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Tomasello on “we” and the sense of obligation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2020

Michael E. Bratman Open the ORCID record for Michael E. Bratman [Opens in a new window]
Michael E. Bratman*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305. bratman@stanford.eduhttps://philosophy.stanford.edu/people/michael-e-bratman
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Abstract

Tomasello explores four interrelated phenomena: (1) joint intentional collaboration; (2) joint commitment; (3) “self-regulative pressure from ‘we’”; and (4) the sense of interpersonal obligation. He argues that the version of (1) that involves (2) is the “source” of (3) and so the source of (4). I note an issue that arises once we distinguish two versions of (3).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e62
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

Bratman, M. E. (2014) Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Engelmann, J. M. & Tomasello, M. (2018) The middle step: Joint intentionality as a human-unique form of second-personal engagement. In: The Routledge handbook of collective intentionality, ed. Jankovic, M. & Ludwig, K., pp. 433–46. Routledge.Google Scholar