^{page 57 note 1} See Flew, Anthony, God and Philosophy(London: Hutchinson, 1966), chapter 9.Google Scholar This argument is alluded to by Swinburne, R. G. in ‘The Christian Wager’, Religious Studies IV (1969), 217–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 57 note 2} As many scholars have pointed out, Pascal was not so naive as to suppose that one could believe in God by an act of will. However, he did think that belief could be developed by acting in certain religious ways, for example by attending mass and taking the sacraments. So the two choices of the non-believer were really to act or not to act in religious ways. See Hacking, Ian, ‘The Logic of Pascal's Wager’, APQ IX (1972), 186–92;Google ScholarCarle, James, ‘Pascal's Wager’, Philosophy XLI (1966), 250–7;Google ScholarMartin, Michael, ‘On Four Critiques of Pascal's Wager’, Sophia XIV (1975), 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 58 note 1} For a more detailed discussion of Pascal's wager from a decision-theoretical standpoint see Hacking, op. cit.

^{page 58 note 2} For a discussion of these and other rules see Luce, D. C. and Raiffa, H., Games and Decisions (New York: John Wiley, 1957), chapters 1–4,Google Scholar

^{page 59 note 1} Clearly then the view is mistaken that one must assume that the probability is 1/2 that God exists and 1/2 that he does not in order to make the argument work. For this mistaken criticism see Beardsley, Monroe and Beardsley, Elizabeth, Philosophical Thinking: An Introduction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, p. 140).Google ScholarHacking, (op. cit. p. 189)Google Scholar claims that Pascal is committed to this assumption in one formulation of his argument. However, this assumption is not made in the version of the argument considered here.

^{page 59 note 2} See Hacking, (op. cit.);Google ScholarCargile, (op. cit.)Google Scholar

^{page 59 note 3} Whether there is an infinite number of possibilities, as Flew has maintained, is another question. In any case an infinite number of possibilities is not needed to refute the argument, although such an assumption is useful in providing reasons for non-belief. See Flew, Anthony ‘Is Pascal's Wager the Only Sage Bet?’ Rationalist Annual (1960), pp. 21–5.Google Scholar

^{page 61 note 1} The above argument will not work in exactly the same way against belief in Supernatural Beings with finite rewards and punishments. However, with slight modification the argument can proceed as before. Space does not permit me to show this extension here.

^{page 62 note 1} When worship is translated into actual religious practice, worship can be time consuming, expensive and troublesome. The long hours spent in religious rituals, the extreme penances required by some sects, the tithe required by some churches, and the asceticism required in others are some of the more obvious examples of the negative value of religious worship.

^{page 62 note 2} For a discussion of epistemic values in decision theory see Levy, Isaac, Gambling with Truth (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967);Google ScholarHempel, Carl, ‘Inductive Inconsistencies’, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965) esp. pp. 73–9.Google Scholar

^{page 63 note 1} Martin, Michael, ‘Is Evil Evidence Against The Existence of God?’ Mind (1978), pp. 429–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 63 note 2} There seem to me to be three main lines of argument to show that the hypothesis that no Supernatural Beings exist is a better explanation of the available evidence that the hypothesis that some Supernatural Beings exist. First, other things being equal, hypotheses that postulate Supernatural Beings are Is simple than hypotheses that do not. Second, supernatural hypotheses tend to be less testable than naturalistic hypotheses. Third, from a historical point of view, hypotheses postulating supernatural entities have in realm after realm been replaced by hypotheses that don't; on inductive grounds one can expect this replacement to continue. Consequently the hypothesis that no Supernatural Beings exist is likely to be a better explanation of the available evidence than the hypothesis that some Supernatural Beings do exist; consequently the hypothesis that no Supernatural Beings exist is likely to be inductively better justified than its negation. See Harmon, Gilbert, ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’, Philosophical Review LXXIV, 1965.Google Scholar