Gains and losses at core allocations

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(75)90018-X

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volume 2, Issue 2, June–September 1975, Pages 119-128

https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(75)90018-X Get rights and content

Abstract

The search for a coalition which can possibly improve upon a given allocation and the redistribution of endowments within such a coalition are conducted through the use of prices. Prices permit the expression of how much every agent gains or loses in the allocation. With any feasible allocation one can associate a price system such that either the total loss of all losers does not exceed a certain bound independent of the number of agents or the losers can improve. The definition of gains and losses that we use implies that the total gain is also bounded in core allocations. Our theorem is closely related to that of Vind (1965).

References (4)

T. Bewley
Edgeworth's conjecture
Econometrica
(1973)
G. Debreu
Theory of value
(1959)

There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

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^☆: Presented at the Mathematical Social Science Board Colloquium on Mathematical Economics in August 1974 at the University of California, Berkeley. The author is grateful to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and to the Mathematical Social Science Board for financial support enabling him to attend this M.S.S.B. colloquium.

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Gains and losses at core allocations☆

Abstract

Edgeworth's conjecture

Econometrica

Theory of value