We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2009
The subject of United States foreign policy towards Argentina in the years during and immediately after World War II continues to hold the attention of scholars. Their interest goes beyond the intrinsic importance which Argentina had then, or now. Rather, interest is fixed because this case provides the first post-War illustration of several serious problems which United States foreign policy in the hemisphere has demonstrated many times since, and currently in its relations with Nicaragua.
1 New York Times, 21 April 1946, section 4, p. 5.
2 That policy consisted of rivalry with Brazil, insistence on the principles of absolute sovereignty and juridical equality, resistance to U.S. leadership of the hemisphere, and adamant independence from Great Powers. Finan, John J., ‘Argentina’, in Davis, Harold Eugene and Wilson, Larman C. (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies – An Analysis (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1975), pp. 266–8.Google Scholar
3 See, for example, Whitaker, Arthur P., Inter-American Affairs; An Annual Survey (N.Y. Columbia University, 1944), no. 3 (1943), p. 23Google Scholar; no. 4 (1944), p. 4; and no. 5 (1945). p. 3.
4 New York Times, 26 January 1947, section 4, p. 7.
5 See, for example, Trask, Roger R., ‘The Impact of the Cold War on United States–Latin American Relations, 1945–1949’, Diplomatic History, 1 (Summer 1977), 271–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 See, for example, Trask, , ‘Spruille Braden Versus George Messersmith, World War II, the Cold War and Argentine Policy, 1945–1947’, Journal of Inter-Amtrican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 26, no. 1 (02. 1984), 69–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Macdonald, C. A., ‘The Politics of Intervention: The United States and Argentina, 1941–1946’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 12, no. 2 (1980), 365–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 Welles, Sumner, Seven Decisions that Shaped History (N.Y. Harper, 1950), p. 106.Google Scholar
8 Fifth Plenary Meeting, 8 February 1945, Palace, Livadia, Foreign Relations of the United States – Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1955), pp. 772–3.Google Scholar
9 Stettinius to Grew, Top Secret, Operational Priority, 8 February 1945, Defense Files, Ibid., pp. 794 and 797.
10 Roosevelt, Bowers to, 12 12 1944, 740.011 EW/12–1244, Foreign Relations 1944, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1967), p. 698Google Scholar. This telegram suggests both the indifference of the United States to the domestic consequences of insisting that Latin governments follow its every policy shift and the unpopularity of many of those shifts and also of kow-towing to the United States. The question of relations with the Soviet Union, for example, was extremely sensitive in all the Latin countries. In Chile the Communists were making a serious bid for power. By November 1946 the Chilean cabinet included three Communist Ministers, the first in the hemisphere.
11 Bowers to Stettinius, no. 184, 5 February 1945, 740.0011 EW/2–545, Foreign Relations 194;, vol. ix, p. 761Google Scholar. Chilean Foreign Minister Fernández told Bowers that ‘th[is] sort of thing implies a strange ignorance of Latin American psychology… He can think of no reason why instant action is necessary’, Bowers added.
12 Spykman, , America's Strategy in World Politics, The United States and the Balance of Power (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 372.Google Scholar
13 Carleton, William G., The Revolution in American Foreign Policy: Its Global Range (2nd ed., New York Random House, 1967), p. 35.Google Scholar
14 Ibid., p. 17.
15 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 3 (1943), p. 206.Google Scholar
