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Where Tracking Loses Traction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2020

Mitchell Barrington Open the ORCID record for Mitchell Barrington [Opens in a new window]
Mitchell Barrington*
Affiliation:
Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, Victoria, Australia
*
Email: mitchell.barrington@myacu.edu.au
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Abstract

Tracking theories see knowledge as a relation between a subject's belief and the truth, where the former is responsive to the latter. This relationship involves causation in virtue of a sensitivity condition, which is constrained by an adherence condition. The result is what I call a stable causal relationship between a fact and a subject's belief in that fact. I argue that when we apprehend the precise role of causation in the theory, previously obscured problems pour out. This paper presents 13 distinct and original counterexamples to Nozick's tracking theory – many of which also constitute problems for more recent tracking theories. I begin by discussing how tracking relates to causation: Nozick invokes causation through conditions similar to those of Lewisian causal dependence. As a result, when causal dependence is not necessary for causation, Nozick fails to identify knowledge. I then address the inability of causation to capture epistemically important concepts, such as justification and truth. I conclude by discussing the underlying asymmetries between causation and knowledge that undermine any attempt to reduce knowledge to a purely metaphysical relation.

Keywords

Tracking theorycausationtruth-trackingRobert Nozickepistemology
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 1 - 14
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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