Central bank independence and public debt policy
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We thank Ed. Westerhout and two anonymous referees for helpful and constructive comments. Of course, any remaining errors are our sole responsibility. This paper was written while Beetsma was a postdoctoral fellow at DELTA (Joint Research Unit CNRS-EHESS-ENS). He thanks DELTA for the stimulating research environment.
Copyright © 1997 Published by Elsevier B.V.