16 Ibid., no. 5 (1945). p. 3.
17 New York Times, 21 August 1947, p. 1.
18 Ibid., 3 September 1947, p. 1. As one historian put it, ‘Latin Americans could not understand the reasoning behind the Marshall Plan… Their overwhelming complaint was that the United States Government had forsaken its former New World allies in favor of its former European and Asian enemies.’ Bierck, Harold A., The United States and Latin America, 1933–1968: From the Good Neighbor Policy to the Alliance for Progress (London, Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1969), p. 26.Google Scholar
19 Whitaker, Arthur P., The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline (Ithacä, N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 1 and 154–5.Google Scholar
20 Duggan, Lawrence, The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security (New York, Henry Holt, 1949), p. 100.Google Scholar
21 Wagner, R. Harrison, United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics (Stanford, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1970), p. 46.Google Scholar
22 Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, ‘Good Fences Make Good Neighbors’, Fortune Magazine (August 1946), p. 169.Google Scholar
23 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 4 (1944), p. 138.Google Scholar
24 Ibid., no. 3 (1943), p. 201.
25 Ibid., no. 4 (1944), p. 136. Price-control expert Seymour Harris observed: ‘in short, in exchange for vitally necessary war materials we have provided these countries with paper credit, with dollars that are manufactured by our banking system, and with gold for which we have no use. In the postwar period it is hoped that they will obtain adequate compensation for their natural resources, for their additional work, and for the reduced standard of living which they have encountered during the present war.’ Harris, Seymour, ed., Economic Problems of Latin America (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1944), p. 37.Google Scholar
26 Duggan to Hull, 10 January 1944, 711.35/212, Record Group 59, State Decimal File, 1940–4, box 1982, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C., pp. 2–3.
27 Mecham, J. Lloyd, The United States and Inter-American Security 1889–1960 (Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 314.Google Scholar In its study of the U.S. defense position in 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that, ‘from the viewpoint of (our) national security… assistance should be extended to the following countries listed in order arrived at by considering their importance to U.S. security and the urgency of their need in combination: (1) Great Britain (2) France (3) Germany (4) Italy (5) Greece (6) Turkey (7) Austria (8) Japan (9) Belgium (10) Netherlands (11) Latin America (12) Spain, etc.’ Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, Top Secret, 12 May 1947, SWNCC 360/1, Foreign Relations (1947), vol. 1, p. 749.Google Scholar
28 New York Times, 17 January 1946, p. 31.
29 Bowers to Hull, 4 January 1944, 811.20 Defense (M) Chile/610, Foreign Relations 1944, vol. vii, p. 708.Google Scholar
30 New York Times, 2 September 1946, p. 5.
31 The Lend-Lease issue had several aspects. To begin with, there was the fact that ‘deliveries of Lend-Lease material to our European and Far Eastern Allies covered not only military material of all kinds but food, medical supplies and a wide range of articles. Our deliveries to the American Republics were all for purely military equipment and nothing else.’ Messersmith to Braden, Personal, no. 26,904, 16 October 1945, 710.11/10–1645, Record Group 59, State Decimal File 1945–9, box no. 3238, National Archives, p. 4. Secondly, the U. S. abruptly and without notification terminated the shipment of Lend-Lease equipment ‘despite specific commitments… [This] is creating [a] very serious situation in the other American republics… [N]umerous small deliveries of maintenance equipment and spare parts to several countries have been held up. Their importance is largely measured by the protests which have come as a result of the stoppage of deliveries and the resulting doubt being cast on [the] good faith of this Government.’ Grew to Byrnes, no. 96, 21 July 1945, 800.24/7–2145, Foreign Relations 1945, vol. ix, p. 247Google Scholar. The United States at last informed recipients that Lend-Lease operations were being terminated on 6 October. Finally, repayment was demanded only of the Latin Americans. Messersmith to Braden, Personal, no. 26, 904, 16 October 1945, 710.11 / 10–1645, Record Group 59, State Decimal File 1945, box no. 3238, National Archives, pp. 4–8. The diplomatic correspondence for this period is full of exhortations from Washington reminding the Latin governments that due dates for repayment had passed. See, for example, Hull to Michels, 16 June 1944, 825.24/18748. Foreign Relations 1944, vol. vii, p. 682; Hull to Bowers, no. 4422, 14 October 1944, 825.24/9–2044, pp. 687–8; Crowley to Hull, 23 October 1944, 83 2.24/10–2344, p. 593; and Stettinius to Berle, no.6841,9 February 1945, 832. 24/2–945, Foreign Relations 1945, vol. ix p. 639Google Scholar. By 1948, the Latin countries had repaid $70 million. United States, Congress, Report on Lend-Lease Operations, House Document 568, 80th Congress, 2nd Session (1948), pp. 4–7.
