Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wzw2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-20T11:55:55.043Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Effect of Referendums on Autocratic Survival: Running Alone and Not Finishing Second

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2023

Alberto Penadés Open the ORCID record for Alberto Penadés [Opens in a new window]  and
Sergio Velasco Open the ORCID record for Sergio Velasco [Opens in a new window]
Alberto Penadés
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain
Sergio Velasco*
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain Department of Applied Economy, Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain
*
Corresponding author: Sergio Velasco, Email: sergio.v.mon@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Dictatorships that use plebiscites – that is, referendums initiated by the executive – have a longer expected lifespan. A successful plebiscite sends a signal that makes coordination for collective action more difficult and induces the falsification of preferences. It also enhances the status of the dictator within the regime and against potential rivals through the use of agenda power. As a result, plebiscites are followed by decreased mobilization and a reduced risk of palace coups. This, in turn, adds years to the dictator's tenure. We have found evidence to support these propositions by utilizing data from various databases of autocratic regimes that span from 1946 to 2008.

Keywords

authoritarianismplebiscitesreferendumsregime survivalinstitutions
Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 59 , Issue 2 , April 2024 , pp. 405 - 424
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Ltd

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Altman, D (2010) Direct Democracy Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barros, R (2002) Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beck, N and Katz, JN (2007) Random Coefficient Models for Time-Series – Cross-Section Data: Monte Carlo Experiments. Political Analysis 15(2), 182–195. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpl001.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boix, C and Svolik, MW (2013) The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. Journal of Politics 75(2), 300–316. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000029.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bolt, J et al. (2018) Rebasing ‘Maddison’: New Income Comparisons and the Shape of Long-Run Economic Development. Maddison Project Working Paper 10, University of Groningen Growth and Development Centre, www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2020?lang=en.Google Scholar
Bratton, M and Lambright, G (2001) Uganda's Referendum 2000: The Silent Boycott. African Affairs 100(400), 429–452. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/100.400.429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Centola, D, Willer, R and Macy, M (2005) The Emperor's Dilemma: A Computational Model of Self-Enforcing Norms. American Journal of Sociology 110(4), 1009–1040. https://doi.org/10.1086/427321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chwe, MS-Y (1999) Structure and Strategy in Collective Action. American Journal of Sociology 105(1), 128–156. https://doi.org/10.1086/210269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chwe, MS-Y (2001) Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination and Common Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Coppedge, M et al. (2020) ‘V-Dem Codebook v10’. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/.Google Scholar
Cox, DR (1972) Regression Models and Life-Tables. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) 34(2), 187–220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1972.tb00899.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dominioni, S (2017) The Mechanism of Direct Democracy in Authoritarian Countries: The Case of the Constitutional Referendum in Azerbaijan. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 25(4), 435–453.Google Scholar
Gandhi, J and Przeworski, A (2006) Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships. Economics & Politics 18(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gandhi, J and Przeworski, A (2007) Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. Comparative Political Studies 40(11), 1279–1301. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007305817.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geddes, B, Wright, J and Frantz, E (2014) Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. Perspectives on Politics 12(2), 313–331. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geddes, B, Wright, J and Frantz, E (2018) How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gillespie, CG (1985) Uruguay's Return to Democracy. Bulletin of Latin American Research 4(2), 99. https://doi.org/10.2307/3338320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haber, S and Menaldo, V (2011) Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse. American Political Science Review 105(1), 1–26. https://www.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055410000584.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hug, S and Tsebelis, G (2002) Veto Players and Referendums around the World. Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4), 465–515. https://doi.org/10.1177/095169280201400404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
‘Informe “La Consulta Nacional del 4 de Enero de 1978”’ (2018) Available at www.archivopatricioaylwin.cl/xmlui/handle/123456789/7285.Google Scholar
Kalaycıoğlu, E (2012) Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010. South European Society and Politics 17(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2011.600555.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kim, NK and Sudduth, JK (2021) Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships. Comparative Political Studies 54(9), 1597–1628. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997161.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Knutsen, CH, Nygård, HM and Wig, T (2017) Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change? World Politics 69(1), 98–143. http://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887116000149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornblith, M and Jawahar, V (2005) Elections versus Democracy. Journal of Democracy 16(1), 124–137. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2005.0011.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kuran, T (1997) Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Magaloni, B (2006) Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meng, A (2020) Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penadés, A (2018) ‘La invención del referéndum’ (The Invention of Referendum). Letras libres 206(November), 24–27, https://letraslibres.com/revista/la-invencion-del-referendum/.Google Scholar
Penadés, A and Velasco, S (2022) Plebiscites: A Tool for Dictatorship. European Political Science Review 14(1), 74–93. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577392100031X.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penfold, M (2010) La democracia subyugada: El hiperpresidencialismo venezolano. Revista de ciencia política (Santiago) 30(1), 21–40. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-090X2010000100003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Powell, JM and Thyne, CL (2011) Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 48(2), 249–259. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397436.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Qvortrup, M (2021) Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Slow Demise of Democracy. Berlin, Boston, MA: De Gruyter.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Qvortrup, M (2022) Referendums and Ethnic Conflict, 2nd edn. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Google Scholar
Qvortrup, M, O'Leary, B and Wintrobe, R (2020) Explaining the Paradox of Plebiscites. Government and Opposition: An International Journal of Comparative Politics 55(2), 202–219. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rilla, J (1997) Uruguay 1980: Transición y democracia plebiscitaria. Nueva sociedad 150, 77–83.Google Scholar
Roberts, TL (2015) The Durability of Presidential and Parliament-Based Dictatorships. Comparative Political Studies 48(7), 915–948. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014565888.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rozenas, A (2010) Forced Consent: Information and Power in Non-Democratic Elections, APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper [preprint], https://ssrn.com/abstract=1643327.Google Scholar
Sánchez-Cuenca, I (2014) Atado y mal atado: El suicidio institucional del franquismo y el surgimiento de la democracia. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.Google Scholar
Scott, JC (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Silitski, V (2005) Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus. Journal of Democracy 16(4), 83–97. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2005.0074.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simpser, A (2013) Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Svolik, MW (2012) The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walker, MC (2003) The Strategic Use of Referendums: Power, Legitimacy, and Democracy, 1st edn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Willer, R, Kuwabara, K and Macy, MW (2009) The False Enforcement of Unpopular Norms. American Journal of Sociology 115(2), 451–490. https://doi.org/10.1086/599250.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Supplementary material: File

Penadés and Velasco supplementary material

Penadés and Velasco supplementary material
Download Penadés and Velasco supplementary material(File)
File 129.7 KB