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Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2021

Carsten Bergenholtz ,
Jacob Busch Open the ORCID record for Jacob Busch [Opens in a new window]  and
Sara Kier Praëm
Carsten Bergenholtz
Affiliation:
University of Aarhus, Department of Management, Fuglesangs Allé 4, Bygning 2622, C06, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
Jacob Busch*
Affiliation:
University of Aarhus, Department of Philosophy, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 7, Bygning 1465, 423, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
Sara Kier Praëm
Affiliation:
University of Aarhus, Department of Mathematics, Ny Munkegade 120, Bygning 1520, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
*
*Corresponding author. Email: filjab@cas.au.dk
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Abstract

Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.

Keywords

Experimental philosophyintuitionknowledge ascriptionGettierfake-barnintuition variancethought experiment
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 163 - 180
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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