32 Reston, James, ‘Latin American Needs Dominate Conference; Delegates at Mexico City Concerned First with Economic Questions’, New York Times, 25 02 1945, section 4, p. 4.Google Scholar
33 ‘Possible Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. Preliminary Draft Outlines of United States Position, with Supporting Considerations, on Certain Economic Topics Which Latin American Governments Might Wish to Discuss’, Secret, 30 December 1944, Adolf A. Berle Papers, State Department Subject File, 1938–45, box no. 60, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, pp. 2 and 3–4.
34 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 5 (1945), p. iii.Google Scholar
35 Aguilar, Alonso, Pan Americanism, From Monroe to the Present: A View From the Other Side (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 81.Google Scholar David Green describes the U.S. position at Chapultepec as ‘an assault on economic nationalism “in all its forms”’. From its low-tariff position to its attempted ban on state-run trading enterprises, the United States’ position was an effort to make sure that the power of the government would not be used in the postwar period to close off any bloc area, regional or national, to United States economic expansion.’ Green, David, The Containment of Latin America – A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy (Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 178.Google Scholar
36 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 5 (1945), p. 120.Google Scholar
37 New York Times, 16 August 1947, p. 1, 17 August, p. 1 and 20 August, p. 1.
39 The reasons given for the United States' position vary with the bias of the analyst. ‘New Leftists’ and Marxists would say it is because the United States is imperialistic and does not wish the countries of South America to have anything but weak and sub-servient governments.‘Realists’ would attribute it to a definition of the United States national interest which requires that the Latin countries be in the hands of friendly governments which will collaborate with the United States in keeping out ‘foreign’ ideologies and powers. ‘Patriots’ would say it is to the mutual benefit of North and South that there be an exclusive cooperation.
40 The Subcommittee for Latin America to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, 15 February 1945, National Archives Record Group 353: SWNCC4, Foreign Relations 1945, vol. ix, p. 236.Google Scholar
41 James, Edwin L., ‘South American Picture is Somewhat Brighter’, New York Times, 30 01 1944, section 4, p. 3.Google Scholar
42 United States Congress, House, ‘Brazil: Our Good Neighbor and Good Friend’, extension of remarks of Honorable John M. Coffee, 78th Congress, 2nd session, 30 March 1944, Congressional Record, 90, A1651.
43 Berle to Truman, 4 September 1945, State Department, Correspondence, 1946–1947, box no. 34, folder no. 9 C.F., Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, p. 1.
44 Truman to Berle, 13 September 1945, State Department, Correspondence, 1946–1947, box no. 34, folder no. 9 C.F., Truman Library, p. 1.
