Public perceptions of climate change and energy futures before and after the Fukushima accident: A comparison between Britain and Japan

highlights

• We report data from 2005 to 2011 of British and Japanese attitudes towards nuclear power and climate change.

• The Japanese are less supportive of nuclear power as a solution to climate change than the British.

• Public support for and trust in nuclear power has collapsed in Japan after Fukushima.

• British public attitudes to nuclear power are remarkably robust in the wake of Fukushima.

Abstract

The threats posed by climate change call for strong action from the international community to limit carbon emissions. Before the Fukushima accident that followed the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011, both Britain and Japan were considering an ambitious expansion of nuclear power as part of their strategy to reduce carbon emissions. However, the accident may have thrown nuclear power as a publicly accep’ energy technology into doubt. This study uses several nationally representative surveys from before and after the Fukushima accident to examine how it may have changed public perceptions of climate change and energy futures in Britain and Japan. The study found that already before the accident the Japanese public were less supportive of nuclear power than the British. While British attitudes have remained remarkably stable over time, the Japanese public appear to have completely lost trust in nuclear safety and regulation, and have become less acceptive of nuclear power even if it would contribute to climate change mitigation or energy security. In Japan the public are now less likely to think that any specific energy source will contribute to a reliable and secure supply of energy. The implications for energy policy are discussed.

Introduction

The threats posed by climate change calls for strong action from the international community to limit Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. Both the UK and Japan Governments have set themselves ambitious long-term domestic targets that go well beyond the Kyoto Protocol. The UK Climate Change Act of 2008 provides a legally binding GHG reduction target of 80% by 2050, with an interim target of 34% by 2020. Japan′s policy is to achieve an emission reduction of 25% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. These targets necessitate fundamental changes to the way energy is used and produced, and are unlikely to be met without widespread engagement and approval from the general public. Not only does the public need to personally change their behaviour in order to reduce energy consumption and to comply with wider policies aimed at motivating these changes, they also need to accept new low-carbon technologies and facilities to de-carbonise the energy they are using (Spence and Pidgeon, 2009).

Within this context, nuclear power has in recent years been promoted as a low-carbon technology that may help to mitigate climate change and at the same time increase energy security (Bickerstaff et al., 2008). While arguments regarding the role of nuclear power in delivering a secure supply of energy have been made since the oil crises in the 1970s, it is only since the early 2000s that nuclear power has been framed explicitly as a means to address climate change (Pidgeon et al., 2008). Over the last decade various industry and government actors in the UK, as well as a number of prominent environmentalists, including Lovelock (2004) and Monbiot (2009), have expressed support for new nuclear built to help combat climate change. Previous studies suggest that this reframing argument has resulted in some changes in public attitudes towards nuclear power over the past decade. A significant proportion of the British public now ‘reluctantly accept’ nuclear power as a means of addressing the greater threat of climate change (e.g. Pidgeon et al., 2008, Corner et al., 2011). However, while the public is willing to consider nuclear power, the energy technology is not embraced wholeheartedly. It has been suggested that this ‘conditional support’ is fragile in nature. Pidgeon et al. (2008) argued that, in the absence of any major accident since Chernobyl, the public may have become less attentive to the risks of nuclear power, and that latent concerns are likely to re-emerge in case of major accident, possibly amplified with considerable force.

