhijn, A. A., Sociale Zekerheid: rapport van de Commissie, ingesteld bij Beschikking van den Minister van Sociale Zaken van 26 maart 1943, met de opdracht algemeene richtlijnen vast te tellen voor de toekomstige ontwikkeling der sociale verzekering in Nederland (Den Haag: Algemeen Landsdrukkerij, 1945), 5–6 Google Scholar.

38. Korpi, W., The Democratic Class Struggle (London: Routledge, 1983)Google Scholar.

39. CNV, Zevende verslag Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond in Nederland (Rotterdam: Christelijk Naitonaal Vakverbond, 1917), 68–69.

40. CNV, De Gids voor Maatschappelijke Zekerheid, 28-12-1946, 2.

41. The differences of opinion within the largest Christian-democratic party, the KVP, have been particularly well documented, with representatives of the old guard, such as party leader Carl Romme for instance taking a much more conservative view than newcomers like the young economist Gerard Veldkamp, who would later become minister of Social Affairs, and who advocated relaxing the link between benefit entitlement and individual contributory effort. Compare C. P. M. Romme, Staatspensionering ouderdomsverzekering (Den Haag: Algemene R. K. Ambtenarenvereniging, 1950), 4–5; and G. M. J. Veldkamp, Individualistische karaktertrekken in de Nederlandse sociale arbeidersverzekering (Alphen aan den Rhijn: N. Samsom N. V., 1949), 13.

42. CNV, De Gids voor Maatschappelijke Zekerheid, 7-7-1951, 1–2.

43. van der Zwaal, P., “Politici, ambtenaren en de verzorgingsstaat. De oudedagsvoorziening, 1945-1952,” in Van particuliere naar openbare zorg, en terug? Sociale politiek in Nederland sinds 1880, ed. Blockmans, Wim and van der Valk, Loes (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1992), 181 Google Scholar.

44. Sociaal-Economische Raad, Advies inzake de wettelijke ouderdomsvoorziening (Den Haag: SER, 1954), 108.

45. Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, NVV, codelijsten 1945-1970, 1951 HM4, Notulen Sociale Commissie, 20-8-1951.

46. Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, Archief CNV, 34:4, Vergadering van de Verbondsraad, 18-6-1951.

47. For an extensive overview see Sociaal-Economische Raad, Advies inzake, 32.

48. Nationaal Archief, Handelingen der Staten-Generaal, deel II, 847, 15-3-1956, 3822.

49. For an extensive overview and the role played in this by labor unions see Oude Nijhuis, Religion, 162–72.

50. Documentatie—en Onderzoekscentrum voor Religie, Cultuur en Samenleving, ACW-NB, ACV, Activiteitenverslag (1945), 30.

51. For a complete overview of events see Vanthemsche, G., De beginjaren van de sociale zekerheid in België 1944-1963 (Brussels: VUB Press, 1994).Google Scholar

52. LBC, “Wat nu met ons pensioen?” Ons Recht 50 (1945): 7; LBC, “De maatschappelijke zekerheid,” Ons Recht 53 (1948): 1.

53. The Dutch and French-speaking white-collar federations, the LBC and National Center of Employees (Centrale National des Employés, or CNE) had respectively 37,936 and 17,859 members in 1960, compared with some half a million for the ACV as a whole. See Vanhooren, P. and Deceunynck, J., Bedienden in beweging. Een geschiedenis van de Landelijke Bedienden Centrale (Antwerpen: Gevaert, 2005), 153.Google Scholar

54. On the discussion over the creation of a separate peak association for white-collar employees and the consequences of that for the position of the LBC within the ACV, see Gerard, De Christelijke vakbeweging, 52–53.

55. Documentatie- en Onderzoekscentrum voor Religie, Cultuur en Samenleving, ACV, PV Bestuur, 5-2-1947.

56. LBC, “Wat nu met ons Pensioen,” Ons Recht 49 (1945): 2.

57. See Pasture, P., “Liefde na datum. De Christelijke arbeidersbeweging en het Sociaal Pact,” in Het Sociaal Pact van 1944. Oorsprong, betekenis en gevolgen, ed. Luyten, D. en Vanthemsche, G. (Brussels: VUB Press, 1995), 310 Google Scholar.