45 Lieuwen, Edwin, United States Policy in Latin America: A Short History (New York, Praeger, 1965), p. 84.Google Scholar
46 Berle, Adolf A., Latin America – Diplomacy and Reality (New York, Harper and Row, 1962), p. 12.Google Scholar
47 Lieuwen's breakdown: ‘When the war broke out in Europe more than half the 20 republics were ruled by conservative military men: Bolivia (General Carlos Quintanillo), the Dominican Republic (General Rafael Trujillo), Ecuador (General P. Alberto Rodrí-quez), Guatemala (General Jorge Ubico), Honduras (General Tiburcio Caríos), Nicaragua (General Anastasio Somoza), Peru (Marshal Oscar Benavides), El Salvador (General Maximiliano Martínez), Venezuela (General Eleazar López Contreras), and Paraguay (General Felix Estigarribia). Traditionalist civilian regimes, maintained in office by the armed forces, prevailed in Argentina, Panama and Haiti, and the army-backed Vargas and Batista dictatorships remained entrenched in Brazil and Cuba respectively… [T]he armed forces were playing key political roles in all the Latin American countries at this time except Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Mexico. In the latter two countries, popularly elected military men (Generals Alfredo Baldomirand Lázaro Cárdenas) held sway.’ Lieuwen, Edwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York, Praeger, rev. ed., 1961), p. 62.Google Scholar
48 Lieuwen notes the pressures resulting from the economic dislocation which was disproportionately borne by the middleand lowerclassesand from the repressive measures and bans on experimentation and reform which the war emergency was used to justify. Ibid., pp. 62–3. An equally strong pressure was the enormous amount of propaganda which the Allies poured into Latin America extolling the virtues of freedom and democracy as worth even the sacrifice of life. In his research in Brazilian archives, Frank McCann found evidence that the spread of this sentiment, especially among the Brazilian expeditionary force, was a major catalyst in Vargas' ouster: ‘Increasingly, with news of each FEB [the Brazilian expeditionary force in Italy] victory, the opposition described Brazil's war effort as a commitment to democratic government…En route to Rio de Janeiro [upon their return] regional commanders [of the FEB] told [General Góes Monteiro, Brazilian Chief of Staff] of the unrest [among their men] and the general feeling that, because the war was ending and Brazilian blood had been shed for freedom, it was time for the dictatorship to end as well… [On 1 November 1945] Góes told Getúlio [Vargas] that he had returned to end the Estado Nôvo, as the mood in the country and the coming allied victory demanded.’ McCann, Frank, The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945 (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 461 and 445–6.Google Scholar
49 Lieuwen, , Arms and Politics, pp. 62 and 63Google Scholar. A few months after the coup, The Economist expressed the same opinion. ‘The crisis in Argentina is part of a much wider revolution which is transforming Latin America’, The Economist, vol. cxlv (6 11 1943), p. 604.Google Scholar
50 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 3 (1943), p. 14.Google Scholar
51 Ibid., no. 4 (1944), p. 210.
52 Ibid., pp. 244, 251, 253 and 258.
53 Ibid., no. 5 (1945). p. 55.
54 Hoover to Vaughn, Personal and Confidential, 8 July 1946, President's Secretary's File, box no. 168, subject file FBI, L, Truman Library, p. 2.
55 Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, vol. I, Year of Decisions (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1955). p. 477.Google Scholar
56 Ibid., pp. 110 and 118.
57 For example, a debate in the Senate on ‘Domestic Supplies of Meat’: ‘Mr (James) Eastland (of Mississippi):… [I]n addition to UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration], a large amount of food is being shipped abroad under Lend-Lease. As a result a deplorable condition exists in the South today. Salt meat is the basic meat diet of millions of working people in the South. Practically the entire salt-meat supply has been consigned to Russia. For this reason none is available for the people of the United States. It is practically impossible to secure any kind of meat in the South today. We all desire that the Russian people and Army be well fed. However, it is not right to take necessary food from the American people. Certainly Russia cannot have less salt-meat than we have, because we have none. We do not have any now; we have had none in months. Practically the entiresupply of canned fish, sardines, and salmon is also being taken away from our people and is being shipped under Lend-Lease. As a result, the diet of the farm worker in the South is deficient… Mr (Styles) Bridges (of New Hampshire): (This) condition… also exists in other sections of the country, as I can personally vouch in the case of New England… Mr (Kenneth) Wherry (of Nebraska):… [T]here is also a shortage of pork… [P]ork is an essential food which the people in my section of the country must have…Mr (Alexander) Wiley (of Wisconsin): There is one food which could be used as a substitute, if the substitute had not been taken away. In Wisconsin our supplies of butter and cheese have been taken away… Mr Eastland: I note (New York) Governor (Herbert) Lehman's statement of our heavy responsibilities in Europe, China, the Philippines and Ethiopia. We should, as far as possible, make food available. But when did Ethiopia come into this war? What has that country contributed to victory? Has not that country always supported itself? Why should Americans go without adequate food in order to supply Ethiopia?…If citizens of that country are hungry, whose fault is it?’ 79th Congress, 1st Session, 13 March 1945, Congressional Record, 91, 2082–3.
