Iterated strict dominance in general games
References (46)
Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
Games Econ. Behav.
(1995)Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
J. Econ. Theory
(1997)- et al.
On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
Oper. Res. Lett.
(1990) A note on the implication of common knowledge of rationality
Games Econ. Behav.
(1994)General systems and φ-stable sets—A formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
J. Math. Econ.
(2001)Hierarchies of compact beliefs and rationalizable behavior
Econ. Lett.
(2003)- et al.
Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models
J. Math. Econ.
(2005) - et al.
Order dependence of iterated weak dominance
Games Econ. Behav.
(1997) - et al.
Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
Games Econ. Behav.
(1996) Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
Math. Soc. Sci.
(1984)
Dominated strategies and common knowledge
Games Econ. Behav.
(1992)
The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
J. Econ. Theory
(1988)
Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
J. Math. Econ.
(1990)
Infinite Dimensional Analysis
(1999)
Agreeing to disagree
Ann. Stat.
(1976)
Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality
Econometrica
(1987)
Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge
Int. J. Game Theory
(1999)
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
Econometrica
(1995)
Rationalizable strategic behavior
Econometrica
(1984)
Pure strategy dominance
Econometrica
(1993)
“Cautious” utility maximization and iterated weak dominance
Int. J. Game Theory
(1992)
Cited by (51)
The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces
2024, Journal of Economic TheoryOrder independence for rationalizability
2024, Games and Economic BehaviorIterated bounded dominance
2023, Economics LettersNon-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
2022, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Aumann (1995) and Aumann (1998) used non-Bayesian models to study games in extensive form with complete information. Chen et al. (2007) showed that for sp-dominance rationality these profiles are those that survive iterative elimination of strategies that are strictly dominated by pure strategies. The case of wp-dominance rationality was studied by Bonanno (2008) and Bonanno and Tsakas (2018), for common belief.3
Common belief in rationality in psychological games: Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
2022, Journal of Mathematical EconomicsBringing Facilitated Industrial Symbiosis and Game Theory together to strengthen waste exchange in industrial parks
2021, Science of the Total EnvironmentCitation Excerpt :Still, both types of games have their own specific procedures. In the case of a two-player static game, the process for its resolution can be structured according to the following three steps (Chen et al., 2007): Search for dominant strategies: a strategy is dominant when it is better than all the other available strategies.
Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.