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Contention and Compromise: a Comparative Analysis of Budgetary Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Thomas R. Cusack
Thomas R. Cusack
Affiliation:
Political Scientist Globus Research Group Science Center Berlin
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Abstract

This paper attempts to place the role of defense spending within the overall context of the budgetary process. Using an extended version of the ‘Competing Aspirations Level Model’ based on the behavioral theory of decision-making, major budgetary aggregates, total spending, defense spending, exhaustive civilian expenditures, and capital outlays, are modelled as outcomes of independently generated aspirations, based on parochial organizational and environmental influences, and a reconciliation process reflecting the bargaining power of budgetary agents. An empirical assessment of the model's performance is conducted using the experience of thirteen national governments, including seven western industrialized states and six developing states. The results of this statistical analysis suggest that the model provides a useful basis for understanding and comparing budgetary processes and outcomes.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , October 1985 , pp. 497 - 519
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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