Contention strikes back? The discursive, instrumental and institutional tactics implemented by coal sector incumbents in Colombia

Abstract

Over the past decade, large-scale coal production and exportation has become an important activity for Colombia's economy. However, this sector is now facing a range of domestic and international social and economic pressures. This article seeks to fill what appears to be a shared gap in the energy transition and natural resource governance research fields: the ways through which incumbent actors of the fossil fuel regime respond to socio-economic pressures and actively resist change. Based on a case study on large-scale coal production in Colombia, we analyze incumbent actors' discursive, instrumental and institutional political strategies to maintain the status quo and shed light on their preliminary intended and unexpected results. We find that although instrumental strategies continue to be important, discursive ones aiming at influencing public narratives have gained increased ground within companies and government´s officials. Yet, new contention strategies do not seem to guarantee incumbents structural power and paradoxically could hinder their already eroded legitimacy.

Introduction

If global warming is to be limited to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, over 80% of the world's coal reserves, a third of its oil reserves, and half of its gas reserves must remain unused from 2010 to 2050 [1]. This reality has led to increasing attention in the academic and policy arenas on how to keep coal and other fossil fuels in the ground [2], [3].

At the same time, the promotion of fossil fuel extraction remains central to energy and development plans in numerous countries. Fossil fuel producers include some of the world's largest companies and have enough political influence to obstruct policies not to their liking [4].

Therefore, efforts to transition away from fossil fuel production will likely spur active resistance by incumbents of the fossil fuel supply regime, especially in countries with long-standing dependence on fossil fuels and their revenues [5]. However, little is known about how incumbents resist, hinder, and delay transitions to a low-carbon society [6].

This is particularly true for the political dynamics specific to transitions away from fossil fuel production (as opposed to consumption). Even as it is becoming clear that the big next step in climate policy is addressing fossil fuel extraction, there has so far been little academic and policy attention on the “supply-side” policies that limit the upstream supply of commodities whose downstream consumption causes greenhouse gas emissions, such as fossil fuels [7], [8], [9]. So far, only a few political aspects of supply-side transitions have been explored, such as: policy options for curbing production [5], [8], [10]; the role of international norms and the emergence of the divestment movement [11]; and the concept of a “just transition” [12], [13].

Research on natural resource governance provides a better understanding of some related issues, such as society's opposition to large-scale extraction projects [14], [15] and extractive-based development [16], [17], [18]. Nevertheless, except for the theme of corporate social responsibility (e.g. [19]), there has been limited research on how extractive companies – and governments in countries highly dependent on extractive industries – respond to new socio-political, economic, and financial pressures. Even the literature on the “resource curse”, which could help explain political economy dynamics around coal extraction, pays little attention to the political coalitions behind natural resource policies [20].

This article seeks to fill what appears to be a shared gap in the energy transition and natural resource governance research fields: the ways through which incumbent actors of the fossil fuel regime respond to socio-economic pressures and actively resist change. Based on a case study in Colombia, we ask how the coal sector's incumbent actors use different types of political strategies to resist regime change and maintain the status quo. We explore to what extent lobbying and other traditional incumbent strategies prevail, and how they have evolved in the face of new international and domestic challenges. We aim to open the black box of incumbents’ structural power, by determining the role institutions, political instruments, and discourses play in their approach. And we shed light on the political effects of incumbency strategies by examining both their intended and unexpected results.

This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the study's methodology and justify the case selection. Section 3 explores the literature relevant to our questions and explains the study's conceptual framework. Section 4 summarizes findings in terms of incumbents’ strategies and presents some of their inherent inconsistencies. Section 5 discusses the implications from our findings and lays out areas for further research.