Elsevier

World Development

Volume 35, Issue 1, January 2007, Pages 121-143
World Development

Demand and Supply-Side Determinants of Conditional Cash Transfer Program Effectiveness

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2006.09.009Get rights and content

Summary

The Programa Nacional de Becas Estudiantiles is a conditional cash transfer program designed to promote human capital accumulation and reduce poverty among Argentine youth. This study follows a 1999 cohort of students for five years and uses matching methods with a comparison group of students excluded due to quotas to estimate average and marginal program impacts. Multilevel methods are used to explore the role of program management and execution in explaining variation between schools in student outcomes. The results suggest that the Becas program improved students’ attendance and performance, in part through program conditions requiring good attendance and academic progress for continued scholarship receipt.

Introduction

Conditional cash transfer programs are currently an important economic and social policy tool being used to address the problems of poverty, inequality, and human capital development in both developing and developed countries. A primary objective of conditional cash transfer programs is to provide short-term assistance to families in poverty, while at the same time promoting investments in long-term human capital development through conditions on benefit receipt. Other important goals of these programs include income redistribution and the promotion of social inclusion. The coverage of these programs is vast in some countries; for example, Brazil’s Bolsa Famı´lia program that began in 2003 is expected to serve up to 50 million poor persons.

Early evaluations of conditional cash transfer programs have reported some positive effects. The proxy means tests that are used in many programs to prioritize access to benefits appear to be effective in targeting the poor, and the electronic transfers of cash are more efficient (lower transaction costs) and less distortive (fewer errors of inclusion and price distortions) than in-kind transfers and general subsidies (Rawlings, 2004). Experimental and nonexperimental evaluations of these programs have also reported positive impacts on school enrollment rates, consumption levels, immunization and nutrition monitoring, and reductions in child labor. In a number of countries, these programs are now being expanded, and “second-generation” models are being implemented and evaluated, including studies of the role that conditions play in increasing family welfare (Martinelli and Parker, 2001, Rawlings & Rubio, 2003).

Another way in which thinking about conditional cash transfer programs is advancing is the greater attention that is now being given to the important aspects of program implementation. A primary challenge to successful program implementation has been limited institutional capacity and resources for basic program management responsibilities, including the registration of beneficiaries, regular and timely benefit transfers, monitoring of compliance with program conditions, recordkeeping, and the prevention of fraud and mismanagement of program funds (Tabor, 2002). In large countries like Argentina and Brazil, programs are administered at the municipal level, with local government, school and health authorities playing key roles.

This research focuses on Argentina’s Programa Nacional de Becas Estudiantiles, a conditional cash transfer program that targets youth aged 13–19 years, who are entering their eighth and ninth years of study in public schools and are at risk of leaving school before completing their education. The primary objectives of the program are to support the retention, promotion, and graduation of students from the third cycle of the Educacion General Basica (EGB)—equivalent to the high school years (i.e., grades 9–12)—thus increasing educational attainment and promoting human capital development among Argentine youth. The Becas program currently provides scholarships to approximately 350 000 economically vulnerable students each year in the form of bi-annual payments to their families.

In this study, nonexperimental analyses are used to assess the impact of Argentina’s Becas program on students’ educational attainment and performance in school. The impact of the treatment on the treated is estimated for two different groups: Becas program beneficiaries compared to eligible students who received no scholarship and Becas program beneficiaries who received the scholarship for only one year compared to those who received the scholarship for two or more years (the marginal program impact). In addition, the analysis goes one step further to explore school-level factors, including characteristics of the schools and the students attending them and various aspects of the Becas program implementation, and their role in explaining the variation in Becas program impacts between schools. Thus, this research aims to contribute to our understanding of both the demand- and supply-side determinants of the effectiveness of a large-scale conditional cash transfer program.

This study finds significant impacts of the Becas program in increasing students’ attendance, reducing grade repetition and improving students’ performance in school. The Becas program also appeared to establish important dynamic incentive effects by linking receipt of the scholarship in subsequent years to students’ academic performance in the first year of participation. In addition, student performance was higher in schools with greater institutional capacity, better conditions for learning, and superior management.

