Elsevier

Ecological Economics

Volume 70, Issue 1, 15 November 2010, Pages 107-113
Ecological Economics

Analysis
Economic values of species management options in human–wildlife conflicts: Hen Harriers in Scotland

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.08.009Get rights and content

Abstract

In this paper, we use the choice experiment method to investigate public preferences over alternative management regimes for a top-level predator in UK moorlands, the Hen Harrier. These birds are at the centre of a conflict between moorland managers and conservation organisations. Illegal killing of Hen Harriers on moorland managed for Red Grouse is considered to be one of the main factors limiting harrier population growth in the UK. Incentives for persecution arise due to the impacts of Hen Harriers on populations of Red Grouse, which are managed for commercial shooting. Numerous alternatives have been proposed to manage this system. We considered three which have emerged from stakeholder debates and scientific enquiry: tougher law enforcement, moving “excess” birds from grouse moors, and feeding of harriers. Results showed that respondents, sampled from the Scottish general public, were willing to pay both for avoiding reductions in harrier populations and for increases, but that these values were lower than those associated with equivalent changes for another raptor sharing the same moorland habitat, the Golden Eagle. Respondents valued a move away from current management, but were largely indifferent to which management option was taken up, suggesting that management options should be selected in terms of relative costs, and on who bears these costs. Differences within our sample of respondents in preferences across management options emerge when a latent class model is estimated.

Introduction

Single objective land management has historically resulted in the suppression of many plant and animal species. This is most obviously so in the case of agriculture, where the desire to maximise profits from cultivation of particular crops has resulted in the use of herbicides and pesticides to reduce competition for resources and to protect yields. If these changes impact on the goals of other stakeholders, then conflicts over resources often ensue. For example, changing patterns of agricultural land use in parts of Africa have led to increased conflict between farmers and conservationists over crop raiding elephants (Thirgood et al., 2005). Understanding such conflicts requires an appreciation of the economic costs (e.g. crop losses to farmers) and benefits (e.g. non-market benefits of elephant conservation to people living outside elephant habitat) of land management, both in terms of the magnitude of these benefits and costs, and their distribution across stakeholders.

In parts of Europe, a focus on intensive game management for sport has led to changes in the abundance of many species. This is illustrated by the historical impact of managing land for hunting on predators in the UK, through poisoning, shooting or trapping (Lovegrove, 2007). The management of Red Grouse (Lagopus lagopus scotticus) in the UK uplands provides a case in point. Management of moorlands for Red Grouse shooting since the mid 19th Century has led to declines in many species of predators, and the extirpation of five species of raptor (Newton, 1998). The aim of grouse management is to maximise numbers of birds available for shooting in the autumn. This management involves a mixture of vegetation management (e.g. heather burning) and predator control (Hudson and Newborn, 1995). There is some evidence to suggest that grouse shooting provides economic benefits to rural communities (McGilvary, 1995, PACEC, 2006), as well as conservation benefits because it retains heather moorland (Robertson et al., 2001) and associated wading birds where well-practised (Thompson et al., 1995, Tharme et al., 2001).

One particular conflict which has arisen in this context concerns the management of Hen Harriers (Circus cyaneus) on sporting estates. Hen Harriers are a medium-sized bird of prey which breed on heather moorlands in the uplands. They are Red Listed due to population declines in the last 200 years (Baillie et al., 2009). Most recent data reveals spatial variation in population trends, with a 41% increase in the UK and Isle of Man during 1998–2004, but with decreases on moorland managed for grouse shooting in the Southern Uplands, east Highlands and northern England (Sim et al., 2007). There are roughly 633 pairs in Scotland at present. Hen Harriers have been protected by law since 1954, but illegal killing has occurred due to the economic costs of Hen Harriers to grouse moor managers.

The economic costs to grouse moor owners arise because harriers prey on grouse (Thirgood et al., 2000). Arguments between the conservation lobby and the sporting estate community have become polarised over time (Redpath et al., 2004, Thirgood and Redpath, 2008). Evidence shows that (i) Hen Harrier densities can increase to the extent that they make management for grouse shooting economically unviable; (ii) illegal killing has resulted in a suppression of harrier populations in both England and Scotland (Etheridge et al., 1997, Sim et al., 2007); and (iii) that enforcement of current laws prohibiting lethal control has been ineffective (Thirgood and Redpath, 2008, Redpath et al., 2010). It is clear that sustainable management options should be considered more broadly (Thompson et al., 2009).

