Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Pretense and Pathology
  • Cited by 37
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2015
Print publication year:
2015
Online ISBN:
9781139235990
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139235990
Subjects:
Philosophy of Mind and Language, Philosophy
Information

Book description

In this book, Bradley Armour-Garb and James A. Woodbridge distinguish various species of fictionalism, locating and defending their own version of philosophical fictionalism. Addressing semantic and philosophical puzzles that arise from ordinary language, they consider such issues as the problem of non-being, plural identity claims, mental-attitude ascriptions, meaning attributions, and truth-talk. They consider 'deflationism about truth', explaining why deflationists should be fictionalists, and show how their philosophical fictionalist account of truth-talk underwrites a dissolution of the Liar Paradox and its kin. They further explore the semantic notions of reference and predicate-satisfaction, showing how philosophical fictionalism can also resolve puzzles that these notions appear to present. Their critical examination of fictionalist approaches in philosophy, together with the development and application of their own brand of philosophical fictionalism, will be of great interest to scholars and upper-level students of philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and linguistics.

Reviews

'This book not only offers about the best account I have seen of what is distinctive about philosophical fictionalism, but also offers a compelling argument in favour of the authors’ own thoroughgoing ‘semantic pretence’ version of fictionalism. A remarkable achievement.'

F. W. Kroon - University of Auckland

'Pretense and Pathology is a superb examination of the important fictionalist metaphysical strategies, followed by an impressive development and defense of the authors' preferred form of fictionalism and its application to several vexed areas of discourse.'

