¹ A good recent summary of literature bearing on this point as it applies to the study of political development may be found in Samuel Huntington, P., “Political Development and Political Decay”, World Politics, 17 (April, 1965), 386–430 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Robert A. Dahl speaks of “the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions—the right to participate in governmental decisions by casting a vote, the right to be represented, and the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the government in elections and in parliament.” In enumerating these three great achievements of democratic government, Dahl also implies that they are embodied principally in three main institutions: parties, elections, and legislatures: Dahl, Robert A. (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. xi Google Scholar. See also William Nisbet Chambers “Party Development and the American Mainstream”, especially pp. 18–19, in Chambers, and Burnham, Walter Dean (eds.), The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development (New York: Oxford, 1967)Google Scholar.

³ See for example, Nelson W. Polsby, “Congressional Research and Congressional Data: A Preliminary Statement” (mimeo) delivered at the Conference on Congressional Research, sponsored by the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research and the Social Science Research Council at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 3–4, 1964; Price, H. Douglas, “The Congressman and the Electoral Arena” (mimeo, 1964)Google Scholar; and Witmer, T. Richard, “The Aging of the House”, Political Science Quarterly, 79 (December, 1964), 526–541 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ SirMaine, Henry Sumner, Ancient Law London: John Murray, 1908), pp. 220–325 Google Scholar.

⁵ Tönnies, Ferdinand, Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft) (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Press, 1957)Google Scholar. See, in particular, the introductory commentary by Charles P. Loomis and John C. McKinney, “The Application of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as Related to Other Typologies,” ibid., pp. 12–29.

⁶ Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 328ff.Google Scholar

⁷ Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947)Google Scholar.

⁸ Parkinson, C. Northcote, Parkinson's Law (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁹ The only successful modern attempt I am aware of that employs a classical theory of institutionalization in an empirical study of something other than a bureaucracy is Pfautz's, Harold W. “Christian Science: The Sociology of a Social Movement and Religious Group” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1954)Google Scholar. See also Pfautz, Harold W., ‘The Sociology of Secularization: Religious Groups”, The American Journal of Sociology, 41 (September, 1955), 121–128 Google Scholar, and Pfautz, , “A Case Study of an Urban Religious Movement: Christian Science” in Burgess, E. W. and Bogue, D. J. (eds.), Contributions to Urban Sociology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 284–303 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ On Clay, see Mayo, Bernard, Henry Clay: Spokesman of the New West (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937)Google Scholar; Deusen, Glyndon G. Van, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937)Google Scholar; Follett, Mary Parker, The Speaker of the House of Representatives (New York: Longman's, Green, 1896), pp. 69–82 Google Scholar; and Mooney, Booth, Mr. Speaker (Chicago: Follett, 1964), pp. 21–48 Google Scholar.

¹¹ This pattern has been suggested before, by Douglas Price and myself, in unpublished papers (see Footnote 3). It is apparently not unique to the House. David Rothman, on what seem to me to be tenuous grounds, suggests something similar for the U.S. Senate in Politics and Power: The U.S. Senate 1869–1901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)Google Scholar. Consider, for a better example, where the United States gets its military leaders today and compare with this observation on the Mexican war period:

The President [Polk] now undertook to offset this Whig advantage by making a number of Democratic generals. … He thereupon proceeded to name numerous Democrats to command the new divisions and brigades. … Even this flock of Democratic generals did not erase Polk's fears. After he had committed the command to Scott he considered giving the top authority to a civilian. He wanted to commission Senator Thomas Hart Benton a lieutenant general, and give him overall command. …

