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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 March 2016
This comment revisits the debate on the reasons for compliance, or lack thereof, with the regulations and administrative rules that govern the current international trade regime. The research on which it is based is the first part of the five-year project on Cross-Cultural Dispute Resolution funded by the Major Collaborative Research Initiative program of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. It focuses on the cultural components of non-compliance based on analysis of the legislative internalization of World Trade Organization norms and case law in China, Canada, and Japan on the one hand and on individual perceptions of the international trade environment on the other. The main hypotheses are that the sharing of international practice rules does not necessarily indicate consensus on the normative order underlying those rules and that the behaviour of those who are involved in the interpretation and application of international rules is informed by (1) their perception of the purpose, content, and effect of nonlocal rules and their underlying norms; (2) those rules' and norms' complementarity with local rules and norms; and (3) the degree of legitimacy accorded by local communities to the processes of interpretation and application.
Ce commentaire reprend le débat sur les raisons pour le respect ou nonrespect des règlements et règles administratives du régime de commerce international actuel. Les résultats présentés dans ce commentaire sont la première partie d’un projet de cinq ans intitulé “Cross-Cultural Dispute Resolution,” financé par le programme des Grands travaux de recherche concertée du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada. Ce commentaire porte sur les éléments culturels du non-respect des règles en analysant, d’une part, l’intériorisation des normes et la jurisprudence de l’OMC par les organes législatifs en Chine, au Canada, et au Japon, et d’autre part, les perceptions individuelles à l’égard de l’environnement du commerce intenational. Les hypothèses principales sont: que le fait de partager des règles internationales n’indique pas nécessairement la présence d’un consensus sur l’ordre normatif qui est à la base de ces règles; que le comportement des représentants impliqués dans l’interprétation et l’application des règles internationales est influencé par (1) leur perception de l’objectif, du contenu et des effets de telles règles, (2) la complémentarité de ces règles et normes avec des règles et normes locales, et (3) le degré de légitimité accordé par les communautés locales aux processus d’interprétation et d’application des règles.
1 Jacobson, H. K., “Afterward: Conceptual, Methodological and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying Compliance” (1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 569 at 572.Google Scholar
2 Henkin, L., How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) at 47.Google Scholar
3 I borrow the metaphor on “travelling” law from William Twining. See Twining, W., “Have Concepts, Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in a Global Context” (2005) 1 Int’l. J. Law in Context 5.10.1017/S1744552305001023CrossRefGoogle Scholar The metaphor signals that contrary to Alan Watson’s concept of transplants or legal concepts being simply transplanted from one system to another, laws do not exist in isolation from cultures and societies — they travel rather than being simply transplanted and, like wine, some concepts travel across cultures and languages better than others (at 8–9). Watson, A., Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd edition (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1993).Google Scholar Note that the term “foreign” (laws and/or institutions) is used in this article to mean non-local.
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [GATT].
5 Potter, P., “Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation” (2004) 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 465 at 480.10.1111/j.1747-4469.2004.tb00343.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
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7 Ibid. at 480.
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13 Potter and Jacobs, supra note 8 at 3.