Nuclear power has for a long time been a national strategic priority in Japan (MOE, 2008); and several government and industry actors have stressed the need for nuclear power to combat climate change (e.g. Hasegawa, 1999). The 2010 Strategic Energy Plan committed to radical reductions in GHG emissions through investments in renewable energy, the promotion of energy conservation, and an ambitious expansion of Japan′s nuclear energy generating capacity from 26% in 2010 to nearly 50% in 2030 (METI, 2010). However, the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant that followed the devastating Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on the 11th of March 2011 has thrown nuclear power as a publicly acceptable energy technology into doubt. Before the accident, public support and trust in the regulation of nuclear power had already been seriously tested following a series of accidents in Japan, most notably the criticality accident at the Tokai-mura uranium reprocessing facility killing two workers (and exposing many others to high doses of radiation), the steam explosion at Mihama nuclear power plant killing 4 workers and injuring 7 more, and the leakage of radioactive water from the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant after the 2007 Chūetsu offshore earthquake (Cyranoski, 2010). Various scholars have argued that these accidents show that the Japanese Government and the nuclear industry have been far too lax in the development and operation of nuclear policies and facilities, and that public safety has not been their main priority (Nakamura and Kikuchi, 2011; NAIIC, 2012). Indeed, at the turn of the century public support for nuclear power reached an all-time low in Japan, as did trust in Japan′s nuclear energy policy (OECD, 2010).

The investigations into the causes of the Fukushima disaster show that public distrust in the safety and management of nuclear power installations was to some degree warranted. Both the investigation of the privately-funded Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation and the NAIIC¹investigation ordered by the National Diet of Japan concluded that Fukushima was a man-made disaster rather than one caused directly by the earthquake and ensuing tsunami (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012; NAIIC, 2012). The reports conclude that, notwithstanding the complexity of the situation or the cascading effects of the unfolding emergency, the Fukushima accident was ultimately preventable (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012). All the direct causes of the accident were foreseeable prior to the accident and could have been responded to. However, the operator, Government, and regulators failed to meet the most basic safety requirements and did not implement appropriate procedures and training for an effective response to critical situations (NAIIC, 2012). This shows that that the pathology of catastrophic accidents can often be found in organisational and societal preconditions, such as a lack of safety culture (Pidgeon, 2012). The conclusions of the independent commissions are likely to have further eroded public trust in the safety and management of the nuclear power stations in Japan. Earthquakes and tsunamis are unpredictable but unavoidable events in Japan and should therefore have been central to any risk assessment and emergency planning in nuclear installations. However, even after a number of nuclear incidents and accidents in the 1990s and 2000s, some of which triggered by an earthquake, the industry and its regulators failed to ensure that appropriate emergency procedures were in place (NAIIC, 2012).

After the Fukushima accident all Japan′s nuclear power plants have either closed or had their operation suspended for safety inspections and maintenance, leaving Japan temporarily without nuclear-produced electricity in 2012. The announcement of the decision to restart two nuclear reactors led to – for Japan – unprecedented demonstrations (BBC, 2012), showing the extent of public opposition and distrust in the safety and management of nuclear power in the wake of Fukushima accident. While there have been sizable and well-organised anti-nuclear movements in both Europe and US since the 1970s, the anti-nuclear movement in Japan has generally been smaller than its Western counterparts and tended to focus on military applications of nuclear technology rather than civilian nuclear power (Valentine and Sovacool, 2010, Hasegawa, 2011). While there has been successful opposition to the siting of new nuclear facilities in Japan (Takubo, 1997), the poor integration and marginalisation of environmental NGOs and civil society movements in policy-making networks limits its power to substantially influence environmental policies (Foljanty-Jost, 2005). The Fukushima accident and – perhaps more importantly – the subsequent loss of trust in Japan′s nuclear industry and government, may have sparked the beginning of a better organised anti-nuclear movement resisting the use of civilian nuclear technology. This may have profound consequences for the future direction of Japan′s energy policy, as shown by the relative success of anti-nuclear movements in the US and Europe to slow down the expansion of nuclear power (Hasegawa, 2011). Indeed, in a dramatic departure from its pre-Fukushima energy policy, the Japanese Government unveiled in September 2012 plans to phase out nuclear power before 2040 -although it declared a number of days later that Japan′s future energy policy would be developed “with flexibility based on tireless verification and re-examination”, leaving open the option of continuing Japan′s existing nuclear power plants. This change in policy can of course not solely be attributed to the influence of public opinion. However, it is clear that Fukushima has fundamentally changed the debate on the role of nuclear power in Japan′s future energy mix and strained the relationship between the general public and the Japanese Government.