Kendall L. Walton - University of Michigan

Refine List

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

Contents

Contents
References

Bibliography

Alston, W. P. (1996) A Realist Conception of Truth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Armour-Garb, B. (2001) “Deflationism and the Meaningless Strategy.” Analysis 61: 280–289.
Armour-Garb, B. (2007) “Consistent Inconsistency Theories.” Inquiry 50: 639–654.
Armour-Garb, B. (2012a) “Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.” Philosophy Compass 7: 256–266.
Armour-Garb, B. (2012b) “Deflationism (about Theories of Truth).” Philosophy Compass 7: 267–277.
Armour-Garb, B. (2012c) “No Consistent Way with Paradox.” Analysis 72: 66–75.
Armour-Garb, B. (2012d) “The Monotonicity of ‘No’ and the No-Proposition View.” American Philosophical Quarterly 49: 1–14.
Armour-Garb, B. (2015) “New Problems for Modal Fictionalism.” Philosophical Studies 172: 1201–1219.
Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, JC (2005a) “Introduction to Deflationism.” In Armour-Garb and Beall (2005b), pp. 1–29.
Armour-Garb, B. and Beall, JC (eds.) (2005b) Deflationary Truth. Chicago: Open Court Press.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2006) “Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology and the Open Pair.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84: 395–416.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2010a) “Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense-Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are).” In Pedersen, N. and Wright, C. (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 59–77.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2010b) “Truth, Paradox and Plausibility.” Analysis 70: 11–23.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2012a) “The Story about Propositions.” Noûs 46: 635–674.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2012b) “Liars, Truthtellers, and Naysayers: A Broader View of Semantic Pathology I.” Language & Communication 32: 293–311.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2012c) “Sellars and Pretense on ‘Truth & “Correspondence”’ (with a Detour through Meaning Attribution).” Discusiones Filosóficas 13(21): 33–63.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2013) “Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar.” Philosophical Studies 164: 845–863.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2014a) “From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 93–118.
Armour-Garb, B. and Woodbridge, J. (2014b) “Semantic Defectiveness: A Dissolution of Semantic Pathology.” In Ciuni, R., Wansing, H., andWillkommen, C. (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Trends in Logic, Vol. 41). Cham: Springer International Publishing Switzerland, pp. 1–12.
Ayer, A. (1946) Language, Truth and Logic, Second Edition. New York: Dover Publications, 1952.
Azzouni, J. (1999) “Comments on Shapiro.” Journal of Philosophy 96: 541–544.
Azzouni, J. (2006) Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence and Truth. Oxford University Press.
Azzouni, J. (2007) “The Inconsistency of Natural Languages: How We Live with It.” Inquiry 50: 590–605.
Balaguer, M. (1998a) Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Balaguer, M. (1998b) “Attitudes without Propositions.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 805–826.
Balaguer, M. (2009) “Fictionalism, Theft, and the Story of Mathematics.” Philosophia Mathematica 17: 131–162.
Balaguer, M. (2011) “Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/.
Barbero, C., Ferraris, M., and Voltolini, A. (eds.) (2013) From Fictionalism to Realism. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1983) Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Beall, JC (2001a) “A Neglected Approach to the Liar.” Analysis 61: 126–129.
Beall, JC (2001b) “Is Yablo's Paradox Non-Circular?” Analysis 61: 176–187.
Beall, JC (2003) “True and False—As If.” In Priest, G., Beall, JC, and Armour-Garb, B. (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press, pp. 197–215.
Benacerraf, P. (1965) “What Numbers Could Not Be.” Philosophical Review 74: 47–73.
Benacerraf, P. (1973) “Mathematical Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 70: 661–679.
Blackburn, S. (1993) Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
Blackburn, S. (2005) “Quasi-Realism No Fictionalism.” In Kalderon (2005), pp. 322–338.
Boghossian, P. (1990) “The Status of Content.” Philosophical Review 99: 157–184.
Brandom, R. (1994) Making it Explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R. (2000) Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Brock, S. (2002) “Fictionalism about Fictional Characters.” Noûs 36: 1–21.
Brock, S. (2014) “The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 574–592.
Bueno, O. (2009) “Mathematical Fictionalism.” In Bueno, O. and Linnebo, Ø. (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics. Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, pp. 59–79.
Burgess, A. and Burgess, J. (2011) Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Burgess, J. (2004) “Mathematics and Bleak House.” Philosophia Mathematica 12: 18–36.
Burgess, J. and Rosen, G. (1997) A Subject With No Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Caddick Bourne, E. (2013) “Fictionalism.” Analysis 73: 147–162.
Caplan, B. and Tillman, C. (2013) “Benacerraf's Revenge.” Philosophical Studies 166: 111–129.
Chierchia, G. and McConnell-Ginet, S. (2000) Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics, Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chihara, C. (1979) “The Semantic Paradoxes: A Diagnostic Investigation.” Philosophical Review 88: 590–618.
Chomsky, N. (1957) Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton de Gruyter.
Church, A. (1950) “On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief.” Analysis 10: 97–99.
