¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the September 1966, meeting of the American Political Science Association (New York City) and at the Seventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association (Brussels, September, 1967). The category “new states of Tropical Africa” excludes Liberia and Ethiopia.

² Arnheim, Rudolf, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 230.Google Scholar

³ Notions concerning the political system apparent in this paper are inspired by the works of Easton, David, but clearly lack the intellectual rigor of A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).Google Scholar

⁴ For the concepts used see Shils, Edward, “Centre and Periphery,” in The Logic of Personal Knowledge—Essays in Honor of Michael Polanyi (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 117–130.Google Scholar See also note 42, below.

⁵ See the discussion in Whitaker, C. S. Jr., “A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change,” World Politics, 19 (January, 1967), 190–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶ The problem with which I am dealing here is akin to that of the “plural society” conceptualized by Smith, M. G. in The Pleural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).Google Scholar The word “syncretic” distinguishes the present societies from the “plural,” which is a particular type involving super-ordination between components. I prefer it to the more passive “heterogeneous,” because “syncretic” connotes that a process of amalgamation and integration is being attempted.

⁷ For a further development of this point, see my book Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), Chapter V. My reasoning here is deductive; but empirical evidence from micro-political studies of Ghana by David Brokensha and Ernst Benjamin, of Mali by Nicholas Hopkins and of Tanzania by Henry Bienen, confirm the validity of the assumption.

⁸ For a general treatment of this topic, see Geertz, Clifford, “The Integrative Revolution,” in Geertz, Clifford (ed.), Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) pp. 105–157.Google Scholar Although every serious monograph on African politics has also dealt with the subject, it is unfortunate that no effort has been made to refine for Africa the comparative analysis of the phenomenon along the lines suggested by Geertz.

⁹ I have attempted to deal with this question in One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 47, 77, 128–134.

¹⁰ The most useful recent surveys of African military establishments are presented in the publications of the Institute of Strategic Studies, London. See in particular, Bell, M. J. V., “Army and Nation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Adelphi Papers, No. 21 (August, 1965)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wood, David, “The Armed Forces of African States,” Adelphi Papers, No. 27 (April, 1966).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an earlier essay, see Coleman, James S. and Bryce, Belmont Jr., “The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Johnson, John J. (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 359–405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹ Pye, Lucian, “The Non-Western Political Process,” in Eckstein, H. and Apter, D. (eds.), Comparative Polities (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 660.Google Scholar

¹² On patterns of recruitment of new elites and their consequences see Clignet, Rémi and Foster, Philip, The Fortunate Few (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).Google Scholar

¹³ Conditions under which the phenomenon occurs are specified by Eisenstadt, S. N., From Generation to Generation (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).Google Scholar

¹⁴ The analogy is drawn from Parsons, Talcott, “Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process,” in Eckstein, Harry (ed.), Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 59–64.Google Scholar A similar analysis is provided by Kilson, Martin in Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with emphasis on the initial growth of “reciprocity” and the eventual inadequacy of this political technique.

¹⁵ Parsons, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁶ This proposition is related to Apter's suggestion that there is “an inverse relationship between information and coercion in a system.” ( Apter, David E., The Politics of Modernization [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965], p. 40.)Google Scholar

¹⁷ Parsons, op. cit., p. 66.

¹⁸ It is difficult to analyze the patterns of coups because it is impossible to identify the components of the universe with which one must deal. If incumbent rulers are to be believed, attempted coups against the government are extremely frequent in almost every African country; but what appear to be anti-government plots may in fact be only government-initiated purges. The present analysis is based exclusively on secondary sources. Unless otherwise specified, data are drawn from reports in West Africa (London), Afrique Nouvelle (Dakar), Le Monde, Sélection Hebdomadaire (Paris), The Times (London), The New York Times, Jeune Afrique (Tunis), Africa Report (Washington), and Africa Digest (London). A more detailed analysis of military interventions will appear in my contribution to Bienen, Henry (ed.), The Military Intervenes (New York: Russell Sage, 1968).Google Scholar

¹⁹ As for example in the hypothesis discussed by Huntington, Samuel P., “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics, 17 (April, 1965), p. 427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar His data are based on Mehden, Fred R. von der, Politics of the Developing Nations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 65.Google Scholar

²⁰ Vieyra, Justin in Jeune Afrique, December 12, 1965.Google Scholar

²¹ Coleman and Bryce, op. cit., p. 399.

²² The Congo crisis of 1960 reminds us, however, that African troops can launch mutinies against their European officers.

