INTRODUCTION

Presidents are not dominant over political parties in Costa Rica, but presidential candidates wield tremendous influence over their copartisans. This chapter focuses attention on the rules that govern political competition and policy making: specifically, electoral laws and the constitutional division of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government. These rules endow Costa Rican presidents with some strengths in influencing partisan policy struggles, but in comparative perspective, the formal powers of Costa Rican presidents to control the actions of politicians within their parties and decisions in the Legislative Assembly are strictly limited. In short, Costa Rican institutions provide for a legislature that is largely independent of the president in debating and deciding on national policy. Nevertheless, the dependence of Costa Rican politicians on future presidential appointments implies that prospective presidents enjoy significant power within their parties, both inside and outside the legislature.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I trace the historical roots of limited presidential power in Costa Rica back to the establishment of the current regime, then review the scope of presidential power in the context of the current constitution and party system. Next, I turn attention to the nature of Costa Rican political careers, arguing that prohibitions on reelection for both legislators and presidents generate unique influence for presidential candidates over their copartisans, in both electoral politics and policy making. I then illustrate the limitations on presidential ability to affect policy making in the legislature with examples from budget and bank reform legislation and from treaty ratification.