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Third World vulnerabilities and global negotiations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Stephen D. Krasner
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What do Third World countries want? More wealth. How can they get it? By adopting more economically rational policies. What should the North do? Facilitate these policies. How should the North approach global negotiations? With cautious optimism. What is the long term prognosis for North–South relations? Hopeful, at least if economic development occurs. This is the common wisdom about relations between industrialized and developing areas in the United States and much of the rest of the North, Within this fold there are intense debates among adherents of conventional liberal, reformist liberal, and interdependence viewpoints. But the emphasis on economics at the expense of politics, on material well-being as opposed to power and control, pervades all of these orientations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , October 1983 , pp. 235 - 249
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1983

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References

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20. Japan did sign the Convention in early 1983.