Collins, J. (2014) “Cutting it (Too) Fine.” Philosophical Studies 169: 143–172.
Crimmins, M. (1992) Talk About Beliefs. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Crimmins, M. (1998) “Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and Reference.” Philosophical Review 107: 1–47.
Crimmins, M. (2002) “Thing-Talk Moonlighting.” Philosophical Studies 108: 83–98.
Currie, G. (1990) The Nature of Fiction. Cambridge University Press.
Daly, C. (2008) “Fictionalism and the Attitudes.” Philosophical Studies 129: 423–440.
Damnjanovic, N. (2005) “Deflationism and the Success Argument.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55: 53–67.
David, M. (2009) “Defending Existentialism?” In Reicher, M. (ed.), States of Affairs. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, pp. 167–208.
Davidson, D. (1967a) “The Logical Form of Action Sentences.” In Rescher, N. (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 81–95. Reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, pp. 105–122.
Davidson, D. (1967b) “Truth and Meaning.” Synthese 17: 304–323. Reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 17-36.
Davidson, D. (1968) “On Saying That”. Synthese 19: 130–146. Reprinted in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 93–108.
Davidson, D. (1996) “The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 93: 263–278.
Devitt, M. (1997) Realism and Truth, Second Edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Devlin, J. (2003) “An Argument for an Error Theory of Truth.” Language and Philosophical Linguistics, Philosophical Perspectives 17: 51–82.
Dummett, M. (1959) “Truth.” Reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 1–24.
Egan, A. (2008) “Pretense for the Complete Idiom.” Noûs 42: 381–409.
Eklund, M. (2002) “Inconsistent Languages.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64: 251–275.
Eklund, M. (2005) “Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71: 557–579.
Eklund, M. (2011) “Fictionalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/fictionalism/.
Evans, G. (1982) “Existential Statements.” In McDowell, J. (ed.), Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 343–369.
Everett, A. (2005) “Against Fictional Realism.” Journal of Philosophy 102: 624–649.
Everett, A. (2007) “Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74: 56–80.
Field, H. (1978) “Mental Representation.” Erkenntnis 13: 9–61. Reprinted in Field (2001), pp. 30–67.
Field, H. (1980) Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Field, H. (1989) Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Field, H. (1994) “Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.” Mind 103: 249–285. Reprinted in Field (2001), pp. 104–140.
Field, H. (1999) “Deflating the Conservativeness Argument.” Journal of Philosophy 96: 533–540.
Field, H. (2001) Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Field, H. (2008) Saving Truth from Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Fine, A. (1993) “Fictionalism.” Philosophy of Science, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18: 1–18.
Frege, G. (1892) “On Sense and Reference.” In Geach, P. and Black, M. (eds.), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Second Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, pp. 56–78.
Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Goldstein, L. (1992) “‘This Statement is Not True’ is Not True.” Analysis 52: 1–5.
Goldstein, L. (2009) “A Consistent Way with Paradox.” Philosophical Studies 144: 377–89.
Grayling, A. (2001) An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Grover, D. (1977) “Inheritors and Paradox.” Journal of Philosophy 74: 590–604.
Grover, D. (1992) A Prosentential Theory of Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Grover, D., Camp, J., and Belnap, N. (1975) “A Prosentential Theory of Truth.” Philosophical Studies 27: 73–125.
Gupta, A. (1993) “A Critique of Deflationism.” Philosophical Topics 21: 57–81.
Gupta, A. and Belnap, N. (1993) The Revision Theory of Truth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Heal, J. (2001) “On Speaking Thus: The Semantics of Indirect Discourse.” Philosophical Quarterly 51: 433–454.
Herzberger, H. (1970) “Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics.” Journal of Philosophy 67: 145–167.
Horwich, P. (1998a) Truth, Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Horwich, P. (1998b) Meaning. Oxford University Press.
Hughes, G. (1982) John Buridan on Self-Reference. Translated, with an introduction and philosophical commentary, by Hughes, G. E.. Cambridge University Press.
Hussein, N. (2004) “The Return of Moral Fictionalism.” Philosophical Perspectives 18: 149–187.
Joyce, R. (2001) The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press.
Kalderon, M. (2005) Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Kalderon, M. (2008) “The Trouble with Terminology.” Philosophical Books 49: 33–41.
Kaplan, D. (1977) “Demonstratives.” In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 481–563.
Katz, J. (1998) Realistic Rationalism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Katz, J. (2004) Sense, Reference and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
King, J. (2007) The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford University Press.
King, J. (2014) “Naturalized Propositions.” In King, J., Soames, S., and Speaks, J., New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford University Press, pp. 47–70.
Kripke, S. (1972[1980]) Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kripke, S. (1973[2013]) Reference and Existence. Oxford University Press.
Kripke, S. (1975) “Outline of a Theory of Truth.” Journal of Philosophy 72: 690–716.
Kroon, F. (1996) “Characterizing Non-Existents.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 51: 163–193.