( Nichols, Roy F., The Stakes of Power: 1846–1877’ New York: Hill and Wang, 1961, pp. 16, 17.Google Scholar) One would expect civilians to serve high in the officer corps in wars of total mobilization, such as the Civil War and World War II, but not in a conflict involving only a partial mobilization, such as the Mexican War, Korea or Viet Nam. Nevertheless, the full professionalization of our army took place only in this century. During the Spanish-American War, another war of partial mobilization, the business of fighting was still carried on partially by militia and by federal volunteer reigments—irregulars—who fought side by side with, but independently of, regular troops. See Millis, Walter, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1956), pp. 167–210 Google Scholar. See also a contemporary Washington newsman's report: Arthur Dunn, Wallace, From Harrison to Harding (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons 1922), Vol. I, pp. 240ff, 272–274 Google Scholar. Dunn says (Vol. I, pp. 240–41): “From the very beginning politics cut a leading part in the war. The appointments of generals and many other officers were due to influence rather than to merit or fitness … One of these [appointments] was General Joe Wheeler, a member of Congress from Alabama. When he appeared with the twin stars of a major general on his shoulders, he joyously exclaimed: ‘It is worth fifteen years of life to die on a battlefield’. … ‘He will have twenty thousand men under him [remarked a critic] who do not share his opinion, and they will not care to lose fifteen years of their lives to give Joe Wheeler a glorious death.’” See also Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1957), esp. pp. 222–269 Google Scholar. Huntington dates the rise of the American military as a profession from after the Civil War.

Consider also the following observation about the U.S. Supreme Court: “In the early years, resignations tended to occur for all sorts of reasons; Chief Justice Jay resigned to assume the governorship of New York, for example. But as the Court's prestige increased, justices found fewer reasons to step down from the bench”: Krislov, Samuel, The Supreme Court in the Political Process (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 9 Google Scholar. David Danelski has suggested in a personal communication that while in its earliest years, the U.S. Supreme Court was neither a prestigious nor well-bounded institution, it became so more rapidly than the House, as the following table indicates:

It is, of course, not uncommon for students of the Court to view the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall as highly significant in stabilizing the role of the Court in the political system and in enlarging its influence. Other indicators useful in tracing the institutionalization of the federal judiciary might be to study changes in the professional training of persons who have become federal judges, the increase in the number of judges on inferior federal courts, the codification of procedures for dealing with constitutional questions, the routinization of procedures for the granting of certiorari, and the growth of a bureaucracy to administer the federal court system. See, inter alia, Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in Ashwander vs. T.V.A. 297 U.S. 346–348; McElwain, Edwin, “The Business of The Supreme Court as Conducted by Chief Justice Hughes”, Harvard Law Review, 63 (November, 1949), 6–26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pusey, Merlo J., Charles Evans Hughes (New York: Macmillan, 1951), Vol. II, pp. 603–690 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wiener, Frederick Bernays, “The Supreme Court's New Rules”, Harvard Law Review, 68 (November, 1954), 20–94 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Chief Justice Vinson's address before the American Bar Association, “The Work of the Federal Courts,” September 7, 1949, reprinted in part in Murphy, Walter F. and Pritchett, C. Herman (eds.), Courts, Judges and Politics (N. Y.: Random House, 1961), pp. 54–58 Google Scholar.

¹² The combined totals of standing committees and subcommittees might be a better guide; but reliable information about subcommittees only exists for the most recent two decades.

¹³ I believe the word is Galloway's, George. See Congress at the Crossroads (New York: Crowell, 1946), p. 340 Google Scholar.

¹⁴ It certainly is, on the other hand, in the present-day United Kingdom, where purely legislative committees are regarded as a threat to the cohesion of the national political parties because they would give the parliamentary parties special instruments with which they could develop independent policy judgments and expertise and exercise oversight over an executive which is, after all, not formally constituted as an entity separate from Parliament. Thus committees can be construed as fundamentally inimical to unified Cabinet government. For an overview see Crick, Bernard, The Reform of Parliament (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1965)Google Scholar; The Political Quarterly, 36 (July–September, 1965)Google Scholar; and Hill, Andrew and Whichelow, Anthony, What's Wrong with Parliament? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), esp. pp. 64–82 Google Scholar. See also a most illuminating essay by Robert C. Fried on the general conditions under which various political institutions (including legislatures) are strong or weak within their political systems: Comparative Political Institutions (New York: Macmillan, 1966), esp. p. 31 Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Harlow, Ralph V., The History of Legislative Methods in the Period Before 1825 (New Haven: Yale, 1917), pp. 127–128 Google Scholar. See also Cooper, Joseph, “Jeffersonian Attitudes Toward Executive Leadership and Committee Development in the House of Representatives 1789–1829”, Western Political Quarterly, 18 (March, 1965), 45–63 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Cooper, , “Congress and Its Committees in the Legislative Process” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1960), pp. 1–65 Google Scholar.