58 United States Congress, House, ‘Cash and Carry: European Plan’, Extension of Remarks of Honorable Roy O. Woodruf of Michigan, 79th Congress, 1st Session, 29 October 1945, Ibid., 4661. Especially singled out for criticism was a $4.4 billion loan made to Great Britain in the summer of 1946. Congressman William Lemke referred to it as ‘financial… hi-jacking…. by our State Department.… If we are to judge Great Britain by the past, she will not pay back one penny. She will again call us Uncle Shylock instead… I do not blame Britain. I blameourown stupidity.’ United States Congress, House ‘National and International Issues’, Extension of Remarks of the Honorable William Lemke, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 2 August 1946, Congressional Record, 92, p. A4949.
59 ‘Say World Seeks Cue in Trade Pacts’, by Crider, John H., New York Times, 14 04 1943, p. 7Google Scholar. Brazil and Mexico did mount small expeditionary forces in the closing months of the war.
60 United States Congress, House, Congressman Rich speaking against any further United States efforts to eradicate hoof and mouth disease in Mexico, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 21 February 1947, Congressional Record, 93, 1313.
61 New York Times, 17 December 1946, p. 54.
62 Ibid., 9 July 1945. p. 17.
63 United States Congress, House, Congresswoman Sumner, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 8 December 1943, Congressional Record, 89, 10466.
64 United States Congress, Senate, Senator, Senator McKellar speaking in rebuttal to Senator Butler's Report, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 13 December 1943, Congressional Record, 89, 10571; New York Times, 27 November 1943, p. 1.
65 For rebuttals see United States Congress, Senate, Senator McKellar, 78th Congress, 1st Session, 13 December 1943, Congressional Record, 89, 10571–90; New York Times, 27 November 1943, p. 7 and 8 December 1943, p. 13.
66 United States Congress, Senate, ‘Expenditures and Activities of the United States in Latin America’, Senator Butler, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, 20 January 1944, Congressional Record, 90, 449. This is Senator Butler's reply to his critics.
67 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 3 (1943), pp. 205 and 42.Google Scholar
68 For example, see Armour to Hull, 6 June 1945, 835.00/1455, Foreign Relations 1943, vol. v, p. 369.Google Scholar
69 Armour to Hull, 9 June 1943, 835.01/166, Foreign Relations 1943, vol. v, p. 376.Google Scholar
70 New York Times, 4 March 1944, p. 3; 5 March, p. 16, and 9 March, p. 4.
71 Stettinius to Roosevelt, Secret, January 1944, President's Secretary's Files, 1933–45, Diplomatic, Argentina, box no. 32, Roosevelt Library, p. 5.
72 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 4 (1944), p. 64.Google Scholar
73 ‘Perspectiva’, Excelsior, 13 October [1944], quoted in Ibid., p. 67.