58. P. Pasture, Kerk, politiek en sociale actie. De unieke positie van de christelijke arbeidersbeweging in België (Leuven: Garant, 1992), 319.

59. Vanhooren and Deceunynck, Bedienden in beweging, 231–32.

60. Documentatie- en Onderzoekscentrum voor Religie, Cultuur en Samenleving, ACV, PV Bestuur, 12-4-1960, PV Raad, 9-12-1952.

61. LBC, “Troclet wil zijn berovingswet erdoor!” Ons Recht 61 (1957): 1–2.

62. Algemeen Rijksarchief, KdV, 1962-1963, no. 2, 10, Nationaal Archief Nederland (National Archives of the Netherlands).

63. LBC, “De hervorming der pensioenstelsels,” ACV Tijdschrift 39 (1968): 9.

64. The employer federations’ stance on pension unification had mostly been determined by administrative considerations. As a result, the Union of Belgian Industry (Verbond der Belgische Nijverheid, or VBN) expressed support for it by as early as 1951. Other employer federations were initially more hesitant to do so, but eventually they expressed their support on the condition that it would not lead to increased costs. See Arcq, E. and Blaise, P., “Politieke geschiedenis van de sociale zekerheid in België,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Sociale Zekerheid 40 (1998): 567–68Google Scholar.

65. K. van Rompey, “Is de pensioenstrijd gestreden?” Ons Recht 71 (oktober 1967): 3.

66. LBC, “Is de pensioenstrijd gestreden?” Ons Recht 71 (1967): 10; LBC, “Testen voor bedienden: bediendenpensioen,” Ons Recht 71 (1967): 9; and LBC, “De minister en onze eisen,” Ons Recht 71 (1967): 3.

67. Deleeck and Cantillon, De architectuur, 515–26.

68. Deleeck and Cantillon, De architectuur, 531.

69. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 23–24.

70. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 32.

71. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: CDU Bundespartei 07-001, 8703, Bundesausschusses für Sozialpolitik 25-9-1952.

72. In 1958, for instance, DAG representatives held 53% of all seats compared with just 24% by the DGB. The rest was also held by unions represented middle-class white-collar groups. See Müller, H. P., Die Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft im Wettbewerb mit dem DGB (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), 101–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

73. Hockerts, H. G., Sozialpolitische Entscheidungen im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), 368–71Google Scholar; and Müller, Die Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft, 101–7.

74. See, for instance, Oude Nijhuis, Religion, 89–104.

75. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: CDU Bundespartei 07-001, 8703, Bundesausschusses für Sozialpolitik, 25-9-1954.

76. Hockerts, Sozialpolische Entscheidungen, 330.

77. Hockerts, Sozialpolische Entscheidungen, 402

78. G.V. Rimlinger, Welfare Policy and Industrialization in Europe, America, and Russia (New York, 1971), 180.

79. On this assumption see for instance for instance, Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, 22; Manow, P., “Religious Cleavages, Divisions on the Left, and the Political Economy of Southern Europe,” International Journal of Social Quality 3, no. 2 (2013): 78–105 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80. Austria has had only one major union federation during the postwar period, the Österreicher Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB). Although formally neutral, the social-democratic fraction has traditionally been the strongest fraction in the ÖGB. Italy’s Christian-democratic union federation has traditionally been much weaker than its Belgian and Dutch counterparts and has also been characterized by a strong horizontal structure. See, for instance, Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, Blaschke, Sabine, Karlhofer, Ferdinand, and Traxler, Franz, “Austria,” and Jelle Visser, “Italy,” in Visser and Ebbinghaus, The Societies of Europe: Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945, ed. Flora, Peter, Kraus, Franz, and Rothenbacher, Franz (London: Springer, 2000), 77–110 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 371–428, respectively.

81. Compare, Esping-Andersen and Korpi, “Social Policy as Class Politics,” 184 and Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds, 32 with Iversen and Stephens, “Partisan Politics,” 612 and Iversen and Soskice, “Democratic Limits,” 187.