²³ Foltz, William J., From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 176–183.Google Scholar

²⁴ Bois, Victor Du, “The Trial of Mamadou Dia,” American Universities Field Staff Report Service, West Africa Series, VI, No. 6 (June, 1963), pp. 4–8.Google Scholar

²⁵ See, for example, the analysis of Dahomey and the Congo-Brazzaville, in Terray, Emmanuel, “Les révolutions congolaise et dahoméene de 1963: essai d'interpretation,” Revue Française de Science Politique, 14 (October, 1964), 917–942.Google Scholar A more detailed account of the process of escalation is presented in my paper cited in note 18.

²⁶ Reported by Decraene, Philippe in Le Monde, Sélection Hebdomadaire, June 30-July 6, 1966.Google Scholar

²⁷ For a further discussion, see my paper, “Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa,” presented at the Conference on Armed Forces and Society sponsored by the World Association of Sociologists (London, September, 1967).

²⁸ Intra-national and international conflicts involving Ethiopia and the Sudan are major exceptions; they are not considered here because these two countries are peripheral to the universe of post-colonial tropical Africa with which I am particularly concerned.

²⁹ This account is based on the excellent analysis by Young, M. Crawford, “The Obote Revolution,” Africa Report, June 1966, 8–14.Google Scholar

³⁰ Manifestations of this process in Uganda are discussed by Leys, Colin, “Violence in Africa,” Transition, 5 (Fourth Quarter, 1965), 17–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³¹ See Note 6, above.

³² For background on Rwanda, see in particular Maquet, Jacques and d'Hertefelt, Marcel, “Elections en Société Feodale,” Académie royale des Sciences coloniales, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, XXI, Fase. 2 (1959)Google Scholar; and Maquet, Jacques, The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).Google Scholar For more recent events, I have relied on Segal, Aaron, “Rwanda: The Underlying Causes,” Africa Report, 9 (April, 1964), 3–8 Google Scholar; and on an unpublished paper by Donald Attwood, graduate student in anthropology at the University of Chicago.

³³ This account is based on Kyle, Keith, “Coup in Zanzibar,” Africa Report, 9 (February 1964), 18–20.Google Scholar See also Lofchie, Michael F., Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ The political emancipation of Fulani “captives” probably contributed to the rise of the nationalist movements of Mali and Guinea in 1956–58.

³⁵ See The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1965). For a more general discussion of Fanon's thought in the context of his life, see my article “Frantz Fanon: A Gospel for the Damned,” Encounter, November, 1966.

³⁶ For background on Brazzaville, see the several works of Georges Balandier and also Wagret, Jean-Michel, Histoire et Sociologie Politiques de la République du Congo (Brazzaville) (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1963).Google Scholar For an analysis of the 1963 coup, see Terray (note 25 above).

³⁷ Jeune Afrique, August 8, 1965. There is some evidence that similar youth groups helped bring Youlou to prominence in 1956 (Wagret, op. cit., p. 65).

³⁸ Succinct and well-balanced analyses of the Congolese Rebellion can be found in Markowitz, Marvin D. and Weiss, Herbert F., “Rebellion in the Congo,” Current History, April 1965, 213–218 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Young, M. Crawford, “The Congo Rebellion,” Africa Report, 9 (April 1965), 6–11.Google Scholar The present discussion of the Kwilu case is based on Fox, Renée C., Craemer, Will de, and Ribeaucourt, Jean-Marie, “‘The Second Independence’; a Case Study of the Kwilu Rebellion in the Congo,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 8 (October 1965), 78–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The most comprehensive source of information on these rebellions is Verhaegen, Benoit, Rébellions au Congo, Vol. I (“Les Etudes du C.R.I.S.P.” Leopoldville and Brussels, 1966).Google Scholar This work, as well as Weiss, Herbert, Political Protest in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), became available too late to be fully consulted.Google Scholar

³⁹ Fox et al, p. 78.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 97.

⁴¹ For similar outcomes elsewhere see, for example, Hobsbawn, E. J., Primitive Rebela (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965).Google Scholar

⁴² For example, the most recently compiled Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries, published by the Agency for International Development in June, 1967 (data for 1965 and 1966), shows that Africa (not including the United Arab Republic and the Union of South Africa) is the lowest ranking of four areas (Africa, East Asia, Latin America, Near East/South Asia) on total GNP, Annual Growth of GNP, electric power per capita, life expectancy, people per physician, literacy, pupils as percent of population. It was tied with one other area for bottom place on several other indicators, and ranked relatively high only on acres of agricultural land available per capita.

⁴³ An approach to the study of institutionalization and integration is suggested in my paper, “Patterns of Integration,” in The Journal of Modern African Studies (forthcoming, 1968).

⁴⁴ This view is inspired by Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), especially p. 318.Google Scholar See also my general argument in Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).