74 New York Times, 11 February 1945, p. 20.
75 Duggan, , The Americas, pp. 107–8.Google Scholar
76 New York Times, 22 February 1945, p. 19 and 23 February, p. 14.
77 Ibid., 3 March 1945, p. 8.
78 Morris, Joe Alex, Nelson Rockefeller: A Biography (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 191.Google Scholar
79 Campbell, Thomas M. and Herring, George C. (eds.), The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943–1946 (N.Y., New Viewpoints, 1975), p. 286Google Scholar. Before going to Chapultepec, Stettinius traveled to Rio to talk with Vargas and learned that Vargas ‘hope(d)… it was possible to figure out a way in which the Argentine could join the Mexico City Conference’, Ibid., p. 265. The same wish was also expressed before the conference by the governments of Colombia (Wiley to Stettinius, no. 100, 20 January 1945, 710 Conference W and PW/1–2045, Foreign Relations 1945, vol. ix, p. 13Google Scholar), Venezuela (Corrigan to Stettinius, no. 6993, 24 January 1945, 710 Conference and PW/1–2445, Ibid., p. 17), and Bolivia (Thurston to Stettinius, no. 166, 10 February 1945, 710 Conference W and PW/2–1045, Ibid., p. 29). Ostensibly, the justification for Stettinius’ recommendation that the United States should abruptly reverse its Argentine policy was that the facts no longer warranted hostility. He cabled the President telling him that ‘since our arrival [in Mexico City] I have reviewed carefully with the FBI our accounts against Argentina and I am now confident that, while one year ago there was substance relative to Axis relations, of recent date it had been more of an emotional feeling on the part of the American people and within our own government rather than any substantial evidence that there is actual aid to the enemy’. Herring, Campbell and (eds.), Stettinius Diaries, p. 286Google Scholar. This observation was largely accurate. Two months before the Conference opened, the U.S. Chargé d' Affaires in Buenos Aires advised the State Department that ‘measures already taken and others being contemplated can only be interpreted as last-minute drive by Farrell [and] Peron to impress American governments before Foreign Ministers meet at Mexico City. In fact, it seems highly probable that [the] Department should be prepared to face a situation in which the Farrell government can demonstrate an adequate if belated compliance with practically all important commitments and in which only lack of confidence in and un willingness to deal with Farrell, Peron, and Company can be adduced as the real reason for continued nonrecognition.’ Reed to Stettinius, 19 January 1945, 835.01/11–1945 Foreign Relations 1945, vol.ix, pp. 369–70Google Scholar. However, Stettinius' argument of this point with the President, accurate as it may have been, was also an unconvincing explanation for the policy shift. A few months after Chapultepec adjourned, the U.S.A. felt that its case against Argentina was strong enough to support the most intense hostility of this five-year period. It included publication of the ‘Blue Book’. Clearly the motivation to admit Argentina to Chapultepec was the desire to avoid complete divergence with the Latin countries which had been rebuffed on two more pressing issues and whose support was thought crucial to the success of the upcoming San Francisco Conference, the Soviet Union having already begun to demonstrate intransigence on postware issues.
80 The ‘Act of Chapultepec’, as all of the Conference resolutions came to be known, altered the Inter-American system in several significant ways. For the first time, the use of sanctions was authorized to prevent aggression not just by an extrahemispheric power but by one American state against another. It also recommended that military cooperation be made permanent and that Inter-American conferences be held every four years and meetings of Foreign Ministers once a year in the three-year interval between conferences. It is interesting to speculate about the motivation for the inclusion of sanctions against aggression by an American state. The United States assumed it was a measure of the Latin countries’ apprehension about Argentina'sallegedlyexpansionist designs. Given the vigor with which they fought for Argentina's reinclusion into the system as well as the consistency of their opposition to the United States on a wide range of issues, it seems more plausible that they were remembering the recent period of overt United States interventions and hoped to bind the United States with an agreement that it would not revert to those policies. Beyond securing the United States’ word as an honorable member of the international community, there was little more the Latin countries could do. Combined, they were insufficiently strong to resist any United States aggression.
81 Duggan, , The Americas, p. 118.Google Scholar
82 Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State, 17 April 1945, 500.cc/4–1745, Foreign Relations 1945, vol. I (Washington, D.C., United States Govt. Printing Office, 1967, Department of State Publication no. 8294), p. 329.Google Scholar
83 Minutes of the 17th meeting (executive session) of the United States Delegation, held at San Francisco, 2; April 1945, RSC Lot 60-D224, box no. 96, U.S. Cr. Min., Ibid., p. 411.
