¹ United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Federation of Malaya, Nigeria, Cyprus, Sierre Leone, Tanganyika.

² Much of the information in this paper has been gained in Interviews with representatives from Commonwealth and other delegations to the United Nations.

³ The representation of Commonwealth countries in certain United Nations organs and committees is shown on pp. 756–757.

⁴ And the review of the Charter under Article 109, which began in 1955.

⁵ On occasions the role of a Vice-President can be influential, as in determining whether a controversial item is included in the agenda of the General Assembly.

⁶ The nature of this “agrement” is not easily determined, and has been variously reported. Trygve Lie speaks only of an agreed “slate” negotiated in advance (In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years in the United Nations [New York: Macmillan, 1954], p. 27)Google Scholar. The results for the first few years followed the pattern given above. See also p. 6, note 1, and Bailey, Sydney D., The General Assembly of the United Nations (London: Stevens, 1960), pp. 165–167Google Scholar.

⁷ Article 23 (i) of the Charter states that in the election of nonpermanent members, due regard shall be “specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution.”

⁸ For example, the Philippines shared a seat with Yugoslavia in the 1956–1957 period, and Japan did so in 1958–1959. The Philippines will share with Romania in the 1962–1963 period.

⁹ Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa.

¹⁰ Hasluck, Paul, Workshop of Security (Melbourne: F. W. Chesire, 1948), p. 24Google Scholar. Mr. Hasluck was Counselor with the first Australian mission to the United Nations. He makes no mention in his book of any “agreement,” merely referring to the election of two representatives from the Latin American states, one from the Arab states, one from eastern Europe, one from western Europe, and one from the Pacific or east Asia (p. 23).

¹¹ These were the only occasions on which two Commonwealth countries competed for the Security Council.

¹² One ex-Commonwealth country, Ireland, has also provided a President, while another, Burma, has contributed the Acting Secretary-General.

¹³ I understand that the meetings used to take place once a week, but that this became impossible to maintain.

¹⁴ Cyprus is in the unusual position of being a member of both the western European group and the Afro-Asian group, and in the sixteenth session it received a Vice-Presidency as a representative of the latter and became a member of the Committee of Seventeen (on decolonialization) as a representative of the former. Ceylon, also rather curiously, attends meetings of the “Casablanca” powers—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic.

¹⁵ This raises an interesting point with regard to the flow of information between Commonwealth countries. Each one obviously will not circulate all information to all the others, for much is relevant only to certain ones. But in addition, not all Commonwealth governments are considered equally good security risks, and it follows that some will receive more highly classified information than others. At a meeting of all their representatives, the classification cannot be greater than the “highest common factor.”

¹⁶ For example, a Ugandan was attached to the Canadian delegation and a West Indian to the British delegation. Cyprus was an exception to this procedure—its permanent representative, Mr. Zenon Rosides, having been attached for three years to the delegation of Greece.

¹⁷ It is difficult to discover where such instances occur, as delegates are reluctant to admit being amenable to influence. It appears that drafts of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960, on colonialism were discussed at Commonwealth meetings, and some rewording was organized through certain Afro-Asian members so that the United Kingdom delegation finally felt able to abstain rather than vote in the negative. Commonwealth pressure on Britain on colonial matters, over South Africa, and over Suez is discussed later in the article.

¹⁸ A few seem reluctant to believe Britain capable of right motives or good deeds.

¹⁹ The United States has come in for a share of this condemnation, partly by association.

²⁰ At the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth sessions, Malaya was instrumental in having the question of Tibet placed on the agenda of the General Assembly and introduced (in conjunction with Ireland at the fourteenth session and with El Salvador, Ireland, and Thailand at the sixteenth) successful resolutions calling for “respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural life.”

²¹ This does not apply to Pakistan, nor, in a degree, to Malaya.

²² All Commonwealth countries have immigration restrictions, the United Kingdom's being the most liberal.

²³ On Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960, only Britain and Australia abstained; the rest of the Commonwealth voted in favor.

²⁴ Hovet, Thomas, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, passim. Professor Hovct's first chapter deals with some of the problems of compilation and analysis. For earlier assessments of the lack of cohesion in Commonwealth voting at the General Assembly, see Carter, Gwendolen M., “The Commonwealth in the United Nations,” International Organization, 05 1950 (Vol. 4, No. 2), pp. 247–260CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ Hovet, , op. cit., p. 72Google Scholar.

^a This vote was on the proposal by the Australian delegation that the draft resolution it sponsored (Document A/L.372) should have priority in voting over the other draft resolutions being considered (Documents A/L.375 and A/L.360).

^b The draft resolution (Document A/L.372) submitted by the delegations of Australia, Colombia, Italy, Japan, and the United States proposed that the Soviet draft resolution contained in Document A/L.360 (see footnote e below) should be considered an “important” question, and dius require a two-thirds majority (under Article 18 of the, Charter).