The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant has had ramifications beyond Japan, substantially reshaping nuclear agendas and policies across the world (Jorant, 2011). This is perhaps most dramatically shown in Germany′s decision to phase out nuclear power by 2022, which was made in response to continuing public opposition and demonstrations in the wake of the accident—thereby revoking recent preceding policy decisions to continue its use (Pfister and Böhm, 2012). While Germany has already established itself as a leader in renewable energy technology and generation (Wittneben, 2012), it will still face challenges in replacing the lost capacity by other forms of low-carbon energy generation in order to meet its carbon reduction targets. In contrast, UK policymakers remain fully committed to their decision to increase the share of nuclear power in the energy mix. The UK Office for Nuclear Regulation concluded that “In considering the direct causes of the Fukushima accident we see no reason for curtailing the operation of nuclear power plants or other nuclear facilities in the UK” (cited in Butler et al., 2011). Crucially, this was before the damning conclusions of the independent investigations that the Fukushima accident was a man-made rather than a natural disaster. UK policy makers however still consider nuclear power as an important part of the transition to a low-carbon economy (Schneider et al., 2012). These show very different policy responses to one of the most serious nuclear accidents in history.

If Japan is to phase out nuclear from its energy mix, it is imperative that the lost capacity is met by other low-carbon sources so that it still can meet its carbon reduction targets. Japan has seen a substantial increase in carbon emissions as it has been forced to import more oil, coal and natural gas to fill the energy gap created by the shutdown of its nuclear power stations. A continued reliance on oil and natural gas may call into question Japan′s ability to reduce CO₂ emissions by 25% by 2020. On 27 October 2011, former minister for the environment Mr Hosono, stated at the committee for the environment of the Upper Diet that CO₂ emissions would increase by 150–170 million tons if all electric power generated by nuclear was substituted by oil or coals. This almost equals 12–14% of 1990 GHG emissions (National Diet Library, 2012). While there are a number of scenarios for a low-carbon Japan, including the large-scale deployment of renewable sources and energy demand reduction (e.g. Shimada et al., 2007, Fujino et al., 2008), these pathways would need to be supported by the general public. Case studies from around the world have shown that community opposition can lead to delays or even cancelation of the deployment and siting of low-carbon energy technologies (Pidgeon et al., 2008), while mitigating climate change through energy demand reduction requires serious commitment from the general public to change their own behaviour (Poortinga et al., 2012).

In this study we compare public perceptions of climate change and energy futures in Britain and Japan using a series of quantitative surveys that were conducted at different stages before and after the Fukushima accident. This comparison will show how the Fukushima accident may have changed public opinion on climate change and nuclear power in the two countries, as well as the acceptability of alternative energy options. The comparison between Britain and Japan is relevant, as nuclear power was part of both countries’ strategy to achieve future carbon emission reductions. While the Fukushima accident is likely to have seriously affected Japanese public attitudes to nuclear power, its impacts on British public opinion are less clear. The studies that are included in this study all contained items that can be used for cross-national comparisons. The datasets include the “Public Risk Perceptions, Climate Change and Reframing of UK Energy” and “Public Perceptions of Climate Change and Energy Choices in Britain” surveys that were conducted in Britain in 2005 and 2010, respectively. The third British dataset is a survey commissioned by the British Science Foundation (BSA) as part of the 2011 British Science Festival. These British surveys are compared with a series of nation-wide public opinion surveys conducted in 2007 and 2011 in Japan. The surveys covered widely similar topics and items, although not each item was included in all surveys. We therefore only make cross-national and pre-post Fukushima comparisons where possible. Although these comparisons are admittedly crude – as the studies were not specifically designed to examine the impacts of the Fukushima accident – the surveys are the only nationally representative datasets available for that purpose. Box A provides details of the five datasets. The studies will be referred to as GB2005, GB2010 and GB2011, and JP2007 and JP2011, respectively.