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Decentred autonomy and authenticity in Honneth*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2014

Dagmar Wilhelm
Dagmar Wilhelm*
Affiliation:
University of Bristoldagmar.wilhelm@bristol.ac.uk
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Abstract

Axel Honneth proposes a recognition theoretical approach to justice, where justice is a matter of the recognition of individuals in the three spheres of ethical life he identifies. The value of recognition is based on the value of ‘self-realization’. Given the intimate relation between self-realization on the one hand and autonomy and authenticity on the other, autonomy and authenticity also play an important normative role in Honneth’s recognition theoretical approach to justice. In this paper I will examine Honneth’s conceptions of autonomy and authenticity. I will argue that these conceptions manage to meet some of the descriptive challenges faced by recognition theories, but fail to provide recognition with the required normative underpinnings. In order to gain or retain normative force, Honneth needs to provide an account of ‘true self’ or objective human well-being, which in turn would fail to meet the descriptive challenge and move dangerously close to traditional theory.

Type
Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 35 , Issue 2: Moral Philosophy , October 2014 , pp. 292 - 312
Copyright
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain 2014 

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Footnotes

*

I am very grateful to John Horton and Ira Kiourti for valuable comments on earlier drafts and to two anonymous referees of the Hegel Bulletin for helpful criticisms.

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