^c The draft resolution (Document A/L.375) submitted by the delegations of Cambodia, Ceylon, and Indonesia, as an amendment to the Soviet draft resolution (Document A/L.360), proposed to delete the operative paragraphs in the Soviet draft resolution and substitute the following: ”“Decides in accordance with the above declaration that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China be seated in the United Nations and all its organs.” The first vote was on the inclusion of the words “in accordance with the above declaration [i.e., the two preambular paragraphs of the Soviet draft resolution].”

^d The second vote on the draft resolution contained in Document A/L.375 was on the remainder of the amendment.

^e The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation (Document A/L.360) was as follows:

The General Assembly,

Considering it necessary to restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations,

Bearing in mind that only representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are competent to occupy China's place in the United Nations and all its organs,

Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations organs the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are unlawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations,

Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China to send its representatives to participate in the work of the United Nations and of all its organs.

²⁶ There is also in this case the consideration of Hongkong.

²⁷ For example, see Prime Minister Nehru's speech of March 17, 1953. India Lok Sabha Debates, 1953, Part 2, 3rd session, vol. 2, column 2246.

²⁸ For a summary of the interests and other ties that link Commonwealth members, sec What is the Commonwealth? (London: Central Office of Information, 1961)Google Scholar. A fuller and more academic treatment is contained in Miller, J. D. B., The Commonwealth in the World (London: Duckworth, 1958)Google Scholar.

²⁹ The annual Commonwealth Relations Office List (London: H.M.S.O.) gives details of these bodies and their activities.

³⁰ The nearest thing to a Commonwealth “voice” is the communique issued at the conclusion of the prime ministers' meetings, which are held about every eighteen months. This communique is usually extremely vagus on world problems, although the one issued after the March 1961 meeting did include an agreed statement on general and complete disarmament.

³¹ Claude, Inis L., Swords into Plowshares (second edition: New York: Random House, 1959), p. 122Google Scholar.

³² Lord Birchwood gives the text of the telegram of December 30, 1948, from the British Commander-in-Chief in India, General Bucher, to the British Commander-in-Chief in Pakistan, General Gracey, proposing a cease-fire. (Two Nations and Kashmir [London: Robert Hale, 1956], p. 215Google Scholar.)

³³ At the insistence of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Kashmir dispute was discussed informally—to little effect—at the meeting of Commonwealh prime ministers in London in January 1951.

³⁴ Speech of March 25, 1957. India Lok. Sabha Debates, 1957, Part 2, 15th session, vol. 1, column 670.

³⁵ Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India. Summary of Proceedings and Documents (London: H.M.S.O., 1921; Cmd. 1474), p. 8Google Scholar.

³⁶ It is interesting that the question of one million Indian Tamils in Ceylon without citizenship rights has never come before the United Nations, although it has been the source of considerable friction between the two countries.

³⁷ It was in February 1960, in Capetown, that the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, in his now famous “wind of change” speech, served notice on the South African government that it could no longer rely on British support. Britain was not merely reacting to pressure at the United Nations, but was also acting to preserve its influence, and the influence of the West, in a changing Africa.

³⁸ General Assembly Official Records… Special Political Committee (15th session, part 2), p. 72Google Scholar. All Commonwealth governments subsequently voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution 1598 (XV), April 13, 1961, condemning the practice of apartheid. A draft resolution (Document A/SPC/-L.60 and Corr.I and Add.I and 2), calling for diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa, failed to obtain a two-thirds majority. The governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom were among the 29 which cast negative votes. The delegations of Cyprus and Pakistan were included among those 18 which abstained.

³⁹ What Britain did resist was the attempt, during the drafting of Chapter 11, to require a metropolitan power to be accountable to the United Nations for its dependencies.

⁴⁰ It would seem likely that the reluctance shown by the United States in its entanglement with Cuba in April 1961 is an example of this.

⁴¹ SirEden, Anthony, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 588Google Scholar.

⁴² See Eayrs, James, “Canadian Policy and Opinion during the Suez Crisis,” International Journal, Spring 1957 (Vol. 12, No. 2), pp. 97–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Spry, Graham, “Canada, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the Commonwealth,” International Affairs, 07 1957 (Vol. 33, No. 3), pp. 289–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ In 1960, assistance by the British government for overseas development amounted to $421.7 million, of which $70.9 million, or one-sixth, was through United Nations channels. The remaining five-sixths was bilateral. Of this bilateral aid, $200 million went to United Kingdom dependencies, $114.9 million to independent Commonwealth countries, and $35.9 million to foreign countries. It is quite possible that some of the multilateral assistance also reached Commonwealth recipients. (United Kingdom Balance of Payments 1958/61 [London: H.M.S.O., 1962Google Scholar; Cmnd. 1506].)

⁴⁴ Leopold Amery suggests that this was the case with the League, citing also the opportunity afforded the independent Commonwealth countries to assert their individual international status without in fact incurring any serious international obligations. (Thoughts on the Constitution [second edition: London: Oxford University Press, 1953], p. 126Google Scholar.)

⁴⁵ Claude, , op. cit., p. 117Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ It is too early to assess with confidence the effect on the Commonwealth of Britain's approach to the European Economic Community.