Elsevier

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 61, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 299-315
Games and Economic Behavior

Iterated strict dominance in general games

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.002Get rights and content

Abstract

We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS*) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS* is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS* by means of a “stability” criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS*. We show by an example that IESDS* may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS* preserves the set of Nash equilibria.

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