¹⁶ On changes in the use of select committees, Lauros G. McConachie says: “Business of the earlier Houses went to hosts of select committees. At least three hundred and fifty were raised in the Third Congress. A special committee had to be formed for every petty claim. A bill founded on the report of one small committee had to be recommended to, or carefully drafted by, yet another committee. But the decline in the number of these select committees was strikingly rapid. In twenty years, at the Congress of 1813–1815 with its three war sessions, it had fallen to about seventy”: Congressional Committees (New York: Crowell, 1898), p. 124 Google Scholar. See also Galloway, op. cit., p. 88.

¹⁷ Alexander, DeAlva Stanwood, History and Procedure of the House of Representatives (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1916), p. 228 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Harlow, op. cit., pp. 141.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 120–150.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 151.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 157–158.

²² Binkley, Wilfred E., President and Congress (New York: Vintage, 1962), p. 64 Google Scholar.

²³ Of Randolph's initial appointment as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, in the Seventh Congress, Noble Cunningham writes: “in view of the close friendship of [Speaker] Macon and Randolph, it is unlikely that Jefferson had any influence in the choice of Randolph as Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee”: Jeffersonian Republicans in Power (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 73 Google Scholar. See also Adams, Henry, John Randolph (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1886), pp. 54–55, 123–165ffGoogle Scholar; and Adams, , History of the United Stales of America During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison (New York: Boni, 1930), Vol. III, p. 128 Google Scholar.

²⁴ This interpretation is the brilliant achievement of Young, James S. in The Washington Community: 1800–1828 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966)Google Scholar. It harmonizes with Richard P. McCormick's notion of a series of historically discrete American party systems. See McCormick, , The Second American Party System (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966)Google Scholar.

²⁵ See Binkley, Wilfred, “The President and Congress”, Journal of Politics, 11 (February, 1949), 65–79 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ See Young, op. cit., pp. 131–135.

²⁷ Chambers, William Nisbet, Political Parties in a New Nation (New York: Oxford, 1963), p. 194 Google Scholar.

²⁸ See Polsby, Nelson W., Gallaher, Miriam and Rundquist, Barry Spencer, “The Growth of the Seniority System in the Selection of Committee Chairman in the U.S. House of Representatives” (mimeo., October, 1967)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Ibid. Chang-wei Chiu says, “The power of appointing committees by the Speaker was a real issue in the attempts to reform the House. In the eyes of the insurgents no change would be of any real and permanent value to the country if that change did not take away from the Speaker the power of appointing standing committees”: The Speaker of The House of Representatives Since 1896 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 71–72 Google Scholar.

³⁰ Harlow, op. cit., p. 176.

³¹ Cunningham, op. cit., p. 74. The quotation is from a letter from Roger Griswold to John Rut-ledge, December 14, 1801.

³² See Jefferson's letters to Barnabas Bidwell and Wilson Cary Nicholas cited in ibid., pp. 89–92. Also Henry Adams, History, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 166–171.

³³ Randall Ripley, in his forthcoming Brookings study, Party Leadership in the House of Representatives (mimeo, 1966) says: “The Majority leader did not become a separate and consistently identifiable party figure until some time around the turn of the century.” Ripley also discusses the indeterminancy of the minority leadership in the mid-19th century. Of an earlier period (1800–1828) Young (op. cit., pp. 126–127) writes: “Party members elected no leaders, designated no functionaries to speak in their behalf or to carry out any legislative task assignments. The party had no whips, no seniority leaders. There were no committees on committees, no steering committees, no policy committees: none of the organizational apparatus that marks the twentieth-century congressional parties. …” On pp. 127–130 Young argues that although there were a number of party leaders in the House, there was no fixed majority leader. “[W]hile the names of Randolph, Giles, Nicholas and Rodney appear more frequently, at least twenty Republican legislators in the eight years of Jefferson's administration are either explicitly identified as leaders in the documentary record or are associated with activities strongly suggesting a role of presidential spokes-manship” (p. 130).

