Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wg55d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-05T20:23:02.947Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Conclusion: The Future of Executive Compensation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2009

Ira Kay
Affiliation:
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Washington, DC
Steven Van Putten
Affiliation:
Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Washington, DC
Get access

Summary

In the mythology that surrounds executive compensation, unchecked executives collect unearned rewards and grow rich at the expense of shareholders, employees, and the broader community. The media's fascination with renegade executives and their boards has overshadowed evidence that realizable executive pay is highly sensitive to corporate performance and that boards act decisively when financial results are unacceptable. We hope the account provided will reset the terms of the debate so that constructive discussions about executive compensation and the U.S. corporate model can flourish.

The process for setting executive pay at the vast majority of companies follows the principles of pay-for-performance and complies with the extensive set of laws and regulations governing executive pay practices and the role of the board of directors. The same force that sets pay opportunity for all Americans determines CEO pay: relatively free, if imperfect, labor markets, in which companies offer the levels of compensation necessary to attract and retain the employees who generate value for shareholders. The problem is not that CEOs receive too much performance-driven stock-based compensation but that nonexecutives receive too little.

The issue should not be the dollar amount paid to U.S. CEOs – or how that amount compares with pay levels in other countries or whether it represents high or low multiples of pay for the average worker. The first and last question must be whether the CEO creates an adequate return on the company's investment.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×