The wisdom of the minority
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Cited by (42)
Information design through scarcity and social learning
2023, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :Our paper contributes to the literature on social learning with imperfect observability of past actions. Different work has assumed that agents can observe a random sample of actions that is anonymous (Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), Smith and Sorensen (2013), Monzón and Rapp (2014), Monzón (2017)) or non-anonymous (Acemoglu et al. (2011), Lobel and Sadler (2015)), the aggregate total of all past actions (Callander and Hörner, 2009), the aggregate total of one particular action (Guarino et al. (2011), Herrera and Hörner (2013)), or only the choice of an agent's immediate predecessor (Çelen and Kariv, 2004). Unlike these papers, the information structure in our setting is endogenous, so consumers may fail to learn about low quality despite two features that the literature suggests should promote learning: multiple consumers who do not have access to social information (see Banerjee (1992), Sgroi (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2011), Smith and Sorensen (2013), Golub and Sadler (2017)); and unbounded private signals (see, e.g., Smith and Sørensen (2000), Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)).
Non-monotone social learning
2021, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationSocial learning with coordination motives
2020, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Their main result states that when the private signal structure features unbounded beliefs, a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning to occur in each equilibrium is that the observation structure enables agents to always observe some close predecessor. Other recent research in this area include the works of Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), Gale and Kariv (2003), Callander and Horner (2009) and Smith and Sorensen (2013), which make alternative assumptions regarding observation, e.g., agents observe only the number of other agents taking each available action but not the positions of the observed agents in the decision sequence. In our model, an agent can always observe a close predecessor, since asymptotic learning is impossible otherwise as shown by the above cited works.
Gleaning inferences from soldout products
2019, Journal of Retailing and Consumer ServicesSocial learning with endogenous observation
2016, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :Their main result states that when the private signal structure features unbounded belief, asymptotic learning occurs in each equilibrium if and only if agents always observe close predecessors. Other recent research in this area include Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004), Gale and Kariv (2003), Callander and Horner (2009) and Smith and Sorensen (2013), which differ from Acemoglu et al. (2011) mainly in making alternative assumption for observation, i.e., that agents only observe the number of others taking each available action but not their positions in the decision sequence. However, these papers also share the assumption of exogenous observation.
Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic
2015, Journal of Economic Theory