³⁴ From 1865–1869, for example, Thaddeus Stevens left the chairmanship of Ways and Means (a post he had held from 1861–1865) to become chairman of the new Committee on Appropriations. See McCall, Samuel W., Thaddeus Stevens (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1899), pp. 259–260 Google Scholar. McCall says, oddly, that at the time the Appropriations Committee was not very important, but this is hard to credit. From 1895–1899, Joseph G. Cannon was floor leader and chairman of Appropriations. See Taylor, Edward T., A History of the Committee on Appropriations (House Document 299, 77th Congress, 1st Session) (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941)Google Scholar.

³⁵ See Brown, George Rothwell, The Leadership of Congress (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1922), pp. 175–177, 183–184 Google Scholar; Davis, Oscar King, “Where Underwood Stands”, The Outlook (December 23, 1911), 197–201 Google Scholar. At p. 199: “Every move Mr. Underwood has made, every bill he has brought forward, he first submitted to a caucus. … Not until the last man had had his say was the vote taken that was to bind them all to united action in the House. Every time that vote has been either unanimous or nearly so, and invariably it has approved Mr. Underwood.” See also Binkley, “The President and Congress,” op. cit., p. 72.

³⁶ See Ripley, op. cit.; Hasbrouck, op. cit., p. 94; and Arnett, Alex M., Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), pp. 42, 71–72, 75–76, 88–89 Google Scholar and passim.

³⁷ See Ripley, Randall B., “The Party Whip Organization in the United States House of Representatives” this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), 561–576 Google Scholar.

³⁸ See, e.g., Alexander, op. cit., pp. 111–114. “[W]ith very few exceptions, the really eminent debaters … were in the Senate; otherwise, MacDuflie [who served 1821–1834], Chief of the Hotspurs, could scarely have justified his title to floor leader,” p. 114.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 110: “In selecting a floor leader the Speaker often names his party opponent.”

⁴⁰ Garner, James W., “Executive Participation in Legislation as a Means of Increasing Legislative Efficiency”, Proceedings of the American Political Science Association at its Tenth Annual Meeting (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1914), p. 187 Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Kofmehl, Kenneth, Professional Staffs of Congress (Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1962), pp. 97–99 Google Scholar. The quotation is at p. 99. Kofmehl presents a short, nonquantitative historical sketch of the growth of committee staffs on pp. 3–5. See also Samuel C. Patterson “Congressional Committee Professional Staffing: Capabilities and Constraints,” a paper presented at the Planning Conference of the Comparative Administration Group, Legislative Services Project, Planting Fields, New York, December 8–10,1967; and Rogers, Lindsay “The Staffing of Congress” Political Science Quarterly, 56 (March, 1941), 1–22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴² George B. Galloway, op. cit., p. 187; Goodwin, George Jr., “The Seniority System in Congress” this REVIEW, 53 (June, 1959), p. 417 Google Scholar.

⁴³ Chiu, op. cit., pp. 68–72; Pollock, James K. Jr., “The Seniority Rule in Congress”, The North American Review, 222 (1925), 235, 236 Google Scholar; Hinds, Asher, “The Speaker of the House of Representatives”, this REVIEW, 3 (May, 1909), 160–161 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Wilson, Woodrow, Congressional Government (New York: Meridian Books, 1956) (First edition, 1884)Google Scholar. See, for example, on pp. 85–86: “The Speaker is expected to constitute the Committees in accordance with his own political views … [and he] generally uses his powers as freely and imperatively as he is expected to use them. He unhesitatingly acts as the legislative chief of his party, organizing the Committees m the interest of this or that policy, not covertly or on the sly, as one who does something of which he is ashamed, but openly and confidently, as one who does his duty. …” Compare this with p. 82: “I know not how better to describe our form of government in a single phrase than by calling it a government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress. This disintegrate ministry, as it figures on the floor of the House of Representatives, has many peculiarities. In the first place, it is made up of the elders of the assembly; for, by custom, seniority in congressional service determines the bestowal of the principal chairmanships. …”

⁴⁵ Polsby, Gallaher, and Rundquist, op. cit.

⁴⁶ Dempsey, John Thomas, “Control by Congress over the Seating and Disciplining of Members” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Michigan, 1956), pp. 50–51 Google Scholar. The final quotation is from Alexander, op. cit., p. 315.

⁴⁷ Hoar, George F., Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York: Scribner, 1903), Vol. I, p. 268 Google Scholar. Hoar claims that during the time he served on the Elections Committee in the Forty-second Congress (1871–73), contested elections were settled on the merits.