Kroon, F. (2000) “‘Disavowal through Commitment’ Theories of Negative Existentials.” In Everett, A. and Hofweber, T. (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 95–116.
Kroon, F. (2001) “Fictionalism and the Informativeness of Identity.” Philosophical Studies 106: 197–225.
Kroon, F. (2004) “Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems.” Philosophical Review 113: 1–30.
Kroon, F. (2009) “Existence in the Theory of Definite Descriptions.” Journal of Philosophy 106: 365–389.
Kroon, F. (2011) “Fictionalism in Metaphysics.” Philosophy Compass 6: 786–803.
Kroon, F. and Voltolini, A. (2011) “Fiction.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/fiction/.
Kukla, R. and Lance, M. (2009) ‘Yo!’ and ‘Lo!’: The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Leeds, S. (1978) “Theories of Reference and Truth.” Erkenntnis 13: 111–129.
Leeds, S. (1995) “Truth, Correspondence, and Success.” Philosophical Studies 79: 1–36.
Lewis, D. (1978) “Truth in Fiction.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 37–46. Reprinted in Lewis (1983), pp. 261–280.
Lewis, D. (1983) Philosophical Papers, Vol. I. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Lewis, D. (2005) “Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism.” In Kalderon (2005), pp. 314–321.
Loar, B. (1976) “Two Theories of Meaning.” In McDowell, J. and Evans, G. (eds.), Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 138–161.
Lowe, E. (1982) “On the Alleged Necessity of True Identity Statements.” Mind 91: 579–584.
Lowe, E. (1993) “Are the Natural Numbers Individuals or Sorts?” Analysis 53: 142–146.
Lynch, M. (2009) Truth as One and Many. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Mackie, J. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Press.
Maddy, P. (1990) Realism in Mathematics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Maddy, P. (1997) Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Meinong, A. (1904) “The Theory of Objects.” In Chisholm, R. (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960; reprint: Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Press, 1981, pp. 76–117.
Melia, J. (1992) “An Alleged Disanalogy between Numbers and Propositions.” Analysis 52: 46–48.
Moore, J. (1999a) “Propositions without Identity.” Noûs 33: 1–29.
Moore, J. (1999b) “Propositions, Numbers, and the Problem of Arbitrary Identification.” Synthese 120: 229–263.
Neumann, M. (1978) “Fictionalism and Realism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8: 533–541.
Nichols, S. and Stich, S. (2003) Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretense, Self-awareness and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
Nolan, D. and O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. (1996) “Reflexive Fictionalisms.” Analysis 56: 23–32.
Nolan, D., Restall, G., West, C. (2005) “Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 307–330.
Parsons, C. (1994) “Structuralism and the Concept of Set.” In Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (ed.), Modality, Morality, and Belief. Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–92.
Parsons, T. (1980) Nonexistent Objects. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Parsons, T. (1984) “Assertion, Denial and the Liar Paradox.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 13: 137–152.
Preminger, A., Brogan, T., et al. (1993) The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Price, H. (2003) “Truth as Convenient Friction.” Journal of Philosophy 100: 167–190.
Priest, G. (1979) “The Logic of Paradox.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 219–241.
Priest, G. (1987) In Contradiction: A Study of the Transconsistent. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Priest, G. (1997) “Yablo's Paradox.” Analysis 57: 236–242.
Priest, G. (2005a) “Words without Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71: 686–94.
Priest, G. (2005b) Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Priest, G. (2006) In Contradiction, Second Edition. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. (1971) Philosophy of Logic. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
Putnam, H. (1975) “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” Reprinted in Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. (1960) Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Quine, W. (1986) Philosophy of Logic, Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reinhardt, W. (1986) “Some Remarks on Extending and Interpreting Theories with a Partial Predicate for Truth.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 15: 219–251.
Resnik, M. (1997) Mathematics as a Series of Patterns. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Richard, M. (2000) “Semantic Pretense.” In Everett, A. and Hofweber, T. (eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence. Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 205–232.
Rosen, G. (1990) “Modal Fictionalism.” Mind 99: 327–354.
Rosen, G. (1994) “What is Constructive Empiricism?” Philosophical Studies 74: 143–178.
Rosen, G. (2005) “Problems in the History of Fictionalism.” In Kalderon (2005), pp. 14–64.
Rumfitt, I. (1993) “Content and Context: The Paratactic Theory Revisited and Revised.” Mind 102: 429–454.
Russell, B. (1905) “On Denoting.” Mind 14: 479–493.
Russell, B. (1918) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985.
Sainsbury, M. (2010) Fiction and Fictionalism. New York: Routledge Press.
Salmon, N. (1986) Frege's Puzzle. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview.
Scharp, K. (2013) Replacing Truth. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Schiffer, S. (1981) “Truth and the Theory of Content.” In Parret, H. and Bouveresse, J. (eds.), Meaning and Understanding. New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 204–222.