14 This article is not intended to offer yet another summary or classification of theories of compliance, but, instead, it draws on several important systematic categorizations established by international law and international relations scholars. See, in particular, an overview of different theories of compliance in Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A., New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (ambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chayes, A. and Handler Chayes, A., “On Compliance” (1993) 47 Int’l Org. 175 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kingsbury, B., “The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law” (1998) 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 345 Google Scholar; Koh, H. H., “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Neb. L. Rev. 181 Google Scholar; Koh, H. H., “Why Do Nations Obey International Law” (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2599 10.2307/797228CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Koh, H. H., “Bringing International Law Home (Address: The 1998 Frankel Lecture)” (1998) 35 Houston L. Rev. 623 Google Scholar; Jacobson, supra note 1; Raustiala, K., “Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation” (2000) 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 Google Scholar; Gerhart, P. M., “Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory: TRIPS as Substantive Issue” (2000) 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 357 Google Scholar; Guzman, A. T., “A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law” (2002) 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1823 10.2307/3481436CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Raustiala, K. and Slaughter, A.-M., “International Law, International Relations and Compliance,” in Carlsnaes, W. et al, eds., The Handbook of International Relations (London: Sage Publications, 2002), chapter 28 at 538 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bradford, W., “International Legal Compliance: Surveying the Field” (2005) Georgetown J. Int’l L. Google Scholar The most recent review of the literature in this area is given by Pulkowski, D., “Testing Compliance Theories: Towards US Obedience of International Law in Avena Case” (2006) 19 Leiden J. Int’l L. 511 at 514–34.10.1017/S0922156506003426CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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16 Franck, T. M., The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; and Franck, T. M., Fairness in International Law and Institutions (New York: Clarendon Press, 1995).Google Scholar
17 Chayes and Handler Chayes, supra note 14.
18 Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” supra note 14.
19 Raustiala and Slaughter, supra note 14 at 544. See also Kingsbury, supra note 14 at 372: “The study of compliance with international law entails engaging with a normative system and with the ideas of law which render it a critical-constructive and ethical practice.” However, see Raustiala, supra note 14 at 391 -95, who criticizes the concept of “compliance” as unable to draw a causal link between a rule and behaviour and argues that compliance does not need to be caused by imple-mentation. Raustiala develops his argument on the basis of the distinction between compliance (conformity or identity between an behaviour and specified rule), implementation (a process of incorporation or “putting international obligations into domestic legislation, creation of relevant domestic institutions and enforcement of implemented rules domestically), and effectiveness (the degree to which a given rule induces a change in behaviour) and argues further that the rule could be effective even if the law does not require compliance with it and vice versa.
20 Benedict Kingsbury analyzes rationalist instrumentalist and new “liberal” theories and their accounts of international law and compliance that show interest in individuals as political actors: “Preferences of individuals are aggregated and mobilized through political processes. See Kingsbury, supra note 14 at 356–57.
21 See, for example, Tyler, T., Why People Obey the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Franck, supra note 16; and Gerhart, supra note 14 at 372.
22 Even though competition rules are not explicitly included in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, ( 1994) 33 I.L.M. 15 [WTO Agreement], recognizing the importance of the subject in numerous bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements to which the World Trade Organization (WTO) members are the signatories, this research asks questions about the respondents’ understanding of market access values.
23 Twining, supra note 3 at 9. In this article, he argues that concepts such as legal education, legal professions, and lawyers do not travel particularly well, while concepts of health law are quite cosmopolitan (see, in particular, at 33–34).
24 Schauer, F., “The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation,” CID Working Paper no. 44, April 2000, Harvard University,Google Scholar Law and Development Paper no. 2.
25 In the preamble to the WTO Agreement, supra note 22, the parties declare their determination “to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading system.” A number of studies have indicated that the framework of international trade build on norms of liberalism and are created by the GATT, supra note 4, and the WTO Agreement, supra note 22, is not a particularly coherent system of international law. For example, Gerald Bunting argues that international trade has always been conducted under a vague set of occasionally recognized norms. See Bunting, G., “GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A Historical Perspective” (1996) 11 St. John’s J. Legal Commentary 505 at 510.Google Scholar Other authors, such as Graham Mayeda and Debra Steger, argue that GATT and the WTO have never provided a hierarchy of their principles in the way that scholars discuss them today and that the norms underlying international trade law should be identified through an analysis of substantive principles of international law (such as trade liberalization, transparency, and non-discrimination) as identified by the GATT and the WTO. See Mayeda, G., “A Normative Perspective on Legal Harmonization: China’s Accession to the WTO” (2005) 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 83 at 89–90Google Scholar; and Steger, D., “Afterward: Trade and … Conundrum: A Commentary” (2002) 96 A.J.I.L. 135.Google Scholar As a result of this vague wording in the GATT and the WTO Agreement and the fact that the meaning of “norms” and “principles” is the subject of academic debate, explanations of the theoretical foundations of international trade norms and values vary — from equality, justice, and morality, as advanced by the liberalists, to economic efficiency, as endorsed by economists. See, for example, Garcia, F., “Building a Just Trade Order for a New Millennium” (2001) 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 1015 at 1015–17Google Scholar; Jackson, J. “World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?” (1992) 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227 Google Scholar; and Bhagwati, J. and Hudec, R., eds., Fair Trade and Harmonization (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995) 95 at 108.Google Scholar Thus, it is worthwhile to explore both the extent to which selective adaptation is applied to some of these concepts originating from Western legal models and what determines the level of adaptation.