⁴⁸ Dawes, Henry L., “The Mode of Procedure in Cases of Contested Elections”, Journal of Social Science (No. 2, 1870), 56–68 Google Scholar. Quoted passages are at p. 64, Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 83–84, identifies Dawes as a one-time chairman of the House Committee on Elections. See also Rammelkamp, C. H., “Contested Congressional Elections”, Political Science Quarterly, 20 (Sept., 1905), 434–435 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁹ Reed, Thomas B., “Contested Elections”, North American Review, 151 (July, 1890), 112–120 Google Scholar. Quoted passages are at pp. 114 and 117. See also Alexander, op. cit., p. 323.

⁵⁰ Report from Elections Committee No. 3, Mr. McCall, chairman, quoted in Rammelkamp, op. cit., p. 435.

⁵¹ Stealey, O. O., Twenty Years in the Press Gallery (New York: published by the author, 1906), p. 147 Google Scholar.

⁵² Rammelkamp, op. cit., pp. 421–442. Quoted passages are from pp. 423 and 434.

⁵³ Stealey, op. cit., p. 147.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Hasbrouck, Paul De Witt, Party Government in the House of Representatives (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 40 Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ See U.S., Revised Statutes of the United States, Title II, Ch. 8, Sections 105–130, and Dempsey, op. cit., pp. 55–60. For indications of attempts to routinize the process of adjudication by setting up general criteria to govern House disposition of contested elections, see two 1933 cases: Gormley vs. Goss (House Report 893, 73rd Congress; see also 78 Congressional Record, pp. 4035, 7087, April 20, 1934 Google Scholar) and Chandler vs. Burnham (House Report 1278, 73rd Congress; see also 78 Congressional Record, pp. 6971, 8921, May 15, 1934)Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ On the relatively scrupulous handling of a recent contest see Rovere, Richard H., “Letter from Washington”, The New Yorker (October 16, 1965), 233–244 Google Scholar. Rovere (at p. 243) identifies criteria governing the report on the 1965 challenge by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to the entire Mississippi House delegation in the following passage: “… the majority could find no way to report favorably [on the challenge] without, as it seemed to them, abandoning due process and their constitutional responsibilities. Neither, for that matter, could the minority report, which went no further than to urge continued study.”

⁵⁷ See, e.g., the assignment of burden of proof in Gormley vs. Goss and Chandler vs. Burnham, loc. cit.

⁵⁸ Durkheim, op. cit., p. 262. Durkheim in turn cites Comte as describing this mechanism. Weber's notion, that the central precondition for the development of bureaucratic institutions is the money economy, strikes me as less interesting and less plausible. See Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 204–209 Google Scholar. See, however, Weber's comment (p 211): “It is obvious that technically the great modern state is absolutely dependent upon a bureaucratic basis. The larger the state, and the more it is or the more it becomes a great power state, the more unconditionally is this the case.”

⁵⁹ Cf. Young, op. cit., pp. 252–253, who seems to put great stress on public attitudes and local political organization as causes of the growth in the influence of the central government.

⁶⁰ George Galloway's History of the U.S. House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 246 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Oflice, 1962), pp. 215–216, has a convenient scorecard on the size and party composition of the House for the first 87 Congresses. Mere size has been found to be an indifferent predictor of the internal complexity of bureaucratic organizations. See Hall, Richard H., Haas, J. Eugene and Johnson, Norman J., “Organizational Size, Complexity, and Formalization”, American Sociological Review, 32 (December, 1967), 903–912 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶¹ Bendiner, Robert, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill (N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 15 Google Scholar.

⁶² Woodrow Wilson, op. cii., p. 57.

⁶³ This is not to say, however, that the policy output of the House is exclusively determined by its level of institutionalization. The 88th, 89th and 90th Congresses all represent more or less equivalent levels of institutionalization, yet their policy outputs varied greatly. Nevertheless if the casual observer asked why it took thirty years, more or less, to get the New Deal enacted in the House, and what sorts of strategies and circumstances made the legislative output of the 89th Congress possible, answers would have to refer quite extensively to structural properties of the institution.