In the next section, additional background information on conditional cash transfer programs is provided, and findings from recent evaluations are briefly described, followed by discussion of the motivation for a focus on Argentina’s human capital development initiatives and the Becas Estudiantiles program. The methodology for this study, samples, and data are described next, and then the empirical analyses and study findings are presented. The paper concludes with a discussion of the study findings and implications for future human capital development programs of this type.

Section snippets

Conditional cash transfer programs and schooling investments

Conditional cash transfer programs, initiated more than a decade ago with a pilot program in Mexico, have since been widely implemented in Latin America and other countries.1 The conditions that typically accompany

Study Samples, Data, and Methodology

A condition of international lenders’ support for the priority social programs in Argentina was an evaluation of the programs’ effectiveness in targeting benefits, delivering services, and improving outcomes for the poor. Random assignment was not an option for the evaluation, as the program was expanded after the economic emergency to provide benefits to all eligible youth. However, a baseline survey that collected very detailed information on students and their families to determine

Predicting treatment status and duration of scholarship receipt

As discussed above, a rich set of pre-treatment measures was available to use in predicting the probability of treatment or Becas scholarship receipt (i.e., the propensity scores). In addition, the choice of variables to use in predicting participation was informed by a careful study and documentation of the application/intake criteria and decision processes for the Becas program.

Based on this prior knowledge, it was expected that the two most important predictors (or determinants) of any

Conclusion

The Programa Nacional de Becas Estudiantiles, a conditional cash transfer program in Argentina, was designed to increase school attendance and to motivate better school performance among high-school aged youth who are poor and at risk of leaving school before completion of the third cycle of basic education (i.e., high school). This nonexperimental study found some statistically significant effects of the Becas program in increasing attendance, reducing grade repetitions and improving students’

Acknowledgement

I thank Marcelo Cabrol of the Inter-American Development Bank, research staff of the Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero—UNTREF, Centro de Investigaciones en Estadı´stica Aplicada—CINEA, and Cristina Vargas de Flood and Jorge Fernandez Bussy for their key roles in data collection, project supervision, and evaluation design and monitoring in Argentina. I also thank Carola Pessino of the Universidad de Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Lucas Ronconi, and anonymous referees for their

References (29)

  • A.S. Bedi et al.

    The impact of school quality on earnings and educational returns—evidence from a low-income country

    Journal of Development Economics

    (2002)
  • S. Handa

    Raising primary school enrollment in developing countries: the relative importance of supply and demand

    Journal of Development Economics

    (2002)
  • E.A. Hanushek et al.

    Redistribution through education and other transfer mechanisms

    Journal of Monetary Economics

    (2003)
  • Abadie, A., & Imbens, G. (2005). On the failure of the bootstrap for matching estimators. Working...
  • J. Angrist et al.

    Vouchers for private schooling in Colombia: evidence from a randomized natural experiment

    The American Economic Review

    (2002)
  • J. Behrman et al.

    Evaluating preschool programs when length of exposure to the program varies: a nonparametric approach

    The Review of Economics and Statistics

    (2004)
  • Behrman, J., Gallardo-Garcia, J., Parker, S. W., Todd, P., & Vélez-Grajales, V. (2005). How conditional cash transfers...
  • Behrman, J., Parker, S. W., & Todd, P. (2005). The longer-term impacts of Mexico’s oportunidades school subsidy program...
  • Behrman, J., Pilali, S., & Todd, P. (2005). Progressing through progresa: an impact assessment of Mexico’s school...
  • S. Cameron et al.

    Life cycle schooling and dynamic selection bias: models and evidence for five cohorts of American males

    Journal of Political Economy

    (1998)
  • Carneiro, P., & Heckman, J. J. (2004). Human capital policy. In J. J. Heckman, & A. Krueger (Eds.), Inequality in...
  • de Janvry, A., Finan, F., & Sadoulet, E. (forthcoming). Can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets in...
  • Dubois, P., de Janvry, A., & Sadoulet, E. (2003). Effects on school enrollment and performance of a conditional cash...
  • Gasparini, L. (2003). Argentina’s distributional failure: the role of integration and public policies. Working paper,...
  • Cited by (0)

    View full text