26 This principle is usually identified through its two sub-principles of most-favourednation (MFN) treatment and national treatment (NT) as specified in the GATT, supra note 4 at Articles I and III respectively. The MFN principle of not discriminating between one’s trading partners is also incorporated in the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B of the WTO Agreement, supra note 22 at Article II, and in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1 B of the WTO Agreement, supra note 22 at Article 4, while the NT principle of giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals, is incorporated in GATS at Article XVII and in the TRIPS Agreement at Article 3. As previously mentioned, since GATT did not introduce common competition policy principles, every member of the WTO can enforce its own competition policy rules and principles as long as they comply with the basic non-discrimination principle of GATT.
27 A Note of the Working Group on Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy emphasizes that the basic principles relevant to competition policy are the principles of national treatment (or treating foreigners and locals equally), MFN treatment (treating another nation as a “most-favoured” nation), and transparency, as incorporated in the 1947 founding GATT document and the subsequent WTO Agreement documents (GATS and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26). See the Working Group, The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and Transparency, Doc. WT/WGTCP/ W/114 (14 April 1999). The principle of national treatment is set out in GATT, supra note 4 at Article II, the GATS, supra note 26 at Article XVII, and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 26 at Article 3. The principle of MFN treatment is contained in the GATT at Article I, the GATS at Article II, and the TRIPS Agreement at Article 4. Finally, the principle of transparency is set out in the GATT at Article X, the GATS at Article III, and the TRIPS Agreement at Article 63.
28 On liberalism and international trade regime, see, in particular, Ruggie, J. G., “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, S. D., ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1983), 195.Google Scholar See also the most recent commentary of Ruggie’s article by Lang, A., “Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism; John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime” (2006) 9 J. Int’l Envt’l L. 81.Google Scholar On the origins and evolution of norms in international trade regime, see Barton, J. H., Goldstein, J. L., El Josling, T., and Steinber, R. H., The Evolution of the Trade Regime (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006)Google Scholar; and Breining-Kaufmann, C., “The Legal Matrix of Human Rights and Trade Law: State Obligations versus Private Rights and Obligations,” in Cottier, T. et al., eds, Human Rights and International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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37 See also Potter, P., “Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices” (2003) 1 Wash. U. Glob. Stud. L. Rev. 119.Google Scholar
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39 Ibid. at 8.
40 Administrative Procedure Law (Japan), Law no. 88 of 1993.
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44 Our data has revealed that people become involved in international trade at an earlier age in China than in Canada. The youngest respondents in Canada involved in these matters were thirty years of age.
45 See Steger, supra note 25; Ostry, supra note 29; and Potter, supra note 36.
46 See, for example, Mayeda, supra note 25.
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48 Competition Act, R.S., 1985, c. C-34, section 1.1. On the objectives of the US competition laws, see the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 at 4 (1958): “The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.” Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. (1890) at sections 1–7.
49 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Law no. 54 of 1947.
50 Anti-Monopoly Law, State Council of People Republic of China approved in principle the draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law in June 2006.
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53 See Potter, supra note 36. Potter’s arguments are based on the Chinese government’s recent white paper that denounced the application of liberal democratic values in China, while, at the same time, the government insists that China complies with basic WTO principles.