⁶⁴ See, e.g. Blau, Peter M., The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955)Google Scholar, passim; Selznick, Philip, TV A and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), esp. pp. 250ff.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Selznick, Philip, Leadership in Administration (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957)Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ This position disagrees with Hyman, Sidney, “Inquiry into the Decline of Congress”, New York Times Magazine, January 31, 1960 Google Scholar. For the argument that 20th century legislatures are on the whole weak see Truman, David B., “The Representative Function in Western Systems”, in Buehrig, Edward H. (ed.), Essays in Political Science (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 84–96 Google Scholar; Truman, , The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1954), pp. 1–10 Google Scholar; Truman, , “Introduction: The Problem and Its Setting”, in Truman, (ed.), The Congress and America's Future (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 1–4 Google Scholar. For the beginning of an argument that the U.S. Congress may be an exception, see Polsby, Nelson W., Congress and the Presidency (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 2, 31–32, 47–115 Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ See Weber, op. cit., p. 69, pp. 330–34; and Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 198–204.

⁶⁸ See, for example, Matthews, Donald, “The Folkways of the U.S. Senate”, this REVIEW, 53 (December, 1959), 1064–1089 Google Scholar; Wahlke, John C., Eulau, Heinz, Buchanan, William, and Ferguson, Leroy C., The Legislative System (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 141–169 Google Scholar; Kornberg, Alan, “The Rules of the Game in the Canadian House of Commons”, The Journal of Politics, 26 (May, 1964), 358–380 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huitt, Ralph K., “The Outsider in The Senate”, this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 566–575 Google Scholar; Masters, Nicholas A., “Committee Assignments in The House of Representatives”, this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 345–357 Google Scholar; Fenno, Richard F. Jr., “The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration”, this REVIEW, 56 (June, 1962), 310–324 Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Miller, Clem, Member of the House (Baker, John W., ed.) (New York: Scribner, 1962), p. 93 Google Scholar. See also pp. 80–81 and 119–122.

⁷⁰ Alexander, op. cit., pp. 115–116. The internal quotations are from John Quincy Adams' Diary and from an article by Reed in the Saturday Evening Post, December 9, 1899.

⁷¹ Mayo, op. cit., p. 424; Cutler, William Parkes and Cutler, Julia Perkins (eds.), Life, Journals and Correspondence of Reverend Manasseh Cutler (Cincinnati: Robert Clark and Co., 1888), Vol. II, pp. 186–189 Google Scholar.

⁷² A motion to expel Brooks from the House for this act was defeated; but soon thereafter Brooks resigned anyway. He was subsequently reelected to fill the vacancy caused by his resignation. See Biographical Directory of The American Congress, 1774–1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 604 Google Scholar.

⁷³ Alexander, op. cit., pp. 111–112. Other instances of flagrant misbehavior are chronicled in Poore, Ben Perley, Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis (Philadelphia: Hubbard, 1886), Vol. I, pp. 394–395 Google Scholar; and Plumer, William, Memorandum of Proceedings in the United States Senate (Brown, Everett Somerville, ed.) (New York: Macmillan, 1923), pp. 269–276 Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ A report on decorum in the 19th Century House of Commons suggests that a corresponding toning down has taken place, although Commons was palpably a good bit less unruly to start with. Says an ecstatic commentator, “Like so much else that is good in the institutions of Parliament, the behaviour of the House has grown straight, or, like a river, purified itself as it flowed”: Taylor, Eric, The House of Commons At Work (Baltimore: Penguin, 1961), pp. 85–87 Google Scholar. Anthony Barker says: “The close of the 19th Century has been described by Lord Campion as the ending of informality and the beginning of rigid government responsibility for policy in the procedures of the House of Commons”: “‘The Most Important And Venerable Function’: A Study of Commons Supply Procedure”, Political Studies, 13 (February, 1965), p. 45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ Perhaps secondary analysis comparing the four states (California, New Jersey, Tennessee, Ohio) in the Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson study (op. cit.) will yield an acceptable test of the hypothesis. This study has good information on the diffusion of legislative norms; it is less strong on structural data, but these might be relatively easy to gather.

⁷⁶ Parkinson, op. cit., p. 39.

⁷⁷ The growth of political institutions does not play a particularly important part in the interpretation offered by Rostow, W. W. in The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), see, e.g., pp. 18–19 Google Scholar, but these may afford at least as good support for his theory as some of the economic indicators he proposes.