84 Minutes of the 16th meeting (executive session) of the United States Delegation, held at San Francisco, 2; April 1945, RSC Lot 60-D224, box no. 96, U.S. Cr. Min., Ibid., pp. 389, 397 and 401. It is an indication of United States priorities that it worried a great deal about breaking a Yalta promise to the Russians but not at all about breaking a Chapultepec promise to the Latins.
[Senator, Tom Connolly] expressed great concern over the trouble we were having with the Soviet delegation on the interpretation of the voting formula. ‘We're right up against the buzz saw on this’, he said, complaining that the ‘Latinos’, whom we had given all kinds of assistance, were now not cooperating well in our hour of need. Senator Vandenberg joined the hue and cry against the Latin American countries… This was a serious matter and I did not hesitate to say that the Latins must be brought into line… I myself felt that we had done
85 New York Times, 29 April 1945, p. 1; 30 April, p. 1, and 1 May, pp. 1 and 13.
86 Ibid., 13 May 1945, p. 1.
87 Ibid., 16 May 1945, p. 1. The Latin difficulty with the Security Council was that it flew in the face of one hundred years of Inter-American history during which the primary objective was to keep out all extra-hemispheric interference. Under the proposed United Nations Organization, any member of the Security Council could veto the defense of an American country against an aggression or, with the vote of nine members, the Security Council could interfere in an American affair.
88 See, for example, New York Times, 15 May 1945, p. 1 and 23 May, p. 1.
89 Campbell and Herring (eds), Stettinius Diaries, pp. 376–7. The Latin bloc re-formed when the United Nations Organization began to function and again lobbied on Argentina's behalf. In September 1947 ‘the bulk of [the Latin countries] supported Argentina [for a seat on the Security Council… It was] made clear to [them] that the [United States] Delegation would consider sympathetically any candidates generally supported by the Latin Americans’. Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the United States Delegation, Secret, 22 September 1947, IO files, US/A/M (Chr)/54, p. 136, Foreign Relations 1947, vol. I, p. 136. By this time, as is discussed below, the United States was eager to support Argentina, not to placate the Latins but because the changed international and environmental circumstances made Argentine cooperation extremely valuable.
90 Memorandum for the Secretary from Ben U. Cohen, Office of the Secretary of State, Secret, 18 August 1945, 710.11/8–1545, National Archives, p. 1.
91 At the height of the name-calling, Braden reported that the ‘bi-monthly meeting of American Chiefs [of] Mission with half attending agreed to Cuban Ambassador's proposal that [the] American corps address [a] note of solidarity to me and another to [the Argentine] Foreign Office expressing alarm at attacks on me… When [the] matter was taken up with Uruguayan Ambassador as Dean of American corps, it was rejected by him and [the] others who had not attended [the] meeting… Chilean colleague evidently had meanwhile received instructions to do nothing… Only ones who have stood out for forthright action are [the] Cuban and Peruvian [Ambassadors]… [The] Brazilian [Ambassador] has continuously since [his] arrival [on] May 20 made every effort to demonstrate [the] closest and most cordial relations with [the] Farrell, Peron regime.’ Braden to Byrnes, no. 1779, Secret, 6 August 1945, 710.11/8–645, Record Group 59, State Decimal File 1945–9, box no. 3239, National Archives, pp. 1–2.
92 New York Times, 22 February 1946, p. 5.
93 Ibid., 5 April 1946, p. 12.
94 Ibid., 8 April 1946, p. 4.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 9 April 1946, p. 2. Emphasis added.
97 Bowers to Byrnes, no. 233, Secret, 23 February 1946, 835.00/2–2346, Foreign Relations 1946, vol. XI, p. 219.Google Scholar
98 Dawson to Byrnes, no. 132, Secret, 23 February 1946, 83;. 00/2–2346, Ibid., p. 220.
99 Wiley to Byrnes, no. 154, Secret, 23 February 1946, 835.00/2–2346, Ibid., p. 221.
100 pawley to Byrnes, no. 214, Secret, 25 February 1946, 835.00/2–2546, Ibid., p. 222.