In this paper, we employ the choice experiment method to investigate public preferences for alternative management strategies for Hen Harriers on grouse moors. We view public preferences as important to the success of conflict management, since solutions are only likely to be effective in the long term if they command majority support. Non-hunting members of the public may well feel that they also have a stake in the future management of heather moorlands managed for grouse, since a legal right of recreational access to all such areas exists in Scotland, and since non-use values for wildlife and landscape associated with heather moorlands are also likely to be important. As noted by Redpath et al. (2010), a number of alternative management options have been proposed to help manage this stakeholder conflict. Three of these alternatives are dealt with here: the establishment of feeding stations, providing harriers with alternative food sources to grouse; the establishment of quotas for Hen Harrier densities on sporting estates maintained by physically moving eggs or chicks away from grouse moors to alternative locations with lower or zero harrier populations; and increasing the probability of detection of illegal persecution, by increasing police surveillance on grouse moors. These are the alternatives most under discussion by stakeholders and scientists at the present time.

Estimating people's willingness to pay for environmental goods has been in focus of mainstream ecological economics for over 30 years now, as in some cases it remains the only way of providing economic value of many environmental goods. Estimating these values is necessary for conducting cost-benefit analyses, which may provide economic arguments for conservation. In particular, there have been numerous valuation studies of improvements in the condition of endangered species. A recent meta-analysis of 43 such studies is provided by Richardson and Loomis (2009a). The authors review 67 willingness-to-pay estimates for threatened, endangered or rare species and identify major drivers of these values. The reported WTP for avoiding loses or ensuring survival of bird species are within the range or 11.38 to 130.19 $US with a mean close to 40 $US (Richardson and Loomis, 2009b).

Similarly, Martín-López et al., 2008, Jacobsen and Hanley, 2009 review a large number of studies on economic valuation of biodiversity and perform metaanalyses of these studies to determine what factors affect willingness to pay. Among other things, they find that anthropomorphic and anthropocentric characteristics, resulting from the public's attitude toward species, remain highly significant even when respondents are sufficiently informed about ‘scientific factors’ that need to be taken into consideration.

A similar consideration for valuing animal species is provided by Jacobsen et al. (2008). The authors aim at valuing environmental improvements (preserving natural habitats) using number of species as an indicator of biodiversity. In one of the two treatments of their experiment they used quantitative description of changes in the number of species, while in the other they named a few species and observed substantially higher WTP values. Since economic values are by definition anthropogenic it is understandable that so called ‘flagship species’ or ‘charismatic species’ (usually top predators or species associated with national identity or culture) will receive more attention and higher WTP values (May, 1995, Noss, 1990).

The aims of this work were to estimate public preferences and willingness to pay for the three management alternatives of Scottish moorlands outlined above. To accomplish this, a Choice Experiment was implemented using members of the Scottish general public as the sampling frame, allowing us to investigate preference heterogeneity of different groups of the public — in particular hunters and people living in rural vs. urban communities. In our choice experiment, in addition to the description of management alternatives we have included descriptions of possible population changes of Hen Harriers. To avoid a focussing bias (Kahneman, 2010) on Hen Harriers, a second raptor population — Golden Eagles (Aquila chrysaetos) — was included in the experimental design. Golden Eagles are often found in Hen Harrier habitat, and are also top predators which have been subject to illegal persecution, particularly in managed grouse moors (Watson et al., 1989, Whitfield et al., 2007, RSPB, 2006). However, note that feeding stations established for Hen Harriers are not likely to benefit Golden Eagles due to differences in feeding behaviour.

In what follows, Section 2 describes the questionnaire design and sampling methods; Section 3 provides some results, whilst a discussion and conclusion follow in Section 4.

Section snippets

Questionnaire Design and Sampling Methods

In order to elicit WTP values we constructed a postal survey questionnaire containing choice experiments. The survey instrument can be obtained from the authors on request. The survey begins by introducing respondents to the location of “the uplands” in the UK, and asking whether they have visited this area and for what reasons. The questionnaire then describes how some uplands areas are managed as grouse moors:

“About half of the heather moorlands found in the uplands are managed for grouse

Results

In the best performing model all the attributes were specified as random parameters of a normal distribution. We allowed for correlations between random parameters (which proved to be highly significant) and accounted for panel structure of our dataset (each respondent faced 6 choice-sets) by introducing a random effects type of treatment — an additional random term for all observations from the same individual. In addition, we have introduced individual heterogeneity in all random parameters’

Discussion and Conclusions

In this paper, we have used choice modelling to investigate public preferences for the management of the Hen Harrier. Public preferences matter if governments wish to partly base policy decisions over species protection and land management on an assessment of relative costs and benefits (Hanley and Barbier, 2009). Here, we show that the public is willing to pay to prevent further declines in harrier populations in Scotland, and to increase these populations. To avoid a potential bias from

Acknowledgements

We thank Simon Thirgood for his help in developing the questionnaire used in this research. Simon passed away before this work was completed. We also thank two referees for their useful comments, and seminar participants at DICE, University of Kent.

This project is supported by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which

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