I - A Plea for Mechanisms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
Summary
INTRODUCTION
Are there lawlike generalizations in the social sciences? If not, are we thrown back on mere description and narrative? In my opinion, the answer to both questions is no. The main task of this chapter is to explain and illustrate the idea of a mechanism as intermediate between laws and descriptions. Roughly speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences. They allow us to explain, but not to predict. An example from George Vaillant gives a flavor of the idea: “Perhaps for every child who becomes alcoholic in response to an alcoholic environment, another eschews alcohol in response to the same environment.” Both reactions embody mechanisms: doing what your parents do and doing the opposite of what they do. We cannot tell ahead of time what will become of the child of an alcoholic, but if he or she turns out either a teetotaler or an alcoholic we may suspect we know why.
Over the years, I have increasingly come to view the ideal of lawlike explanation (“covering-law explanation”) in history and the social sciences as implausible and fragile. Early on, I was struck by Paul Veyne's discussion of the idea of providing a nomological explanation of Louis XIV's unpopularity. Suppose we start from the generalization that “any king imposing excessive taxes becomes unpopular.”
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- Alchemies of the MindRationality and the Emotions, pp. 1 - 47Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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