Schiffer, S. (1987) Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schiffer, S. (1988) “Review of The Varieties of Reference by Gareth Evans; John McDowell.” Journal of Philosophy 85: 33–42.
Schiffer, S. (1996) “Language-Created, Language-Independent Entities.” Philosophical Topics 24: 149–167.
Schiffer, S. (2003) The Things We Mean. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (1975) “The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse.” New Literary History 6: 319–332.
Sellars, W. (1963) Science, Perception and Reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Republished by Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero, CA, 1991.
Sellars, W.(1969) “Language as Thought and as Communication.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29: 506–527.
Sellars, W.(1974) “Meaning as Functional Classification.” Synthese 27: 417–437.
Sellars, W. (1979) Naturalism and Ontology. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
Shapiro, S. (1983) “Conservativeness and Incompleteness.” Journal of Philosophy 80: 521–531.
Shapiro, S. (1997) Structure and Ontology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Simmons, K. (1994) “Paradox of Denotation.” Philosophical Studies 76: 71-106.
Soames, S. (1992) “Truth, Meaning, and Understanding.” Philosophical Studies 65: 17–35.
Sorensen, R. (2001) Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Speaks, J. (2014) “What’s Wrong with Semantic Theories Which Make No Use of Propositions?” In King, J., Soames, S., Speaks, J., New Thinking about Propositions. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press, pp. 9–24.
Stanley, J. (2001) “Hermeneutic Fictionalim.” Figurative Language, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25: 36–71.
Strawson, P. (1950) “On Referring.” Mind 59: 320–44.
Tappenden, J. (1993) “The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes: Towards a Unified Treatment.” Journal of Philosophy 90: 551–77.
Tarski, A. (1933[1983]) “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages.” Page citations are to the reprint in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923–1938. Translated by Woodger, J. H., Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, pp. 152–178.
Tarski, A. (1944) “The Semantic Conception of Truth.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4: 341–375.
Textor, M. (2012) “States of Affairs.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition), Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/states-of-affairs/.
Thomasson, A. (1999) Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Thomasson, A. (2003) “Speaking of Fictional Characters.” Dialectica 57: 205–223.
Vaihinger, H. (1911) The Philosophy of ‘As If’: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind. Translated by Ogden, C. K.. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1924.
van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image. Oxford: Claredon Press.
Velleman, D. (2000) “On the Aim of Belief.” In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 244–281.
von Wright, G. (1960) “The Heterological Paradox.” Soc. Sci. Fenn., Comm. Phys.-Math 24: 3–26.
Wagner, S. (1982) “Arithmetical Fiction.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63: 255–269.
Walton, K. (1990) Mimesis as Make-Believe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Walton, K. (1993) “Metaphor and Prop-Oriented Make-Believe.” European Journal of Philosophy 1: 39–56. Reprinted in Kalderon (2005), pp. 65–87.
Walton, K. (2003) “Restricted Quantification, Negative Existentials, and Fiction.” Dialectica 57: 239–242.
Williams, M. (1986) “Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?” Philosophical Topics 14: 223–242.
Woodbridge, J. (2005) “Truth as a Pretense.” In Kalderon (2005), pp. 134–177.
Woodbridge, J. (2006) “Propositions as Semantic Pretense.” Language & Communication 26: 343–355.
Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. (2005) “Semantic Pathology and the Open Pair.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71: 695–703.
Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. (2008) “The Pathology of Validity.” Synthese 160: 63–74.
Woodbridge, J. and Armour-Garb, B. (2009) “Linguistic Puzzles and Semantic Pretense.” In Sawyer, S. (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 250–284.
Woods, J. (2007) “Fictions and their Logic.” In Jacquette, D. (ed.), Philosophy of Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing, pp. 1061–1126.
Woods, J. (ed.) (2010) Fictions and Models: New Essays. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
Woods, J. and Rosales, A. (2010) “Unifying the Fictional.” In Woods (2010), pp. 345–388.
Yablo, S. (1985) “Truth and Reflection.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 14: 297–349.
Yablo, S. (1993a) “Paradox without Self-Reference.” Analysis 53: 251–252.
Yablo, S. (1993b) “Hop, Skip, and Jump: The Agnostic Conception of Truth.” Philosophical Perspectives 7: 371–396. Corrections in Philosophical Perspectives 9: 503–506.
Yablo, S. (1996) “How in the World?” Philosophical Topics 24: 255–286.
Yablo, S. (2001) “Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism.” Figurative Language, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25: 72–102.
Yablo, S. (2002) “Abstract Objects: A Case Study.” Realism and Relativism, Philosophical Issues 12: 220–240.
Yablo, S. (2003) “New Grounds for Naïve Truth Theory.” In: Beall, JC (ed.), Liars and Heaps. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 312–330.
Yablo, S. (2005) “The Myth of the Seven.” In Kalderon (2005), pp. 88–115.
Zalta, E. (1988) Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Book summary page views

Total views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between #date#. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed.