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2017.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Leiden Journal of International Law,
Vol. 30,
Issue. 1,
p.
263.
Article contents
Chasing the Frontier in Humanitarian Intervention Law: The Case for Aequitas ad Bellum
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 August 2015
Abstract
The question whether humanitarian intervention may ever be lawfully carried out unilaterally outside the scope of Chapter VII of the UN Charter has captured the interest of many for years. Faced with legal formalist arguments under the UN Charter, those otherwise favouring the idea of humanitarian intervention often retreat into an apologist stance by conceding too quickly the lack of cogent legal justifications therefor, preferring instead to rely on moral and ethical reasoning. The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, while seemingly promising when first mooted in 2001, has since effectively been rendered obsolete as a justification for unilateral humanitarian intervention following the UN World Summit in 2005. By examining the role that equity plays in Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, this paper advances the view that an aequitas ad bellum exists in international law that, under certain strict conditions, enables unilateral humanitarian intervention to be lawfully carried out.
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Footnotes
*
Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore. LLB (National University of Singapore); LLM (Harvard University). The author would like to register his gratitude to Professor Gabriella Blum for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s personal views and do not in any way represent the views of the Supreme Court of Singapore. Any error in the paper is solely the author’s.
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155. For the purposes of this paper, the distinction between a non liquet and a situation having too many competing norms is not of great significance. In fact, the two concepts may be compatible, particularly considering the nature of international law, because a non liquet often may be seen as a predicate to the rise of competing norms advocated by different norm entrepreneurs on the subject in question.
156. This, of course, is independent of the question of whether the individual states in the international community do in fact intervene, since the decision whether to carry out intervention may be affected by a variety of non-legal considerations in every state.
157. See accompanying text to supra note 134.
158. To the extent that Burke’s writing omits to provide any illumination in this regard, the equitable framework as argued by Burke is incomplete.
159. Supra note 128.
160. This is a well-established equitable principle that exemplifies equity’s preference for substance over form. See e.g. the English case of Walsh v. Lonsdale [1882] 21 Ch. D. 9.
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164. Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute.
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172. Address at Georgetown University on 23 February 1999; U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6901, P.K.O. 80.
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