101 Fletcher Warren to Byrnes, no. 135, Secret, 27 February 1946, 835.00/2–2746, Ibid., p. 224.
102 Welles, Sumner, ‘Peron Defeat May Get United States Out of Unhappy Situation’, Chicago Sun, 27 02 1946Google Scholar, quoted in United States Congress, House, Extension of Remarks of the Honorable Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 February 1946, Congressional Record, 92, A1033.
103 Hull to Caffery, no. A-1416, 10 May 1943, 811.20 Defense (M) Bra/3380b, Foreign Relations 1943, vol. v, p. 668Google Scholar. The Rubber Agreement established the United States as the sole purchaser of the entire Brazilian rubber supply at a negotiated price. When confronted with the breach of contract, the Brazilian Foreign Minister replied, ‘The United States and Great Britain both find it necessary to continue to make considerable purchases in the Argentine; we find it necessary to make purchases there too.’ Caffery to Hull, no. 5662, December 10, 1943, 835.24/2396, Ibid., p. 684.
104 Hull to Bowers, no. A-559, 22 February 1943, 825.6363/315a, Ibid., p. 862.
105 Bowers to Stettinius, no. A-746, 1 December 1944, 825.24/12–144, Foreign Relations 1944, vol. VII, p. 737.Google Scholar
106 Welles to Caffery, no. A-1052, 12 March 1943, 800.8830 Coal/2519, Foreign Relations 1943, vol. v, p. 727.Google Scholar
107 Hull to Simmons, no. A-86, 22 January 1944, 800.8830 Coal/350, Foreign Relations 1944, vol. VII, p. 645Google Scholar. By this time the United States was suffering from coal shortages in several sections of the country. Ibid. Brazil repeated its demand for more coal, as well as gas and railway equipment, in September. Caffery to Hull, no. 17821, 15 September 1944, 832.24/9–1544, Ibid., p. 590.
108 Hull to the diplomatic representatives in the American republics except Peru, Uruguay and Argentina, 15 September 1944, 835.24/9–1544, Ibid., p. 350.
109 ‘To Hull, the Foreign Economic Administration, I am sure you are giving serious consideration to the implications of this lack of cooperation.’ Crowley to Hull, 10 October 1944, 835.24/10–1044, Ibid., p. 360. After reviewing the situation, the United States embassy in Buenos Aires declared that the policy of economic sanctions was ‘a failure and that its maintenance is contrary to the best interests of the United States in Argentina’ because former United States business was now going to the British and other American Republics. Reed to Stettinius, no. A-936, 16 December 1944, 740.35 112 A/12–1644, Ibid., P. 374.
110 ‘Argentine–United States Relations’ (from Intelligence Review, no. 22, 11 07 1946)Google Scholar, 711.35/7–1146, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1945–9, box no. C-32, National Archives, pp. 4–5.
111 Memorandum for the President from William J. Donovan, Strictly Confidential, 30 November 1944 President's Secretary's Files boxno. 170, subjectfile OSS, 1–15 December 1944, Roosevelt Library, p. I. The Foreign Policy Association reached almost identical conclusions in a report published the following month: ‘Expressing the view that inter-American relations were at their lowest ebb in a decade, the Foreign Policy Associationsaidina bulletinissued yesterday that… many Latin Americans believe… that until now the United States action against Argentina has been purely unilateral… [T]hey have a latent fear that the United States may revert to “Big Stick” diplomacy, and this fear leads them to applaud Argentina's successful resistance to pressure from the United States. To protect themselves against possible imperialistic tendencies on the part of the United States, the countries to the south may undertake in the postwar period to play the Great Powers against each other.’ New York Times, 15 December 1944, p. 8.
112 Whitaker, , Inter-American Affairs, no. 4 (1944), p. 60.Google Scholar
